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Editors’ Note
Following the success of William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum—Volume I published 
in 2012, the Institute of Competition Law is proud to release the second volume of 
this book within the European tradition of Liber Amicorum. 
In witnessing the constant growth of antitrust regimes around the world and in reco-
gnizing the significant role played by William Kovacic in favoring the antitrust dialogue 
at the international level, this Volume II pays tribute to Professor Kovacic’s outstanding 
career offering a unique combination of theoretical insights and practical knowledge 
of competition and antitrust law issues worldwide.
In this Volume II, thirty-seven prominent authors signed twenty-seven contributions 
that tackle some of the most stimulating and current topics in competition policy and 
antitrust laws. 
PART I, entitled “The InTernaTIonal DImensIon of CompeTITIon polICy,” includes 
twelve articles that offer a dynamic overview of international competition policy.  Thus, 
Jonathan Baker reviews Kovacic’s work on the design of antitrust enforcement insti-
tutions analyzing how antitrust norms exhibit continuity over the time; Doris Hildebrand, 
stemming from Kovacic’s advocacy for convergence, discusses how the US/EU divide 
can be surpassed by superior norms; Florian Wagner-von Papp delineates a comparison 
between the US antitrust laws and EU competition law pointing out some thoughts on 
the importance of defining the relationship between antitrust law on the federal (or 
EU) level and antitrust laws on (Member) state level; Jacques Steenbergen offers some 
reflections on legitimacy, accountability and independence of competition authorities; 
Maureen Ohlhausen discusses the recommendations in the “FTC at 100 Report” for 
improving agency performance;  John Briggs and Donald Baker suggest a critical 
revision of the US antitrust policy and administration to join the rest of the world; 
Marc Winerman steps into the past discussing the international issues arising when the 
FTC first opened its doors and even before; Bruno Lasserre highlights successes and 
challenges of the European Competition Network; Wouter Wils gives a retrospective 
Nicolas Charbit
Elisa Ramundo
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analysis of the EC Regulation 1/2013, after ten years since its enactment; Ali Nikpay 
tries to assess the OFT’s performance by reference to the analytical framework set 
down by Kovacic on agency effectiveness; Julían Peña outlines the role of international 
cooperation in the development of competition law in Latin America; Ian McEwin 
delves into the existing connection between business, politics and competition law in 
Southeast Asia.
The fifteen articles of PART II, entitled “ComplexITIes of anTITrusT rules arounD 
The WorlD”, guide readers through some of the intricacies in the application of 
antitrust rules in different countries around the world.  In Part II, John Terzaken and 
Molly Kelley analyze the expanding role of behavioral remedies in cartel enforcements; 
Damien Geradin and Laurie-Anne Grelier offer some critical considerations on the EU 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Claims; Omar Guerrero and Alan Ramírez explore 
how effective criminal cartel provisions could be to deter cartel behavior; Robert 
Marshall and Leslie Marx discuss compliance with Section 1 of the Sherman Act from 
an economic perspective; Caron Beaton Wells, drawing on the Australian experience, 
tests effectiveness of a range of leniency policies; Eleanor Fox and Merit Janow, by 
examining the Vitamin C cartel case, set forth the main points at which trade and 
competition ought to meet; Andy Chen analyzes impacts and implications arising from 
the LCD cartel case for the Taiwanese competition policy; Simon Roberts reviews the 
approach of the South African Competition Commission to uncovering collusion in 
the construction sector and draws out some lessons for establishing new institutions; 
Patrick Rey and Thibaud Vergé outline vertical restraints treatment in the EU; Andreas 
Mundt conducts an insightful digression on some forms of vertical restraints vis-à-vis 
the rapid development of the Internet economy; Daniel Crane provides some analytical 
clarity on the legal rules governing predatory innovations claims; Joseph Kattan and 
Chris Wood explain the standard-essential patents and the related problem of hold-up; 
Margaret Bloom discusses convergence and cooperation in international merger control; 
Joshua Wright and Jan Rybnicek advocate for a more committed consideration of the 
evolution of out-of-market efficiencies in the US and around the world; George Cary 
and Elaine Ewing consider what can the  US/EU experience in the merger context tell 
us about convergence with MOFCOM.
Volume II, with its 27 papers, takes readers around the world providing them with 
provoking reflections, insightful thoughts, and learning experiences on competition 
policy and antitrust laws.  This is the same world that Bill Kovacic has traveled so 
much to share knowledge and favor dialogue among different players in the international 
antitrust arena.
The editors would like to give their sincere thanks to the thirty-seven authors for their 
hours of labor in dedication to the Volume II of this Liber Amicorum and to Anna 
Pavlik and Jessica Rebarber for their precious editorial assistance.
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Comparative Antitrust Federalism  
and the Error-Cost Framework or:  
Rhetoric and Reality:  
You Protect Competitors,  
We Protect Competition –  
Except When We Protect Competitors
Florian waGner-von PaPP*
f.wagner-von-papp@ucl.ac.uk
Director of the UCL Institute of Global Law and the UCL Centre for Law and Economics, London
Abstract
The aim of this contribution is threefold.  First, it seeks to contribute to a more fine-grained comparison 
between US antitrust and EU competition law by (selectively) including state antitrust laws as well as 
laws that pursue objectives different from the antitrust laws but interfere with the aims of the antitrust 
laws, such as sale-below-cost statutes, car dealer and franchise statutes, or general contract law inva-
lidating resale price maintenance agreements (“non-antitrust laws”). 
Secondly, the paper highlights the degree to which such state antitrust laws and non-antitrust laws may 
interfere with the error-cost framework employed in antitrust law, which finely balances Type I and 
Type II errors. 
Thirdly, as a consequence of the first two points, the paper seeks to raise awareness of the importance 
of clearly defining the relationship between antitrust law on the federal (or EU) level and antitrust laws 
as well as non-antitrust laws on the (Member) state level.  Neither the US approach nor the current 
EU approach to this relationship are considered satisfactory.
*  I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Cédric Argenton, John Kallaugher, Giorgio Monti, Mel Marquis, Philip 
Marsden, Natalie St. Cyr-Clarke, Christopher Townley, Angela Zhang as well as the participants of the workshop 
at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and those at the MaCCI Annual Conference 2014, Germany, 
for very helpful comments.  I am indebted to the editors of this volume for their patience, their willingness to accept 
last-minute changes, and smooth handling of the editorial process. Somewhat unusually for a Liber Amicorum, I 
also have to thank the friend to be honored, Bill Kovacic, for comments—as I explain below (infra text at and in 
note 3), I simply could not find a conference to present the working paper without Bill being present.  I hope this 
did not ruin the surprise for him.
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I. Introduction
When choosing a topic for a Liber Amicorum, one usually first has to do some research 
to find a more or less tenuous relationship between one’s current research interests and 
those of the friend to be honored.  With Bill Kovacic, such research is fortunately not 
necessary.  He has written on every conceivable antitrust topic, and frequently in an 
international context.  As a consequence, one can practically blindly choose a topic 
and jurisdiction, find the corresponding contribution by Bill Kovacic, and pretend to 
have thought long and hard about a fitting topic.  It is much like painting a bull’s eye 
around the bullet hole after shooting blindfolded at the barn door.
1. Shooting at the Barn Door: The Scope of the Contribution
This contribution will revisit modern antitrust concern with avoiding type I errors 
(false positives, rejecting a true null hypothesis) from a comparative US-EU perspec-
tive.  There is, of course, no dearth of such comparisons in the existing literature.  This 
contribution seeks to distinguish itself by going beyond the comparison between the 
federal antitrust rules in the US and the supranational competition rules of the EU by 
including—albeit very selectively—state law and non-antitrust rules in the comparison. 
From a comparative law perspective, the inclusion of both aspects seems necessary to 
go beyond the “law in the books” and to understand the “law in action.” 
My argument can be summarized in the following bullet points. 
• Since the late 1970s, US federal antitrust law has made considerable efforts to 
restrict itself to cases in which a credible theory of harm can be advanced.  Where 
conduct does not and is not likely to harm competition, it should not be prohibited. 
Prohibiting or chilling such conduct itself restricts competition.  Not only the 
under-enforcement of antitrust laws, but also their over-enforcement is detrimental 
to the very competition they are designed to protect.
• This development has, for the greater part, been confined to the federal antitrust 
laws.  Legal comparisons often focus on antitrust laws of the jurisdictions to be 
compared.  Whether or not a foreign (non-US) antitrust law has struck the right 
error-cost balance is usually measured against the perceived gold standard of 
federal US antitrust law.  The refinements in antitrust doctrine using the error-cost 
framework are very much part of the “rhetoric” of US antitrust advocacy abroad.
• From the perspective of comparative law, however, a superficial comparison 
implicit in the comparison of individual fields of law (comparing the “antitrust 
laws” in jurisdictions A and B) does not conform to best practice.  A legal compa-
rison has to consider real-life scenarios and take into account all functional 
equivalents applicable to these scenarios, including rules such as those on 
contracts, consumer protection, and, in particular, unfair competition—and federal 
as well as state law.  Where, for example, resale price maintenance or unilateral 
conduct by a non-dominant firm is prohibited, the affected firm will only be mildly 
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interested in knowing whether it is antitrust law, regulation, unfair competition 
law, or contract law that prohibits the conduct, or whether the prohibition derives 
from federal law or state law (although it may, of course, still be interested in the 
differences with regard to the geographic scope, and in whether these prohibitions 
are enforced and sanctioned differently).
• Taking functional equivalents into account, the gap between the ostensibly very 
permissive US antitrust laws and jurisdictions with a more interventionist approach 
in their antitrust laws is narrowed, especially due to the influence of American 
state law.
• The recognition that these functional equivalents interfere with the sensitive 
error-cost balance struck by the federal antitrust laws suggests a policy response 
at or between the two extreme ends of a sliding scale. 
• Either the existence of interventionist functional equivalents that complement 
the non-interventionist federal antitrust laws even in US law is seen as 
evidence that there is a pressing need for some restrictive interference beyond 
the scope of the antitrust laws.  In other words, the descriptive statement 
that there is such complementary, more interventionist, law could result in 
the normative recommendation to retain or provide for such legislation. 
This is a possible, but of course not a logically conclusive inference—as 
any Is-Ought reasoning, it would be fallacious to determine the normative 
question by looking only at what is actually happening.
• At the other end of the scale, the error-cost balance struck by the federal 
antitrust laws could be considered to be the normatively correct position. 
If that is the case, it should be applied to the functional equivalents as well. 
Proponents of this position would, for example, argue for the pre-emption 
of conflicting state law by the federal antitrust laws because the latter not 
only passively refrain from condemning conduct that is not considered 
anticompetitive, but have made an affirmative choice to uphold such conduct 
as legal and desirable.
• Apart from the two-dimensional comparison between two jurisdictions, the third 
dimension that is relevant for the comparison between US and EU law has already 
been touched upon in the previous bullet points: the issue of antitrust federalism. 
The distinction between “pure” antitrust laws and “meddlesome” functional 
equivalents of the “antitrust light” variety maps nearly, albeit not exactly, on the 
federal-state distinction in the US and the EU-Member State distinction in the 
European Union.  As an example recognizable by both US and EU lawyers, one 
could mention the area of unilateral conduct.  In the US, it is in particular state 
laws such as state franchise relationship laws and sales-below-cost laws that 
prohibit certain competitive unilateral conduct below the threshold of monopoly 
power.  In the EU, it is mostly Member States’ law that addresses such unilateral 
conduct, generally under the heading “economic dependency.”  This raises, at 
least partly, the question to what extent federal US or supranational EU law should 
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“preempt” state laws.1  The fact that functional equivalents that can interfere with 
federal/EU antitrust rules can be unfair competition laws, contract law rules, tort 
law rules, etc. makes any attempt at preserving the balance struck at the federal/
EU level a formidable one.  Parts VII and VIII of this contribution address this 
issue.
2. Painting the Bull’s Eye: Bill Kovacic
What remains for the introduction is painting the bull’s eye around the bullet hole: 
how does all this tie in with Bill Kovacic’s interests? 
Bill Kovacic has never contented himself with superficial legal comparisons,2 and he 
has always distanced himself from the “one size fits all” attitude that is sometimes 
associated with US antitrust advocacy.  He has travelled widely—I have yet to attend 
a conference of any significance anywhere in the world where I do not meet him3—
advised foreign jurisdictions on competition law, policy, and advocacy, and he has 
always made a point of first understanding each jurisdiction’s institutional background 
before making nuanced policy recommendations.4 
He has on numerous occasions compared US and EU antitrust policies, pointed out 
the similarities and differences, and taken into account the institutional differences 
between the two systems.5  More particularly he has highlighted the preference of the 
US courts to err on the side of non-intervention in monopolization cases, and noted 
the absence of such a preference in the EU.6 
1 I have put “preempt” in quotation marks because the European Union concept of supremacy of EU law is not 
usually called preemption, and the scope and consequences of federal preemption in the United States differ from 
those of the European concept.
2 For more detail on Bill Kovacic’s contribution to comparative antitrust law, see Andre Fiebig, The Normative Limits 
of Comparative Competition Law, in william e. kovacic – an antitrust triBute, liBer amicorum – volume i 
329, 330, 336 (Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo, Anna Chehtova & Abigail Slater eds., 2012). 
3 On the top of my head, I remember meeting him at conferences and workshops in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and the United States, and I am sure I would have met him in most 
other countries of the world if only my travel budget did not put limits to my own radius.  A colleague of mine has 
speculated that Bill Kovacic must have been cloned to achieve omnipresence at simultaneous conferences around 
the globe.  My only doubt that this is true derives from the experience of one conference at Columbia Law School 
in 2012, where Bill Kovacic was a speaker but made his presentation on speaker phone.  It says a lot about Bill 
Kovacic’s rhetorical skill that even at that conference he clearly dominated the room.
4 See William E. Kovacic, Lucky Trip? Perspectives from a Foreign Advisor on Competition Policy, Development 
and Technical Assistance, 3 eur. comPetition J. 319 (2007); for an example, see William E. Kovacic & Ben Slay, 
Perilous beginnings: the establishment of antimonopoly and consumer protection programs in the Republic of 
Georgia, 43 antitrust Bull. 15 (1998).  See also FieBiG, supra note 2.
5 E.g. William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or 
Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, DC (June 2, 2008).
6 Ibid. at 11: “At the margin, US courts have tended to say that courts and enforcement agencies commit greater 
errors by intervening too much rather than too little. This perspective does not appear in EU jurisprudence or in 
speeches by EU enforcement officials.”
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He is also one of the very few who has emphasized the impact of non-antitrust rules 
when assessing competition policy.7  In this respect, “unfair competition” provisions 
in particular may interfere with the error-cost framework of antitrust because they 
prohibit unilateral conduct below the threshold of dominance.  Most of the (primarily 
state) rules I will consider below as irritants to the error-cost framework of antitrust 
are sold to the public as unfair competition rules or consumer protection rules.  The 
relationship between antitrust and unfair competition law/consumer protection rules 
is clearly a topic very close to Bill’s heart.  On numerous occasions he has extolled 
the virtues of institutionally joining antitrust and unfair competition/consumer protec-
tion lawyers under one roof,8 because antitrust and consumer protection rules ideally 
coexist in a mutually beneficial symbiosis,9 and—as Bill’s friend, former colleague at 
George Mason University, and one of his predecessors as Chairman of the FTC Tim 
Muris pointed out—“robust competition is the best single means for protecting 
consumer interests.”10  However, Bill has also emphasized that it is insufficient to put 
antitrust lawyers and consumer protection lawyers physically under one roof—it is the 
policies that need to be integrated.11  Consumer protection and antitrust should work 
hand in hand to the benefit of consumers, but, as Bill has pointed out, this is not always 
7 William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in comPetition laws in conFlict 316, 320 (Richard 
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (“Academics, policymakers, and practitioners are becoming increasingly 
aware that the decisions of bodies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Patent and Trademark Office, 
and the Department of Defense deeply influence business rivalry—perhaps as much as the enforcement of traditional 
antitrust rules.”).
8 E.g., William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and the Assignment of Regulatory Tasks, in the reGu-
latory revolution at the Ftc: a thirty-year PersPective on comPetition and consumer Protection 25 (James 
C. Cooper ed., 2013); William E. Kovacic, The digital broadband migration and the Federal Trade Commission: 
Building the competition and consumer protection agency of the future, 8 J. on telecomm. & hiGh tech. l. 1, 12 
(2010); William E. Kovacic, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency and the hazards of regulatory restructu-
ring, lomBard street, September 14, 2009, at 19, 21, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/090914h
azzrdsrestructuring.pdf; also cf. statement suBmitted For the record By commissioner william e. kovacic on 
the ProPosal to create a consumer Financial Protection aGency to the committee on enerGy & commerce 
and the committee on Financial services us house oF rePresentatives (July 28, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/kovacic/090728stmtrecord.pdf.
9 Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the future development of US Consumer Protection Policy, 
Aspen Summit Cyberspace and the American Dream, The Progress and Freedom Foundation, (August 19, 2003) 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.shtm [hereinafter Muris, Aspen Remarks]: “Both consumer 
protection and competition serve the common aim of improving consumer welfare, and they naturally complement 
each other.”
10 Muris, Aspen Remarks, note 9; Timothy J. Muris, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection, Prepared 
remarks at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s twenty-ninth annual conference on international antitrust law 
and policy (31 October 2002), at 7, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/021031fordham.pdf.  For an elaboration 
on how competition protects consumers, see Mark Armstrong, Interactions between competition and consumer 
policy, 4(1) comPetition Policy international 97, 100-106 (but see also ibid. at 109-112, summarizing various 
problems that in practice impede intermediaries, such as price comparison sites, from providing the best informa-
tion).
11 Kovacic, in reGulatory revolution, supra note 8, at 28; see also Interview with William E. Kovacic, General 
Council, Federal Trade Commission, the antitrust source January 2004, 1, 3 [hereinafter, the 2004 Interview]: 
“A third priority . . . is to promote the realization of the benefits of the Commission’s distinctive combination of 
functions—to further integrate the application of the agency’s competition and consumer protection authority and 
pursue projects that exploit synergies between the two missions.”; Interview with William E. Kovacic, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission, the antitrust source August 2008, 1, 14 [hereinafter, the 2008 Kovacic Interview]: 
“I am even more convinced than I was four years ago that the FTC can improve its performance significantly by 
building stronger links between the competition and consumer protection dimensions of its statutory mandates.”, 
and, ibid. at 15: “Recognition of this condition compels the agency to take more steps internally to ensure that 
connections between our competition and consumer protection capabilities are drawn.”; Stéphanie Yon & William 
E. Kovacic, Interview - William Kovacic: A new chairman for the FTC, concurrences No 3-2008, 5, 6: “A fourth 
significant change [scil.: in the FTC compared to 30 years earlier] has taken the form of greater efforts to achieve 
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the case;12 there is often “friction”.13  The argument in this contribution is essentially 
that unfair competition policy and consumer protection that is not well coordinated 
with antitrust policy may upset the fine balance between the legal framework that 
antitrust law sets for the firms (the “rules of the game”) on the one hand, and the 
otherwise unrestricted space for independent action by the players within that framework 
(the “players’ game moves”) on the other.  Bill Kovacic has pointed to this detrimental 
effect of ill-conceived consumer protection rules in the past.14
Going even more to the core concern of this contribution, the danger of ignoring the 
law in action on the state level, is Bill Kovacic’s dissent in N-Data Solutions, where 
he pointed out that the majority of Commissioners disregarded the unintended reper-
cussions which the decision might have once the states applied similar standards under 
their corresponding state antitrust laws: 
The Commission overlooks how the proposed settlement could affect the 
application of state statutes that are modeled on the FTC Act. . . .  The federal 
and state . . . systems do not operate in watertight compartments. As commen-
tators have documented the federal and state regimes are interdependent. . . . 
[S]tates might incorporate the theories of liability in the settlement and order 
proposed here into their own . . . jurisprudence.  A number of states that 
employ this incorporation principle have authorized private parties to enforce 
their . . . statutes in suits that permit the court to impose treble damages for 
infringements.  If the Commission desires to deny the reasoning of its approach 
to private treble damages litigants, the proposed settlement does not neces-
sarily do so.15 
This tribute to Bill Kovacic attempts to follow in his footsteps and bring a little more 
nuance to the comparison of “US” and “EU” antitrust law by integrating state laws 
and non-antitrust laws.
more integration of the agency’s competition policy and consumer protection capabilities.  There is a growing 
realization that in a number of sectors, such as health care and financial services, the FTC can achieve superior 
outcomes by joining up knowledge that comes from the study of both supply side (the competition policy emphasis) 
and demand side (the consumer protection policy emphasis) perspectives.”
12 2008 Kovacic Interview, note 11, at 15 (noting that “[t]he cultures of the two fields sometimes conflict”).
13 2008 Kovacic Interview, note 11, at 15.
14 E.g., 2008 Kovacic Interview, note 11, at 15 (noting that “if an agency imposes ever more restrictive standards 
concerning advertising and various forms of marketing practices, it is possible that the agency will stifle the rivalry 
and new entry that are important sources of protection for consumers”).  Similarly Muris, Aspen Remarks, note 9 
(“Consumer protection policy that ignores the impact on competition can result in a cure worse than the disease.”), 
and Armstrong, note 10, 115 (explaining how the removal of restrictions on—truthful—advertising may increase 
competition).
15 dissentinG statement oF commissioner william e. kovacic, in the matter oF neGotiated data solutions, LLC, 
File No. 051-0094.
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II. The Problem of Over-Enforcement 
and Functional Equivalents
Antitrust law has long recognized that over-enforcement can be as much of a problem 
as under-enforcement.  It is important for antitrust law to prohibit those private restric-
tions that harm competition—but no more than that.  The costs of type I and type II 
errors have to be brought into a balance.16  If we prohibit non-restrictive conduct, this 
stifles permissible forms of competition and therefore restricts competition itself.  This 
may be just as harmful to competition in the market as a private restraint would 
be—or even more harmful, because state restraints are less prone to being undermined 
by the self-correcting forces of competition.17  As long as conduct does not harm 
competition, firms should have an unrestricted action space to choose their strategies 
independently, because competition, like any other evolutionary process, generally 
thrives when there is variation.
In the following parts of the contribution, I will assess various competitive restraints 
in turn.  For each of these restraints, I will first outline the assessment under federal 
US antitrust law, which reflects the concern with type I errors and over-enforcement. 
I will then describe the European position, which is generally more interventionist 
than the US position, with a greater focus on avoiding type II errors (false negatives). 
I will keep the description of the US and EU positions as brief as possible, because at 
this level there is an abundance of legal comparisons.  At this level, the big picture is 
that Europe still is, or at least traditionally has been, interventionist without proper 
regard to the danger of over-deterrence, while the United States has adopted a framework 
that provides firms with the necessary free space for action while intervening selecti-
vely only in those instances where a well-founded theory of harm can be advanced 
16 For a recent detailed overview of the genesis and development of the error-framework analysis in US antitrust law, 
see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s wrong with Antitrust’s Right, social 
science research network (September 30, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333736.  While the main thrust of 
Baker’s argument is against a further re-balancing towards a preference for type II errors, and that occasionally the 
adjustment may have gone too far in that direction, he does not deny that a balancing is necessary and that the more 
interventionist antitrust era “had in general likely chilled cost reductions and other efficiency-enhancing conduct.” 
For early error-cost framework approaches, see Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing 
Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 yale l.J. 213, 222 et seq. (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 
texas l. rev. 1, 10, 15 et seq. (1984); see also the further references in Baker (cited at the start of this note) in 
his note 16.  In my contribution, I am not taking a position on whether the US or the EU have gone too far (see 
Baker, op. cit.; american antitrust institute (“aai”), the next antitrust aGenda 55-93 (Albert E. Foer ed., 
2008)), not far enough (for example, because vertical restraints are still treated under a rule of reason and not as 
per se legal, as roBert h. Bork, the antitrust Paradox: a Policy at war with itselF 297 (1978, and rev. ed. 
1993) had recommended), or have hit the mark.  I agree with Baker (ibid.) that there was a time when the balance 
was clearly tilted too much towards avoiding type II errors, but, as Bill Kovacic has pointed out, a lot has changed 
since then, and “[a] proper appreciation for these trends ought to inspire caution before one embraces the propo-
sition that US antitrust doctrine and policy today expose dominant firms to significant, systematic risks attributable 
to over-inclusive liability rules.”  statement oF Ftc chairman william e. kovacic, modern us comPetition law 
and the treatment oF dominant Firms: comments on the dePartment oF Justice and Federal trade commission 
ProceedinGs relatinG to section 2 oF the sherman act (Sept. 8, 2008).  My point is a different one: regardless 
where one strikes the balance, the considerations supporting this balance should be consistently applied across the 
boundaries of legal fields. 
17 In other words, antitrust enforcement may in itself become a “public restraint on competition.” On the need to 
tackle such restraints, see James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, US Convergence with International Norms: 
Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.u.l. rev. 1555 (2010).
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and requires intervention.  This widely held view is well encapsulated in the expression 
“we protect competition, you protect competitors”18—a sentiment that is rarely openly 
stated but is the elephant in the room whenever comparative EU and US antitrust law, 
especially on unilateral conduct, is discussed.19  Comparisons that go deeper enquire 
into the different institutional background, such as the market-integration objective in 
the EU, or the different ideological foundation on which the antitrust laws are built. 
However, generally they do not question the internalization of the error-cost framework 
in US law.
A closer look will show both that there was a greater understanding of the over-
enforcement problem in Europe than it is generally credited for, and, conversely, that 
in actual practice US American law is sometimes not as true to the error-cost framework 
as the US federal antitrust rhetoric wants to make us believe.  As mentioned above, 
the reason for the divergence between rhetoric and reality is that a legal comparison 
cannot focus exclusively on the limited field of antitrust rules, but has to include 
functional equivalents.
In comparative law, the traditional functionalist approach is to identify a real-life 
problem and search for rules in the various legal systems that address this problem 
(“functional equivalents”).20  Experience shows that quite often—though not inva-
riably—different legal systems reach similar solutions by different routes.21  Functional 
equivalents may come in unlikely guises.  What is a procedural rule in one jurisdiction 
may be a substantive question in another jurisdiction.  What may be a contract law 
question in one jurisdiction may be a tort, unjust enrichment, property, or family law 
question in another jurisdiction.  And what is an antitrust question in one jurisdiction 
may be an unfair competition, regulatory, business tort, or contract law question in 
another jurisdiction.  These functional equivalents become more readily apparent when 
one engages in a comparative analysis—or when one has to deal with a conflict of 
laws case—but they should be of concern to lawyers interested in purely domestic 
cases as well, especially in the antitrust context.  The reason why functional equivalents 
should be of particular concern in the antitrust context is precisely the danger of 
over-enforcement.  If antitrust law is as much concerned with false positives as it is 
with false negatives, then it must also be concerned about false positives created by 
rules that are not part of the “antitrust laws” but are functionally equivalent.
18 This is the title of an article by Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26(2) world 
comPetition 149-165 (2003).
19 See kovacic, supra note 5, at 8: “EU officials also have grown accustomed to hearing, by direct quotation or 
paraphrase, the US Supreme Court’s admonition that the proper aim of antitrust law is ‘the protection of competi-
tion, not competitors.’ ” (citations omitted).
20 Generally, konrad ZweiGert & hein kötZ, introduction to comParative law 34-40 (3rd rev. ed. 1998); see also 
Ralf Michaels The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in the oxFord handBook oF comParative law 340-343, 
363-381 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
21 This is the famous or—depending on one’s standpoint—notorious praesumptio similitudinis (see Zweigert & Kötz, 
ibid, at 40; for a critical discussion cf. Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, 
in the oxFord handBook oF comParative law 383-419 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006)). 
The controversy around this presumption is wholly artificial.  It was always conceived as a working hypothesis, 
and no more. 
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The following parts of this contribution will look at vertical non-price distribution 
restraints, vertical price restraints, and various unilateral conduct prohibitions in turn. 
Each of these parts will be structured in the same way, namely by describing:
 - First, the position of US federal antitrust law, which reflect the position of concep-
tual purity; 
 - Secondly, the situation in Europe, which can be criticized in many respects for 
paying too little attention to the problem of over-enforcement and the attendant 
chilling of pro-competitive conduct; and
 - Thirdly, the functional equivalents in the United States that (sometimes conside-
rably) narrow the gap between the conceptually pure error-cost framework 
position of the federal antitrust laws and the inferior European rules. 
I would like to emphasize at the outset what I do not want to do: 
 - I do not want to suggest that the functional equivalents that I mention make US 
law overall equally restrictive as, or even more restrictive than, European law. 
In some limited instances, this may be the case, but in general I suspect that 
European rules are overall more restrictive.  In some cases, the American state 
laws I mention exist only in a small minority of states; in other cases, restrictive 
state laws cover only a small sub-set of conduct that may be prohibited more 
broadly in Europe.
 - Nor do I want to suggest that we should not be concerned with over-enforcement 
in Europe, or that because there are functional equivalents in the United States 
for many of the restrictive rules in European law, these rules necessarily satisfy 
an imperative need for such restrictions. On the very contrary.  
The point I do want to make is that antitrust lawyers that are concerned with over-
enforcement need to pay attention to functional equivalents outside the scope of the 
federal or supranational antitrust laws—on both sides of the Atlantic.  This requires 
thinking about the relationship between federal/EU antitrust rules on the one hand, 
and state antitrust laws or non-antitrust laws on the other hand.
III. Vertical Non-Price Restraints
1. The Position of Conceptual Purity:  
GTE Sylvania and Germany in 1958
Antitrust law has long emphasized that different distribution strategies may compete 
with one another, and that prohibiting some of these distribution strategies on the basis 
that they restrict intrabrand competition may stifle interbrand competition, in particular 
the competition for the most efficient distribution strategy.  While some non-price 
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vertical restraints were initially treated as per se violations,22 GTE Sylvania famously 
acknowledged in 1977 the need for competition between distribution schemes with a 
switch from a per se illegality rule to a rule of reason analysis for such restraints in 
the United States: 
The market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their poten-
tial for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation 
of interbrand competition. . . .  Although intrabrand competition may be 
reduced, the ability of retailers to exploit the resulting market may be limited 
both by the ability of consumers to travel to other franchised locations and, 
perhaps more importantly, to purchase the competing products of other 
manufacturers. . . .  Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by 
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution 
of his products. . . .  [N]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new 
markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive 
retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often 
required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer.  Established 
manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional 
activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient 
marketing of their products. . . .  Because of market imperfections such as the 
so-called “free rider” effect, these services might not be provided by retailers 
in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer’s benefit 
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did. . . .  Economists 
also have argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining 
as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution 
of their products. 23
From a comparative perspective, one could add that at least one European jurisdiction 
was actually some 20 years ahead of the United States with regard to vertical non-price 
distribution restrictions.  German antitrust law treated vertical non-price distribution 
restrictions in principle as per se legal as early as 1958.24  The German competition 
authorities were authorized to declare restrictive vertical distribution agreements 
unenforceable and prohibit their future use only in circumstances where the extent of 
their use “substantially impaired competition on the market.”25  This provided the firms 
with even more legal certainty than the rule of reason approach practiced today in the 
22 “Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas 
or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.”  United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
23 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51-55 (1977).
24 See § 18 of the German ARC of 1958, which was renumbered as § 16 ARC in the 6th Amendment of 1999; since 
2005, Germany has replaced this provision by copy-pasting the EU system of a prohibition-in-principle coupled 
with a relatively permissive block exemption (or legal exception in the individual case), see §§ 1, 2 ARC 2005/2013. 
Before 1958, German courts frequently tried to treat vertical restraints under a rule of reason, but felt constrained 
by the US precedent that was applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the Allied decartelization laws then in force in 
Germany.  For a contemporary assessment and overview of the muddled case law, see Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, 
Dekartellierung und Wettbewerb in der Rechtsprechung der deutschen Gerichte, 9 ordo - JahrBuch Für die 
ordnunG von wirtschaFt und GesellschaFt 99, 122-127 (1957).
25 § 18 of the German ARC of 1958 (= § 16 ARC 1999).
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United States, because the prohibition would only apply ex nunc once the competition 
authority had declared the agreement unenforceable and prohibited it for the future.26 
It is true, however, that the German freedom to engage in such distribution schemes 
without fear of intervention became limited as soon as the practice had the capability 
to affect trade between Member States of the European Union (or more precisely then, 
European Communities27).  If that was the case, the European Treaty rules applied 
concurrently to the German rules, and, as outlined immediately below, the European 
rules used to be much more restrictive.  All this is history, however, since the European 
rules eventually underwent a change to a relatively permissive regime in 1999, and 
Germany subsequently adopted the European scheme in 2005.
2. Europe:  Lagging Behind, but Catching Up
The approach to vertical restraints on the EU level was traditionally much more 
restrictive than in the United States: vertical distribution restraints were treated with 
hostility, in particular where they interfered with the European market-integration 
objective,28 even though the German government had submitted the arguments for 
more lenient treatment of vertical restraints based on the distinction between interbrand 
and intrabrand competition to the Court.29 
The old vertical Block Exemption Regulations tended to address tightly compartmen-
talized vertical practices, and to dictate rigidly the clauses that firms could use (“white 
clauses”), or could not use (“black clauses”) in their distribution agreements.30  These 
regulations turned out to be “straitjackets” for distribution systems; distribution agree-
26 Nor did the competition authorities often make use of the possibility to prohibit vertical non-price distribution 
strategies.  In practice, the greater stumbling block proved to be a statutory form requirement for all—including 
vertical—restrictive agreements (§ 34 ARC 1958: such agreements had to be in writing).  This often caught 
unsophisticated parties unawares, and was not infrequently used to wiggle out of bad bargains, until the form 
requirement was eventually repealed.
27 In the following, I will use EU or European Union even when referring to the pre-Lisbon European Communities.
28 Case 56 and 58/64 (Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission) [1966] ECR 
(English edition) 299, 339 (refusing to exclude vertical restraints from what is today Article 101 TFEU because 
the Treaty makes no distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints), 340 (“Finally, an agreement between 
producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might 
be such as to frustrate the most fundamental objections of the Community.  The Treaty, whose preamble and content 
aim at abolishing the barriers between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude 
with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct such barriers.  Article [101(1)] is 
designed to pursue this aim, even in the case of agreements between undertakings placed at different levels in the 
economic process.”).
29 Ibid. 342: “The applicants and the German Government maintain that since the Commission restricted its exami-
nation solely to Grundig products the decision was based upon a false concept of competition and of the rules on 
prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) [101(1)], since this concept applies particularly to competition between 
similar products of different makes; the Commission, before declaring Article [101(1)] to be applicable, should, 
by basing itself upon the ‘rule of reason,’ have considered the economic effects of the disputed contract upon 
competition between the different makes.  There is a presumption that vertical sole distributorship agreements are 
not harmful to competition and in the present case there is nothing to invalidate that presumption.  On the contrary, 
the contract in question has increased the competition between similar products of different makes.”
30 See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements, [1983] O.J. L173/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing 
agreements, [1983] O.J. L173/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the applica-
tion of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, 
[1985] O.J. L15/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements [1988] O.J. L359/46. 
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ments mostly copied the permissible clauses from the Block Exemption Regulations 
to ensure their compatibility with competition law; there was little room for creativity.
It was only over the past 15 years that this approach has been considerably relaxed.31 
The new vertical block exemption regulations (and accompanying guidelines) provide 
for a relatively permissive system.32  While even harmless vertical agreements may 
still be found to contain clauses that restrict competition in the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU, the newer vertical block exemption regulations largely exempt vertical 
restraints across the board,33 provided the market share thresholds are not exceeded34 
and the agreement does not contain any of the black-listed hardcore restrictions.35 
Even where the block exemption regulation does not apply, it is still possible to esta-
blish that the restriction is legally excepted under Article 101(3) TFEU if its require-
ments are fulfilled in the individual case.36  The effects on interbrand and intrabrand 
competition are fully acknowledged, and efficiencies achieved by vertical restraints 
are taken into account.37
Nevertheless, remaining differences between the EU approach and the US approach 
are often criticized as based on a poor understanding of antitrust principles.38  The 
market integration objective is still mentioned in a prominent position.39  The rules on 
online distribution are considered to be too restrictive.40  The vertical Block Exemption 
31 For an overview of the development of EU law on vertical restraints, see Gianluca Faella, Vertical Agreements, in 
handBook on euroPean comPetition law – suBstantive asPects 174, 189-194 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin 
eds., 2013); for a description of the current law, see ibid., at 194-216.
32 First: Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [1999] O.J. L336/21, and since June 1, 2010: 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [2010] O.J. 
L102/1, with the accompanying Guidelines on vertical restraints, [2010] O.J. C130/1.
33 Article 2 Regulation (EU) 330/2010.
34 Article 3 Regulation (EU) 330/2010 (where neither the supplier nor the buyer exceeds 30 per cent market share on 
the seller or buyer market, respectively).
35 Article 4 Regulation (EU) 330/2010 (some of these hardcore restrictions will be discussed below, e.g., minimum 
price fixing and absolute territorial restrictions restricting “passive” sales).
36 Guidelines on vertical restraints, supra note 32, para. 96.
37 See, e.g., Guidelines on vertical restraints, supra note 32, paras. 6, 96-127.
38 E.g., csonGor istván naGy, eu and us comPetition law: divided in unity?: the rule on restrictive aGreements 
and vertical intra-Brand restraints, ch. VI (vertical price restraints; on this, see below IV.), ch. VII (territorial 
restrictions), and passim (2013).
39 Guidelines on vertical restraints, supra note 32, para. 7: “Assessing vertical restraints is also important in the 
context of the wider objective of achieving an integrated internal market.  Market integration enhances competition 
in the European Union.  Companies should not be allowed to re-establish private barriers between Member States 
where State barriers have been successfully abolished.”  On the market integration objective, see Ioannis Lianos, 
Some Reflections on the Goals of Competition Law, in handBook on euroPean comPetition law – suBstantive 
asPects 1, 17-19 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., 2013).
40 Regulation (EU) 330/2010 is silent on this particular aspect, but the Guidelines on vertical restraints (supra 
note 32) contain a few observations (paras. 52-54).  For more detail, see, e.g., orGanisation For economic co-oPera-
tion and develoPment (oecd), vertical restraints For online sales, DAF/COMP(2013)13 (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/VerticalRestraintsForOnlineSales2013.pdf (including a background note by 
Paolo Buccirossi, concluding, at 39, that “[a]lthough the two jurisdictions are converging over time, the area of 
what in the EU are referred to as ‘hardcore restraints’ is still wider than in the US and the case law discussed above 
confirms that this is true also for the assessment of the organization of on-line sales”); Kyriakos Fountoukakos & 
Camille Puech-Baron, Latest Develpments in the European Union as Regards Online Sales and Selective Distri-
bution: Confirmation of a Hard-Line Approach, 17(2) distriBution newsletter—aBa antitrust section (Feb. 
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Regulation, although in general quite permissive, does not, for example, allow a 
distributor to provide for absolute territorial protection: so-called “passive sales,” that 
is, where the customers from outside the allocated territory approach the distributor 
without the latter’s solicitation, may not be restricted.41  In the age of the Internet, 
where customers will find a distributor through search engines even where the distri-
butor does not actively solicit these customers, the lack of the ability to restrict passive 
sales may severely undermine the allocation of exclusive territories to distributors.42 
Where selective distribution is practiced, not even active sales to end users may be 
restricted.43  This also means that a supplier practicing a selective distribution scheme 
may not ban marketing via the Internet.44  More generally, absent special circumstances, 
no distributor may be banned from marketing via the Internet.45  Where a supplier sells 
components to a buyer for incorporation in a product, the supplier may not restrict the 
buyer’s ability to sell these parts on as spare parts.46  Again, however, it has to be 
pointed out that in all these cases of hardcore restrictions, it may still be possible to 
justify the restrictions in the individual case by showing that the elements of the legal 
exception in Article 101(3) TFEU are present (although the chances are arguably slim).
The upshot is that today the European situation with regard to vertical non-price 
restraints is not very different from that in the United States under GTE Sylvania.  Some 
limitations on the supplier’s freedom to negotiate vertical non-price restrictions remain, 
but these arguably do not constitute a major departure from the general principle. 
In the EU Member States, the same standards are applied.47  This is largely mandated 
by EU law.48  Whenever there is an agreement, a decision by an association of under-
2013) at 14; David Stein, Online Distribution in the EU: The New Rules on Vertical Restraints and their Implica-
tions for Internet Retailing Across the Atlantic, 15(1) distriBution newsletter – aBa antitrust section (Jan. 
2011) at 16; see also the contributions to the Bundeskartellamt’s 2013 workshop on “vertical restraints in the 
internet economy” (arBeitskreis kartellrecht, vertikale BeschränkunGen in der internetökonomie), http://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/Veranstaltungen/AKK.php.
41 Article 4(b)(i) of Regulation (EU) 330/2010 (making territorial restrictions a hardcore restriction that removes the 
benefit of the block exemption, but making an exception for the prohibition of active sales into exclusive territories).
42 Similarly, Faella, supra note 31, at 202. 
43 Article 4(c) of Regulation (EU) 330/2010.
44 C-Case 439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v. Président de l’Autorité de la Concurrence, [2011] ECR I-9419 
(Court of Justice of the European Union). 
45 Guidelines on vertical restraints (supra note 32) para. 52 (“In principle, every distributor must be allowed to 
use the internet to sell products”).
46 Article 4(e) of Regulation (EU) 330/2010.
47 For the practice regarding vertical non-price restraints in the EU Member States, see, e.g., Andrés Font Galarza, 
Eryk Lucas Dziadykiewicz & Pablo Figueroa, Exclusive Distribution: An Overview of EU and National Case Law, 
in 2013 comPetition case law diGest 31-40 (Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo & Maly Op-Courtaigne eds., 2012); 
Stephen Kinsella & Rosanna Connolly, Selective Distribution: An Overview of EU and National Case Law, in 2013 
comPetition case law diGest 41-49 (Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo & Maly Op-Courtaigne eds., 2012).
48 I am slightly simplifying.  First, whenever the agreement is incapable of affecting trade between Member States, 
Member States are free to introduce stricter or more lenient rules (or none at all).  However, the “affectation of 
trade” criterion is a very sensitive one, so that all but the most regionally limited restraints will trigger the appli-
cation of EU law.  In addition, EU Member States generally do not want to apply a stricter regime to these “regional” 
restraints.  Secondly, EU law does not prevent Member States from having a national regime that is more lenient 
than EU law.  However, where EU law applies, it will govern the result anyway.  And implementing a more lenient 
regime only for those cases in which the affectation-of-trade-between-Member-States criterion is not fulfilled would 
require a difficult analysis in each case whether EU law applies or does not apply.  Therefore, the national compe-
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takings, or a concerted practice that may affect trade between Member States, the 
so-called “convergence rule” in Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 applies, and Member 
States may not prohibit such agreements (etc.) if they are not prohibited under EU 
law.49  The substantive standards employed in all Member States with regard to vertical 
non-price restraints must be identical to the EU law standard.
There is one caveat, however.  While Member States may not introduce competition 
law rules that prohibit vertical non-price agreements that are permissible under EU 
competition law, they may still prohibit such distribution agreements if the provision 
prohibiting the agreement pursues predominantly other objectives than the protection 
of competition.50
3. US Distribution Restraints in State Law 
As explained above, US federal antitrust law will not present a major challenge to the 
competition between different distribution strategies since the 1977 GTE Sylvania 
decision, and of all the issues discussed in this contribution vertical non-price restraints 
are the least controversial issue.  The principle that stimulated interbrand competition 
may compensate the restriction in intrabrand competition resulting from vertical non-
price restraints had already been recognized in some jurisdictions before the US crossed 
the aisle, and has now been accepted by the EU as well.  As the US and EU models 
influenced jurisdictions across the world, the concept has been accepted practically 
everywhere. 
And yet, as Dan Crane has pointed out,51 this is of little consolation to car manufactu-
rers such as Tesla in the United States that want to introduce direct manufacturer-to-
consumer sales but find themselves confronted with existing or proposed state laws 
requiring car manufacturers to sell through independently owned franchisees.52
These restrictions, however, are relatively limited in scope; they are often confined to 
specific sectors, and leave the supplier in general free to employ vertical non-price 
restraints.53
tition regimes in practically all Member States have copy-pasted the EU system of Article 101 TFEU without any, 
or with only minor, modifications.  One of the few modifications is § 3 of the German ARC, which exempts some 
SME cooperation where some, but not necessarily all, of the elements of Article 101(3) TFEU are present.  Where 
the agreement may affect trade between Member States, EU law applies and § 3 ARC is irrelevant for the result.
49 See infra Part VII.2.
50 Article 3(3) Regulation 1/2003, and Recital 9 to that Regulation.  See infra Part VII.2.
51 Daniel Crane, Tesla and the auto dealers lobby, truth on the market (June 24, 2013), http://truthonthemarket.
com/2013/06/24/tesla-and-the-auto-dealers-lobby.
52 For in-depth background information on these dealer laws in the car sector see Gerald R. Bodisch, Economic effects 
of state bans on direct manufacturer sales to car buyers, economic analysis GrouP comPetition advocacy PaPer 
eaG 09-1 ca, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/246374.pdf; Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, State 
franchise laws, dealer termination, and the auto crisis, 24(3) J. econ. PersP. 233-250 (Summer 2010).  Since these 
papers were published, Tesla’s lobbying efforts have eroded some, but by far not all of these state laws.
53 I do not want to be seen as trivializing this: anti-competitive state and local regulations are a source of great antitrust 
concern.  The discussion, however, would lead us too far into the separate issue of the state action doctrine.  See, 
e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, Controlling Unjustified, Anticompetitive State and Local Regulation: Where is attorney 
general “Waldo”?, 56 The Antitrust Bull. 771-821 (2011); D. Daniel Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regula-
tion, in The Global Limits of Competition Law 83 (Ioannis Lianos & Daniel Sokol eds. 2012); D. Daniel Sokol, 
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A much more general problem had temporarily arisen in Kansas.  In a case concerning 
vertical price restraints, O’Brien v. Leegin,54 the Kansas Supreme Court had done away 
with rule of reason analysis for any and all antitrust restrictions under the Kansas 
antitrust laws.  After explaining that the rule of reason was established in Kansas in 
two cases, Heckard55 and Okerberg,56 the Kansas Supreme Court refused to apply the 
rule of reason to vertical price restraints for two reasons.
First, Heckard and Okerberg concerned different types of restraints, “for example, 
covenants not to compete and a requirements contract,” and could therefore be distin-
guished.  If the Court had stopped here, O’Brien would only be of relevance to vertical 
price restraints. 
Secondly, however, the Court went on to emphasize that the relevant provisions in the 
Kansas state antitrust laws prohibit “[a]ny such combinations” and “[a]ll arrangements, 
contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations . . .”, and that “this clear statutory language 
draws a bright line.”57  The Court concluded that it was “loathe to read unwritten 
elements into otherwise clear legislative language . . .”,58 and that accordingly “if the 
Heckard and Okerberg contracts were to come before us now, it is all but certain we 
would not append a requirement that an antitrust plaintiff demonstrate the unreaso-
nableness of a defendant’s trade restraint . . . because the clear language of the gover-
ning statutes does not require it.”59  In the absence of legislative intervention, “we have 
no confidence in the soundness of the Heckard language. . . .”60  The Court finally 
concluded: “The clear statutory language of K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 leaves 
no room for such an approach [scil.: the rule of reason].  The reasonableness rubric 
of Heckard and Okerberg is overruled.”61
The statutes cited by the Kansas Supreme Court deal with agreed restraints in general, 
and not exclusively with pricing restraints.  O’Brien subjected vertical and horizontal 
Limiting Anti-Competitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 Geo. mason l. rev. 119 
(2009); for an interesting new perspective on this issue, see Ioannis Lianos, Towards a bureaucracy theory of the 
interaction between competition law and state action, CLES Working Paper Series 3/2012, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-3-2012.
54 O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 294 Kan. 318, 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. May 4, 2012); since repealed by 
New Section 1(c), introduced by enactment of Senate Bill No. 124, An Act concerning the Kansas restraint of trade 
act; amending K.S.A. 50-101, 50-112, 50-158 and 50-161 and repealing the existing sections; also repealing K.S.A. 
50-108 and 50-115, available at http://kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/sb124/.  When I refer to “post-” and 
“pre-Leegin” in this contribution, I mean the US Supreme Court decision (infra note 69); when I mean the Kansas 
decision, I will refer to “O’Brien.”  For an extensive note on O’Brien and its implications, see Michael L. Fessinger, 
A Century Behind? The Kansas Supreme Court Opts Out of the Rule of Reason in O’Brien v. Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. [277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012)] 52 washBurn l.J. 323 (2013) (see ibid., at 353-354, for an 
account of a previous, failed, attempt to repeal O’Brien through legislation).
55 Heckard v. Park, 164 Kan. 216, 223-24, 188 P.2d 926 (Kan., 1948).
56 Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 217, 341 P.2d 966 (Kan. 1959). 
57 O’Brien, supra note 54, at 342.  
58 Ibid. at 348.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. at 349
61 Ibid.
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agreements alike to a per se approach.  Indeed, its literal approach eliminated the “rule 
of reason” under the Kansas antitrust laws altogether—it appears that the tinkering 
with the language of the Sherman Act by inserting a “standard of reason” in Standard 
Oil was too much for the Kansas Supreme Court,62 and it seems that the Kansas Supreme 
Court sided with Trans-Missouri Freight63 and Justice Harlan.64  To the extent that 
Kansas law applied, a party that made use of the freedom granted by GTE Sylvania to 
engage in reasonable vertical non-price restraints exposed itself, among other things, 
to treble damages suits—until the Kansas legislature eventually re-introduced the rule 
of reason with effect from 18 April 2013.65
Had the O’Brien decision not been repealed, this would have been a stricter approach 
to vertical restraints than was ever practiced in Europe.  Not only were treble damages 
never at issue in Europe, but vertical restraints could, even when caught by Article 
101(1) TFEU, always be exempted where the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU 
were established.  The O’Brien approach was certainly a more draconian approach 
than that of the modern vertical Block Exemption Regulations that now govern the 
result both on the EU level and on the Member States level; the few remaining limits 
on the supplier’s freedom to agree vertical restraints pale in comparison to the per se 
approach that now governed even vertical non-price restraints in Kansas between 2012 
and 2013.
IV. Vertical Price Restraints 
1. The Position of Conceptual Purity: State Oil v. Khan and Leegin
The application of the GTE Sylvania reasoning to vertical price restraints took a while 
longer.66  Vertical price restraints were considered to be prohibited per se under US 
federal antitrust law until 1997.67  Then, of course, State Oil v. Khan switched to a rule 
62 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“[I]t inevitably follows that the provision 
necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some standard should be resorted to for the 
purpose of determining whether the prohibition contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been 
violated.  Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended 
that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects 
of the character embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether, 
in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided.”).
63 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 166 U.S. 290, 312 et seq. (1897).
64 Concurring Opinion in Standard Oil, supra note 62, at 85 et seq.
65 New Section 1(c), supra note 54.
66 Germany had in the ARC 1958 excepted brand manufacturers from the prohibition of resale price maintenance 
(until 1973, when the exception was repealed).  Even under the Allied decartelization laws, the Allied authorities 
had, on request by the German authorities, agreed not to prosecute resale price maintenance practiced by brand 
manufacturers in anticipation of the planned rule in the Bill for the ARC (so-called Willner letter, dated December 
18, 1952, reprinted in wirtschaFt und wettBewerB 923 (1952)).  For a description of the “rule of reason” analysis 
practiced by some German courts in the time between 1952 and 1958, see mestmäcker, supra note 24, at 119-122. 
67 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parker & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical minimum price fixing prohibited 
per se); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical maximum price fixing also prohibited per se). 
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of reason approach for vertical maximum prices,68 and, in 2007, Leegin completed the 
charm by adopting the rule of reason even for vertical minimum prices.69  The interfe-
rence with the freedom to use price as a parameter to influence distribution practices 
was considered objectionable; after all, maximum prices might serve to keep prices 
low, so as to avoid price gouging by greedy exclusive distributors,70 and minimum 
prices could incentivize distributors to offer better pre-sale services.71
Since then, all vertical restraints are assessed under a rule of reason standard with the 
possible exception of tying, towards which—at least for the time being—a qualified 
per se approach is generally adopted, which requires a showing of market power.72
2. Europe: Vertical Price Fixing as a Hardcore Restraint— 
and an Enforcement Priority?
Where vertical price restraints are concerned, the contrast between EU and US law 
was and is pronounced.73  Traditionally, practically all vertical price fixing used to be 
treated as an object restriction in Europe.  Resale price maintenance was neither 
exempted under block exemption regulations, nor was it generally possible to receive 
an individual exemption.
Again, since 1999 the newer generation of vertical block exemption regulations has 
brought a certain approximation to the US position.  These newer block exemption 
regulations follow the State Oil v. Khan example and exempt vertical maximum prices 
(and price recommendations) for undertakings that stay below the relevant market 
share thresholds.74  Vertical minimum price fixing, however, is still treated as a hardcore 
restriction.75  The possibility of implementing a legal vertical minimum price fixing 
68 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
69 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).   For criticism of this move to a rule 
of reason, see e.g., Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in Action, 52 the 
antitrust Bulletin 475-529 (2007); Roger D. Blair, The Demise of Dr. Miles: Some Troubling Consequences, 53 
the antitrust Bulletin 133-151 (2008); but see Lino A Graglia, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., v. PSKS, 
Inc.: The strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Maintenance, 53 the antitrust Bulletin 803-847 (2008).
70 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
71 This is not the place to discuss the pros and cons of resale price maintenance in any depth.  Provided interbrand 
competition works effectively, and it is not impaired due to manufacturer or dealer collusion, there is no reason to 
fear either vertical non-price or vertical price restraints.  And if interbrand competition does not work effectively, 
the rule of reason should bite—at least in theory.  And yet, the very argument of the majority opinion in State Oil 
v. Khan that exclusive distributors may need disciplining through maximum prices set by the manufacturer (supra 
note 70) makes the implicit assumption that these prices are not sufficiently kept in check by interbrand competition 
or rule of reason enforcement alone.
72 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984); Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 
547 U.S. 28 (2006) (rejecting a presumption of market power from the mere fact that the tying product was patented); 
Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LLC, 530 F.3d 590, 593-594 (7th Cir. 2008); but see US v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir., 2001) (discussing the merits of a qualified per se and rule of reason approach to 
tying in the special context of platform software markets, and applying, exceptionally, the rule of reason).
73 kovacic, supra note 5, at 12.
74 Article 4(a) Regulation (EU) 330/2010.
75 Ibid.
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scheme where it fulfills the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU in the individual 
case76 is arguably a theoretical one.77
As already mentioned, and discussed below in more depth,78 EU Member States may 
not employ stricter standards than EU law whenever there is an agreement, a decision 
by an association of undertakings, or a concerted practice that may affect trade between 
Member States (the ‘convergence rule’ in Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003).  So, the 
substantive standards employed in all Member States with regard to vertical price 
restraints must be identical to the EU law standard, at least where the agreement (etc.) 
may affect trade between Member States.79  However, while the Commission does not 
appear to enforce minimum resale price maintenance vigorously, the Member States 
appear to treat vertical minimum price fixing cases as an enforcement priority in recent 
years, imposing fines of a magnitude comparable to that of fines for the participation 
in hardcore horizontal cartels.80
3. US State Law on Resale Price Maintenance
After State Oil v. Khan and Leegin decided that the rule of reason would apply to 
vertical price restraints, commentators swiftly pointed to this authority to bolster their 
argument that the per se rule against vertical price fixing in Europe should be aban-
doned.81  As indicated above, the argument based on the 1997 State Oil v. Khan case 
76 Guidelines on vertical restraints (supra note 32) paras. 223-229.
77 Faella, supra note 31, at 199, 200.
78 Part VII.2.
79 For a synthesis of the application of the competition rules to resale price maintenance, see Derek Ridyard, Resale 
Price Maintenance: An overview of EU and national case law, in 2013 comPetition case law diGest 51-60 (Nicolas 
Charbit, Elisa Ramundo & Maly Op-Courtaigne eds., 2012).
80 For the United Kingdom, see, e.g., Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT issues Statement of Objections to 
sports bra supplier and three UK department stores (September 20, 2013) (statement of objections sent to the sports 
bra supplier DB Apparel UK Ltd., Debenhams, John Lewis, and House of Fraser, alleging resale price maintenance 
agreements); see also Greg Shaffer, Anti-Competitive Effects of RPM (Resale Price Maintenance) Agreements in 
Fragmented Markets, prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (February 7, 2013), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
research/RPM.pdf.  For Germany, see, e.g., Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bußgeld gegen die WALA Heilmittel 
GmbH wegen vertikaler Preisbindung bei Dr. Hauschka-Kosmetik (July 31, 2013) (fines of €6.5m against WALA 
Heilmittel and responsible individuals for resale price maintenance—compare the amount of the fine with a nearly 
contemporaneous €10m fine for participation in a hardcore price-fixing cartel against Moravia Steel, Press Release, 
Bundeskartellamt (July 11, 2013)); Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen 
TTS Tooltechnic wegen vertikaler Preisbindung (August 20, 2012) (fine of €8.2m against TTS Tooltechnic for 
resale price maintenance; for more information, see also the summary of the decision in Fallbericht, October 8, 
2012, Case B5-20/10); Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen Hörgeräte-
hersteller Phonak GmbH (October 15, 2009) (fine of €4.2m against manufacturer of hearing aids for resale price 
maintenance); Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen CIBA Vision (September 
25, 2009) (fine of €11.5m against producer of contact lenses that practiced resale price maintenance by contacting 
distributors that deviated from recommended prices); for scathing criticism of the German fixation on resale price 
maintenance, see Albrecht Bach, Form-based Approach at its Best—German FCO Re-discovers Old Rules on 
Recommended Resale Prices, 1 J. eur. comPetition l. & Practice 241-244 (2010); Wernhard Möschel, Marke-
nartikel und vertikale Kooperation, wirtschaFt und wettBewerB 1229-1237 (2010).  Austria has recently published 
a consultation, cf. Austria: The Federal Competition Authority (FCA) launches Public Consultation on Draft 
Guidelines regarding Vertical Price Fixing, ecn BrieF 03/2013 (July 2013), http://ec.Europa.EU/competition/ecn/
brief/03_2013/au_vertgl.pdf.  For the enforcement practice in other EU Member States, see Ridyard, supra note 
79.
81 Alison Jones, Completion of the Revolution in Antitrust Doctrine on Restricted Distribution: Leegin and Its 
Implications for EC Competition Law, 53(4) the antitrust Bulletin 903 (Winter 2008); eadem, Resale Price 
Maintenance: A Debate About Competition Policy in Europe?, 5(2) euroPean comPetition Journal 479 (2009); 
Peter Gey & Hans-Georg Kamann, The assessment of minimum resale price maintenance in Europe in the aftermath 
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regarding vertical maximum price fixing was accepted in the 1999 vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation, but the argument based on the 2007 Leegin decision regarding 
vertical minimum price fixing failed in the 2010 revision of the Regulation.
And yet, these commentators rarely raised the question whether firms could, post 
Leegin, actually put their price maintenance schemes in action in the United States.82 
The answer to this question depends on the state law of all the states in which the firm 
in question wants to practice the scheme—or more accurately, all the states whose 
commerce is affected to a sufficient degree for those states’ laws to apply.83 
So what is the state law on this issue in the several states?  The situation varies from 
state to state, and is currently not settled in most states.  The clarification of the legal 
position requires the state legislatures or the state courts to decide the issue by statute 
or decision handed down after Leegin.84  Unless this has happened, various scenarios 
can be distinguished.
a. General State Rule with or without Pre-Khan/Leegin Precedent 
The most common scenario is that the state antitrust statute includes as the relevant 
rule for vertical price constraints only a basic prohibition against anticompetitive 
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies, more or less85 closely modeled on § 1 Sherman 
Act.  In these cases, one has to distinguish two sub-scenarios. 
 - In some states, there is no state precedent on vertical price restraints under these 
state quasi-“§ 1 equivalents.”  Because practically all state antitrust laws choose 
to follow the interpretation of the federal antitrust laws to the extent that state 
law does not clearly require a divergent interpretation, it is very likely—though 
of Leegin, ZeitschriFt Für wettBewerBsrecht (Zwer) 208 (2008); Möschel, supra note 80; Boris kasten, 
höchstPreisBindunGen (2005) (on maximum price fixing); Boris Kasten, Vertikale (Mindest-) Preisbindung im 
Licht des “more economic approach”, wirtschaFt und wettBewerB 994-1007 (2007) (on minimum price fixing 
post Leegin).  See recently Nagy, supra note 38, ch. VI.
82 But see Jones, Completion, supra note 81, at 964-965 (warning, with great premonition, that (1) one would have 
to await how the rule of reason would be applied, and (2) that “U.S. firms will also have to be mindful of state 
antitrust or unfair competition laws, which may be interpreted differently from the federal antitrust laws and which 
may still condemn RPM per se.” (internal citation omitted)); identically eadem, Resale Price Maintenance, supra 
note 81, at 514.
83 I will return to the question whether federal law preempts these state laws later (infra VII.).  The quick answer for 
now is that state laws are given wide leeway even in prohibiting conduct that is considered beneficial by the federal 
antitrust laws. 
84 Helpfully, one author has compiled a table of state antitrust statutes and cases dealing with such RPM issues, 
starting with Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM (Complete), antitrust, Fall 2007, 1; see also the 
accompanying articles, e.g., Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin, antitrust 
source (Oct. 2009), 1; idem, Repatching the Quilt: An Update on State RPM Laws, antittrust source (Feb. 2014), 
1 (further references ibid., in note 3).  The table is regularly updated, see https://www.american bar.org/publications/
the_antitrust_source.html (under supplementary materials).
85 Some state statutes differ in that they prohibit contracts that, for example, “control” or “maintain” prices (or use 
similar language).  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-28(A); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-4(b)(1); Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 10/3(1)(A); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-112; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325D.53, Subdiv. 1(1)(a); Mont. Code Ann. § 
30-14-205; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 598A.060; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356:2.  This language could indicate a slightly 
greater willingness to catch vertical restraints as well; after all, “price maintenance” is usually shorthand for vertical 
price fixing schemes.  However, one can still argue that (i) the statutes do not explicitly say that such agreements 
are prohibited per se, and that therefore (ii) “controlling” or “maintaining” prices should only be prohibited per se 
when agreed between competitors.  The wording of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1331.01(B)(4) arguably sufficiently 
diverges from the wording of the Sherman Act to opt for an interpretation prohibiting vertical price restraints per 
se, if the courts so choose.
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not certain—that in these states vertical price restraints will now be treated under 
the rule of reason, just as they are under federal law.86
 - In other states, courts have pronounced vertical price restraints to be per se illegal 
under the state “§ 1 equivalent” during the time when vertical price restraints 
were still prohibited per se on the federal level.  Where these states’ laws apply, 
it seems slightly riskier for firms to implement their price maintenance schemes 
in reliance on the change in the law in Leegin.87
I would suspect that the courts even in the latter category of states would generally 
follow the federal antitrust laws’ U-turn in Leegin.  Nevertheless, it is at least possible 
that the pre-Khan/Leegin decisions under state law are considered to reflect the state 
law’s position for the future. 
And indeed, not only had one state, Kansas, decided post Leegin that vertical price 
fixing is per se illegal under state antitrust law, although this was later reversed by 
legislation, but also is there some evidence in several other states—including populous 
and commercially important states such as New York, Michigan, and Illinois—sugges-
ting that state law may continue to consider vertical price fixing to be a per se violation.88
In Kansas, the Supreme Court had held in the O’Brien judgment, discussed above in 
the context of vertical non-price restraints, that Kansas law prohibits vertical price 
maintenance agreements per se.89  It is a telling facet that the case was one against 
Leegin Creative Leather Products itself—which shows that winning on the federal 
level is not enough.
86 In particular, there are very few post-Leegin decisions under state law that extrapolate from the US Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Sherman Act in Leegin to state law.  But see Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 2008 
WL 3914461, 2009-1 Trade Cases § 76,566 (E.D. Tennessee 2008), where a federal district court took an (educated) 
guess that Tennessee courts would follow the US Supreme Court’s Leegin decision:
At issue in this case are minimum resale price maintenance agreements and, so far as this Court can tell, 
no Tennessee court has ever analyzed the application of the TTPA to such agreements.  Therefore, the 
Court is without guidance from any reported Tennessee decision on the question of whether the Tennessee 
courts will analyze resale price maintenance agreements as horizontal restraints which are per se illegal 
or under the rule of reason.  The plaintiffs suggest, without any citation of authority or analysis, that the 
Tennessee courts will not follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Leegin.  Defendant, on the other hand, 
suggests that the Tennessee courts are likely to do just that in view of the fact that every Tennessee case 
decided under the TTPA has relied heavily on federal precedent. . . . This Court finds defendant’s argument 
to be persuasive. 
Ibid. at *13-14.  Similarly, for Illinois law, House of Brides, Inc. v. Alfred Angelo, Inc. 2014 WL 64657 (N.D.Ill., 
January 8, 2014).  Contra, O’Brien, supra note 54, and discussion in the accompanying text (considering resale 
price maintenance per se illegal under Kansas state law, despite a lack of pre-Leegin case law to that effect; repealed 
by legislation in April 2013). 
87 See, e.g., infra nn. 90-92 and accompanying text for the possibility of post-Leegin per se illegality in California.
88 House of Brides has since held that Illinois Antitrust Law follows Leegin’s interpretation (supra note 86 and infra 
note 96).  In addition to the cases brought under state law in the states mentioned (see text following this footnote), 
the state attorneys general of the following states emphatically supported legislative reversal of the Leegin decision, 
which may make an aggressive enforcement of state laws more likely: Arkansas, Hawaii, Oregon, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming.  See the Communication of the Chief Legal Officers of these states (May 14, 2008), http://www.naag.
org/assets/files/pdf/signons/antitrust.AG_Letter_Supporting_S2261.pdf. 
89 See the citation supra in note 54, and the discussion in the text following that footnote. 
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In California, there was pre-Leegin case law under the Cartwright Act holding vertical 
price fixing to be per se illegal.90  Commentators have argued that this line of precedent 
is obsolete in the face of Leegin.91  However, when a federal District Court was 
confronted with the question whether vertical price fixing remains per se illegal in 
2013, the Court declined to assume that state courts would automatically follow the 
Leegin decision in their interpretation of the Cartwright Act:
[L]eegin involved an interpretation of a federal statute, not the Cartwright 
Act. Under current California Supreme Court precedent, vertical price 
restraints are per se unlawful under the Cartwright Act [citing Mailand].  
There is no indication that precedent is changing [citing Chavez].  While the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Mailand did rely on Supreme Court 
authority, there is some indication that the opinion was derived from California 
authority as well [citing Mailand’s reference to Speegle v. Board of Fire 
Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (Cal.1946)].  In any event, 
simply because the Supreme Court has changed course regarding the Sherman 
Act does not mean the California Supreme Court will regarding the Cartwright 
Act.  Until the California Supreme Court has given a persuasive indication 
that it will, the Court cannot simply disregard its decision. See West v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 
(1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state 
law.  When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal 
courts as defining state law unless it has later given clear and persuasive 
indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or restricted.”).92
In addition, the State of California pursued vertical price fixing claims in 2010 and 
2011, evidently as per se violations; these cases were settled.93
90 Mailand v. Burckle, 20 Cal.3d 367, 143 Cal. Rptr. 1, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1978); Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp., 
93 Cal. App. 4th 363, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 175, 180 (Cal. App.2d Dist. 2001). 
91 James M. Mulcahy, California Courts are Beginning to Reexamine their Outdated Decisions Addressing Vertical 
Price and other Distribution Restraints under the Cartwright Act, 17(2) distriBution newsletter – aBa antitrust 
section (Sept. 2013) at 8, 13, 14, 16-25 (concluding that Mailand “is no longer binding law”, but that it remains 
to be seen whether California courts follow Leegin, and listing lower courts’ decisions that indicate a departure 
from Mailand).
92 Alan Darush MD APC v. Revision LP, 2013 WL 1749539 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2013); this decision dismissed the 
complaint with leave to amend, and the amended complaint reportedly survived the motion to dismiss, see Lindsay, 
Repatching the Quilt (supra note 84), 1-3, citing Darush MD APC v. Revision LP (Darush II), No.12-cv-10296 
(C.D. Cal. July16, 2013).  Similarly, Alsheikh v. Superior Court, 2013 WL 5530508 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., October 7, 
2013) (“if there were vertical price fixing, that would, under Mailand v. Burckle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 367, be a per se 
violation under the Cartwright Act, notwithstanding a change of law under the Sherman Antitrust Act [citing to 
Leegin]”).
93 The People of the State of California v. DermaQuest, Final Judgment, Case No. RG 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Alameda County Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/service?ServiceNam
e=DomainWebService&TemplateName=jsp/imgviewer.html&rofadt=03/02/10&Action=24150019 (consent 
judgment in which DermaQuest was enjoined from engaging in resale price maintenance and undertook to disavow 
its resale price maintenance agreements (para. 4 of the judgment) and to pay to the State of California $70,000 as 
a civil penalty and $50,000 for investigation costs and attorney fees (paras. 5, 6 of the judgment)); The People of 
the State of California v. Bioelements, Final Judgment, Case No. 10011659 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside County, 
filed Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n2028_bioelements_final_judgment.
pdf (consent judgment on substantially the same terms, the civil penalties being in this case $15,000 and the 
investigation costs and attorneys fees $36,000).
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The States of New York, Illinois, and Michigan similarly filed a complaint, post Leegin, 
against the resale price maintenance practiced by Herman Miller under their state 
antitrust laws.94  The case was settled by consent decree without an admission of 
wrongdoing or liability; Herman Miller was enjoined from practicing resale price 
maintenance schemes and agreed to pay $750,000 to the states.95  There is no allegation 
that Herman Miller had substantial market power; the theory of the complaint seems 
to have been that resale price maintenance is prohibited per se under the state antitrust 
laws of New York, Illinois, and Michigan.96  While the position under New York’s 
antitrust statute, the Donnelly Act, is not yet clear,97 resale price maintenance agreements 
are definitely unenforceable in New York.
Similarly, though not quite as unambiguously, a Louisiana Court of Appeal stated in 
a 2011 obiter dictum that “[w]here the alleged restrictions are vertical, and not directed 
at fixing prices, their legality is governed by the rule of reason . . .”,98 referring to a 
94 Specifically, the complaint alleged violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340, 342, and 342-a; 740 Illinois Compiled 
Statutes 10/3; and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445-771 et seq. See Complaint, available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/
sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/antitrust/08_cv_02977_Complaint.pdf, paras. 47-49. 
95 State of New York, State of Illinois, State of Michigan v. Herman Miller, No. 08 Civ. 2977 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 
25, 2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/antitrust/Signed_FJ.pdf (final judgment 
and consent decree in which Herman Miller was enjoined from entering into resale price maintenance agreements 
and, without admitting wrongdoing or liability, undertook to pay $750,000).
96 It has recently been held that the Illinois Antitrust Act is to be interpreted in line with Leegin. House of Brides, Inc. 
v. Alfred Angelo, Inc. 2014 WL 64657 (N.D. Ill., January 8, 2014).  Even before House of Brides, Lindsay had 
already doubted that the Herman Miller consent decree properly reflects the state of the law in Illinois. Lindsay, 
State Resale Price Maintenance Laws, supra note 84, at 4.  According to Lindsay, the Gilbert’s Ethan Allen Gallery 
case established that under Illinois state law vertical price restraints are not illegal per se. Ibid. citing Gilbert’s 
Ethan Allen Gallery v. Ethan Allen, 620 N.E.2d 1349, 1350, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), aff’d 642 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 
1994).  However, that case concerned the unilateral termination of a distributor, allegedly because that distributor 
was unwilling to adhere to the suggested resale prices.  While the judgment contains a few obiter dicta that may 
indirectly cast doubt on the wisdom of treating vertical price restraints practiced in a competitive market as a per 
se violation (620 N.E.2d 1349, at 1354, stating that per se agreements are “normally” agreements between compe-
titors), the case was decided exclusively on the basis of the state statute that corresponds to Sherman Act § 2.  This 
was, unsurprisingly, held to require a rule of reason analysis.  Gilbert’s does not establish that a vertical agreement 
fixing prices would require a rule of reason analysis.
97 In New York, there is pre-Leegin case law that resale price maintenance is per se prohibited. Worldhomecenter.
com, Inc. v. Franke Consumer Prods., 2011 WL 2565284 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) cites George C. Miller Brick v. Stark 
Ceramics, 770 N.Y.S.2d 235, 2004-1 Trade Cases § 74,249 (App. Div. 4th Dep 2003) for this proposition; from 
the mere text of that decision, however, it is impossible to see whether the conduct complained of concerned vertical 
price fixing, and the contested N.Y. Supreme Court decision is unavailable.  In Worldhomecenter.com, a federal 
district court considered it likely that New York courts would follow Leegin under the Donnelly Act, but held that 
the issue needs not be decided given that the restriction complained of concerned advertised, rather than actual 
resale prices. Worldhomecenter.com claims (at *3) that “[w]hile the Court is not aware of any New York State case 
dealing with vertical price maintenance claims under the Donnelly Act post-Leegin, at least a few federal courts 
assessing Sherman Act and Donnelly Act claims have applied Leegin to require a rule of reason analysis under 
both statutes. See Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 532 F.Supp.2d 556, 570, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gatt 
Communications, Inc. v. PMS Associates, LLC, 2011 WL 1044898 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 10, 2011).”  As the 
introductory clause in this quote indicates, none of these citations is on point. Arista did not apply Leegin to the 
Donnelly Act.  While Leegin is cited in Arista, the court did not comment on whether or not it could be applied to 
the Donnelly Act.  The claim based on resale price maintenance was rejected because a competitor cannot show 
antitrust injury based on an allegation of its competitors’ minimum pricing.  In Gatt, the plaintiff alleged that the 
supplier had terminated Gatt’s distributorship after Gatt refused to continue participation in a bid-rigging scheme. 
The District Court in Gatt (since affirmed by Gatt Communications, Inc. v. PMC Associates, 711 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 14, 2013), while citing Leegin and applying a rule of reason analysis to the Donnelly Act claim, did not discuss 
the position of New York law on resale price maintenance in detail.
98 Van Hoose v. Gravois, 70 So.3d 1017, 1022, 2011-0976 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
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1981 decision by the 5th Circuit applying Louisiana law.99  Given that the case before 
the Court concerned non-price restrictions, the proviso regarding vertical price fixing 
in a dictum may have been an inadvertent slip of the pen, an attempt to stay faithful 
to the cited opinion, and not a conscious decision to except vertical price fixing from 
the rule of reason treatment.100  However, given the scarcity of decisions clarifying the 
state antitrust laws in general and Louisiana antitrust law in particular,101 the indication 
that the per se rule may apply to vertical price fixing may become significant in future 
cases.
b. States That Prohibit Vertical Minimum Price Fixing with Explicit Language  
(No, Not That Sort of Explicit)
In addition to the states in which there is post-Leegin evidence that vertical price fixing 
continues to be viewed as a per se violation, some states use language in their statutes 
that seems unambiguous in its condemnation of vertical price restraints. 
Maryland is the clearest case.  It is, at least so far, the only state that has made a 
conscious decision post-Khan/Leegin to outlaw vertical minimum price restraints by 
statute.  The Maryland antitrust laws provide that any contract, combination or conspi-
racy “that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor 
may not sell a commodity or service” is considered to be an unreasonable restraint of 
trade or commerce.102  There are attempts in other states and even on the federal level 
to introduce such “Leegin Repealers.”103
Other states also have provisions that deal explicitly with vertical price restraints, 
though not under their antitrust laws but under contract law.  For example, vertical 
price fixing agreements are unenforceable under New York and New Jersey law.104  It 
99 Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005, text accompanying and in note 6 (5th Cir. 
1981), where the 5th Circuit stated in an obiter dictum that vertical price fixing was prohibited per se under federal 
law, which was held to be a proxy for Louisiana law (ibid. at 1003).
100 The following statement, preceding the statement which seems to except vertical price fixing from the rule of 
reason, could indicate that the Louisiana court considered all vertical restraints to be governed by the rule of reason: 
“When a vertical conspiracy is alleged, plaintiffs must show that the restraint of trade violates the ‘rule of reason’” 
(Van Hoose, supra note 98, at 1022, citing, however, to Plaquemine Marine, Inc. v. Mercury Marine, 859 So.2d 
110, 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003), a case that concerned a vertical non-price restraint, and which in turn cited to 
the State Oil v. Khan case; federal law would not, in 2003, have justified a statement that all vertical restraints are 
governed by the rule of reason).
101 For Louisiana, see Red Diamond Supply, supra note 99, at 1003 (“There is very little case law construing or applying 
Louisiana antitrust statutes and none that is particularly helpful to us in this case.”); for Kansas, see O’Brien, supra 
note 54, at 322 (“Kansas’ antitrust law under the KRTA, originally enacted in 1897, remains largely undeveloped; 
very few cases have reached this court.  We have observed generally that the KRTA is broad in scope but that the 
bulk of its provisions have not been meaningfully interpreted by Kansas courts.”  (internal citations omitted)).  The 
same is arguably true for most state antitrust laws, with the possible exceptions of New York’s Donnelly Act and 
California’s Cartwright Act.
102 Md. Code Ann. Com. Law § 11-204(b).
103 See Alan J. Meese, Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided And Futile, 40 Fla. st. u. rev. 
907, 931-933 (2013).
104 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-a (“§ 369-a. Price-fixing prohibited.  Any contract provision that purports to restrain a 
vendee  of a commodity from reselling such commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer 
shall  not  be enforceable or actionable at law.”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-1.1  (“56:4-1.1. Contracts to restrain resale 
of commodity at lower than stipulated price; unenforceability.  Any contract provision that purports to restrain a 
vendee of a commodity from reselling such commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer 
shall not be enforceable or actionable at law.”).  For an application of the New York statute, see People ex rel. State 
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should be noted that these contract law statutes merely deny the vertical minimum 
price fixing agreements enforceability and actionability; they do not make the agreement 
illegal, entail criminal sanctions, or support treble damages claims.105  While the 
comparative analysis must take into account both antitrust laws and contract law rules, 
the different remedial consequences have to be acknowledged. 
c. Summary
Even post Leegin, a supplier that wants to establish a nationwide, or at least interstate, 
price maintenance scheme in the United States faces hurdles in a substantial number 
of states.  The scheme would definitely be found to infringe the antitrust laws, with all 
its harsh remedial consequences, in Maryland106 and Kansas.107  In New York108 and 
New Jersey,109 the scheme is definitely unenforceable under contract law; at least in 
New York it is also quite possibly illegal under the Donnelly Act.110  The scheme would 
also likely be considered illegal in Michigan,111 and California,112 though no longer in 
Illinois.113  Together, these states in which the scheme is certainly or likely unenforceable 
v. Tempur–Pedic Intern., Inc., 30 Misc.3d 986, 916 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2011-1 Trade Cases § 77,311 (N.Y. Sup. 2011), 
aff’d, 95 A.D.3d 539, 944 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. May 8, 2012) (holding that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-a 
makes any vertically price-fixing contract unenforceable but not illegal); see also Worldhomecenter v. Franke 
Consumer Prods., supra note 97 (§ 369-a makes agreement unenforceable but not illegal).  The consent decree in 
Herman Miller, supra note 95, suggests that vertical price fixing may additionally be illegal under the Donnelly 
Act, but in Tempur-Pedic, the Attorney General chose to rely exclusively on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-a (leading 
to speculation that this was done “perhaps out of concern that the court would interpret the Donnelly Act in light 
of the Supreme Court’s Leegin ruling”, douGlas F. Broder, us antitrust law and enForcement 59 in note 111 
(2nd edn. 2012)).  The New Jersey statute was only briefly mentioned in an obiter dictum in Exit A Plus Realty v. 
Zuniga, 930 A.2d 491, 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., September 5, 2007) (mentioning N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-1.1 
as an example of a statutory provision that clearly makes the agreement automatically unenforceable, rather than 
making it only voidable).  It has been remarked that the decision does not mention Leegin (Michael A. Lindsay, 
Overview of State RPM, the antitrust source (April 2013) at x), but it is unclear why it should have—quite apart 
from the limited purpose for which the provision was cited, the Leegin decision is completely irrelevant for the 
interpretation of a statute that makes such an agreement explicitly unenforceable under contract law.  This, of 
course, is precisely the point to which I am trying to draw attention in this contribution—that non-antitrust laws 
are treated as a separate category but may, of course, have an effect on the balance supposedly achieved by the 
antitrust laws.
105 People of the State of New York v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, 95 A.D.3d 539, 540, 944 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. App. 
Div. May 8, 2012) (“[The] statutory language makes clear that an action may not be maintained in a court of law 
to enforce such a provision.  However, there is nothing in the text to declare those contract provisions to be illegal 
or unlawful; rather the statute provides that such provisions are simply unenforceable in the courts of this state.”).
106 U.S. Census Bureau estimate of the 2012 population: slightly below 6m.  For the post-Leegin statute explicitly 
outlawing resale price maintenance in Maryland, see supra note 102.
107 2012 population estimate: slightly below 3m.  For the O’Brien decision, see supra note 54.
108 2012 population estimate: about 19.5m.  For the New York statute making resale price maintenance unenforceable, 
see supra note 92.
109 2012 population estimate: slightly below 9m.  For the New Jersey statute making resale price maintenance unen-
forceable, see supra note 104.
110 As indicated in the Herman Miller consent decree, supra note 95; but see Worldhomecenter.com v. Franke Consumer 
Prods., supra note 97, indicating, in an obiter dictum, a preference for a rule of reason approach under the Donnelly 
Act.
111 2012 population estimate: slightly below 10m. For Michigan’s position on resale price maintenance, see the Herman 
Miller consent decree supra note 95.
112 2012 population estimate: about 38m.  For California’s position on resale price maintenance, see supra notes 90-93 
and accompanying text.
113 For Illinois’ new position on resale price maintenance, see, first, the Herman Miller consent decree supra note 95, 
but then the decision in House of Brides, supra notes 88, 96.
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account for a population of more than 75 million inhabitants.  These 75 million inha-
bitants cannot be reached by the resale price maintenance schemes.  However, that is 
not all that limits the significance of the federal Leegin decision for the law in action.
First, in the majority of states it is currently simply unclear what the situation is.  Even 
if the best bet is that they would follow the example of federal antitrust law interpre-
tation, Kansas has shown that courts could decide the other way.  Establishing resale 
price maintenance schemes on the mere reliance on the slogan that “there is no place 
like Kansas” may be a risky strategy.
Secondly, contracts in a substantial number of jurisdictions choose, for example, New 
York law as the applicable law.  Of course, parties could avoid New York law where 
the resale price maintenance scheme is a major part of a distribution agreement, but it 
is far from certain that all contract parties would think of this aspect before they (or 
their New York law firms) insert the choice of applicable law clause.
Thirdly, and most importantly, consumers in jurisdictions in which a vertical minimum 
price maintenance scheme is operating legally (or at least unchallenged) may well 
decide to buy the product more cheaply from sellers located in jurisdictions in which 
the scheme is unenforceable.  It is not unheard of for consumers coming from out of 
state to go shopping in New York or California, say, by using such exotic means as the 
Internet.  It is difficult to see how minimum resale price maintenance schemes can be 
successfully operated under these conditions114—except perhaps for large bulky items 
in remote jurisdictions such as refrigerators in Alaska or ovens in Hawaii.115  And, 
indeed, practitioners in the United States have been reported to advise their clients 
even post Leegin to refrain from using outright resale price maintenance schemes and 
instead rely on the old, pre-Leegin ways to implement similar schemes unilaterally 
(Colgate) or by way of consignment.116  These, of course, are exactly the practices that 
are employed in the EU as well, where minimum resale price maintenance is still 
prohibited.117
114 See, e.g., Barbara O. Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State Antitrust Laws Banning 
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 hastinGs cost. l.Q. 391, 411 (Winter 2012) (“Per Se State laws can 
prevent a manufacturer from adopting competitive RPM strategies in neighboring Leegin States because, as a 
practical matter, it cannot set resale prices for some but not all resellers in the same economic market.”).
115 All right, it admittedly works the other way round as well.
116 Thom Lambert, Some Thoughts on the Spring Meeting: Bummed About RPM, Happy About the FTC’s Future, 
truth on the market (April 12, 2013), http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/04/12/some-thoughts-on-the-spring-
meeting-bummed-about-rpm-happy-about-the-ftcs-future/. 
117 Case C-217/05, Confederación Espagñola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v. v Compañía Española de 
Petróleos SA, 2006 ECR I-11987 paras. 38 et seq.; Case T-325/01, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Commission, 2005 ECR 
II-3319, paras. 86-87 Guidelines on vertical restraints, supra note 32 paras. 12-21 (describing when agents are 
treated as genuine agents, that is, not undertakings).
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V. Unilateral Conduct
1. The Position of Conceptual Purity in the United States:  
Requirement of Clear Monopoly Power and Avoiding Type I Errors
The US American main concern in the area of unilateral conduct is clearly the avoidance 
of type I errors, that is, false positives because of over-enforcement.118  Bill Kovacic 
has pithily summarized the development in his reaction to the notorious 2008 DOJ 
Report: 
Several aspects of modern Section 2 jurisprudence stand out.  The first is the 
judiciary’s almost exclusive focus on whether challenged behavior yields 
harmful economic effects or is likely to do so. . . .  The second trait of this 
jurisprudence is wariness of rules that might discourage dominant firms from 
pursuing price-cutting, product development, or other strategies that generally 
serve to improve consumer welfare.  This wariness reflects respect for the 
economic contributions of large firms and concern that overly restrictive rules 
will induce passivity.  Implicit in this view is confidence in the resilience of 
the US economic system and the capacity of the dominant firm’s rivals, 
suppliers, and customers to adopt effective counterstrategies to blunt exclu-
sionary strategies.119
Prohibiting unilateral action directly limits the variation of approaches in the market 
place, and over-enforcement in this area means prohibiting or chilling the use of 
legitimate approaches in the competitive process.
a. Unrestricted Freedom to Act Unilaterally Below  
the Monopoly Power Threshold
US federal antitrust law is adamant that prohibitions of unilateral action should be 
restricted to cases of firms with monopoly power, or at most cases where there is a 
dangerous probability that they acquire monopoly power.120  The reason is that practices 
that may be harmful in the hands of a true monopolist may be “harmless or even 
beneficial when practiced by nonmonopolists.”121  Below this threshold, firms are 
prohibited from conspiring with each other, but as long as they avoid this temptation, 
118 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398, 414 (2004) (“The cost of false 
positives counsels against an undue expansion of §2 liability.”).
119 statement oF Ftc chairman william e. kovacic, supra note 16, at 4. The DOJ report itself (dePartment oF 
Justice, comPetition and monoPoly: sinGle Firm conduct under section 2 sherman act (2008)) was withdrawn 
soon thereafter, see Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department withdraws Report on Antitrust 
Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. 
120 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 et seq. (1993).
121 PhiliP areeda & herBert hovenkamP, 3 antitrust law § 651j 3rd edn. (2008) (also pointing out that the corollary 
of being too lax in finding monopoly power may be that courts become “unwilling to condemn exclusionary 
practices that are anticompetitive when practiced by a true monopolist, but ambiguous or harmless when the 
defendant is not a monopolist.”, ibid.).
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they are free to choose their actions—unilaterally—without having to fear interference 
from the antitrust laws.122 
b. Prohibited Conduct: The Examples of Predatory Pricing, Refusal to Deal, 
and Margin Squeeze
Even where a firm has exceeded the threshold of monopoly power, US law is very 
concerned about the danger of false positives with regard to the conduct to be prohibited. 
Extreme care has to be taken lest pro-competitive conduct be prohibited or chilled. 
The standard example is, of course, predatory pricing.123  Matsushita and Brooke 
Groupe stand for the proposition that predatory pricing is “rarely tried and even more 
rarely successful”;124 and, given the low probability of occurrence and success, we 
generally want to take advantage of low prices for the benefit of consumers, even where 
they are intended to wipe out a competitor.125  Only where prices are below the relevant 
measure of cost and there is a dangerous probability of recoupment may antitrust 
interfere.  As long as post-predation exploitation is not sufficiently likely, we want to 
ensure that firms are free to price as low as they wish.  This means that firms without 
monopoly power (or the dangerous probability of achieving such power) are free to 
set their prices. It also means that above-cost pricing will be in a safe harbor.  And it 
means that pricing below cost is innocuous where the “recoupment” is not intended 
to come from post-predation exploitation of its increased market power, but, for 
example, cross subsidization of a “loss leader” from other products.
Similar reasoning applies to refusals to deal.  A firm, even a monopolist, is generally 
free to choose with whom it wants to contract.126  If it were otherwise, and the firm 
with monopoly power would be compelled to share its resources, the incentives to 
invest for a firm with monopoly power—or a firm that might, post investment, acquire 
monopoly power—would be reduced; and the incentives for competitors of the firm 
with monopoly power to invest in circumventing any bottlenecks would be reduced 
122 American Needle v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010) (“Congress used this 
distinction between concerted and independent action to deter anticompetitive conduct and compensate its victims, 
without chilling vigorous competition through ordinary business operations.  The distinction also avoids judicial 
scrutiny of routine, internal business decisions.  Thus, in § 1 Congress ‘treated concerted behavior more strictly 
than unilateral behavior.’ . . .  This is so because unlike independent action, ‘[c]oncerted activity inherently is fraught 
with anticompetitive risk’ insofar as it ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking that 
competition assumes and demands.’ . . .  And because concerted action is discrete and distinct, a limit on such 
activity leaves untouched a vast amount of business conduct.  As a result, there is less risk of deterring a firm’s 
necessary conduct; courts need only examine discrete agreements; and such conduct may be remedied simply 
through prohibition.”).
123 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16.
124 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
125 Brooke Group at 226-227 (“[T]he costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high. . . . [M]istaken inferences . . . 
are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. . . .  It would 
be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits themselves became 
a tool for keeping prices high” (internal citations omitted)).
126 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, 
he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell”); see also Verizon Communi-
cations Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
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if they can expect to get a free—or at least risk-free—ride on the dominant firm’s 
investment.127  Only very exceptionally can a duty to deal follow from § 2 Sherman 
Act.128
The policy to let even dominant firms compete freely unless a credible theory of harm 
can be advanced does not change when the two categories of predatory pricing and 
refusal to deal are combined to form the theory of margin squeeze.129  After Linkline, 
three scenarios are distinguished.  First, the downstream prices offered to the dominant 
firm’s customers are so low as to be predatory.  In that case, the theory of harm is one 
of predatory pricing and the standards of that theory of harm are to be employed.  In 
the second scenario, the upstream prices demanded by the dominant firm from the 
firms that compete on the downstream market are so high as to amount to a construc-
tive refusal to deal.  In that case, the theory of harm is one of refusal to deal and the 
standards of that theory of harm are to be employed.  In the third scenario, the prices 
on the downstream market are not so low as to be predatory and the prices on the 
upstream market are not so high as to amount to a constructive refusal to deal.  In that 
case, there does not appear to be a credible theory of harm.  In other words, there is 
no need for a stand-alone abuse of margin squeeze. 
c. Limited Potential Irritants on the Level of Federal Antitrust: Attempted or 
Joint Monopolization and § 5 FTC Act
While the prohibition of monopolization in § 2 Sherman Act has been largely reduced 
by these error-cost framework considerations to catch only cases in which antitrust 
injury is sufficiently likely, the federal antitrust laws have the potential to reach more 
conduct.  § 2 Sherman Act also provides for “attempted monopolization.”  The possi-
bility of “joint monopolization” has been discussed for a long time, and employed 
from time to time by the courts.130  To the extent the FTC applies § 5 FTC Act as an 
“incipiency” statute to catch cases that fall outside the core of § 2 Sherman Act, there 
is a question whether firms in the United States can conduct their affairs really with 
less need to worry about antitrust law than in Europe. 
Nevertheless, even the prohibition of attempted monopolization, the potential use of 
joint monopolization, and § 5 FTC Act are today very much assessed against the 
dangers of over-enforcement.  Accordingly, these statutory provisions, which theore-
tically could make antitrust enforcement at least as aggressive as the Commission’s 
use of Article 102 TFEU, are interpreted restrictively by the antitrust authorities and 
127 Trinko, at 407-408 (“Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the 
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest 
in those economically beneficial facilities.  Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, 
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.  Moreover, 
compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion”).
128 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 et seq. (1985) (emphasizing sacrifice by 
terminating an existing, and therefore presumably profitable, relationship).  See also Trinko, at 408-409 (discussing 
Aspen Skiing).  For more detail from an error-cost perspective see Keith N. Hylton, Unilateral Refusals To Deal 
and the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report 53 the antitrust Bulletin 623-641 (2008).
129 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline, 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
130 See, e.g., United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984).
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courts.  Attempted monopolization is made subject to the demanding “dangerous 
probability of success” threshold.  Joint monopolization is not widely accepted as a 
basis for liability, and certainly not widely employed in litigated cases.  While the 
theoretical reach of § 5 FTC Act—and the desirability of harnessing its potentially 
wide reach by issuing guidelines— is hotly debated,131 instances in which § 5 FTC Act 
is employed by the FTC to reach cases that could not be reached by § 2 Sherman Act 
are far and few between; and where the Commission has made the attempt, it has often 
been stopped by the courts.  While § 5 FT. Act is employed to catch unilateral conduct 
that is meant to lead up to a conspiracy, such as invitations to collude, the use in cases 
that fall short of § 2 Sherman Act liability is rare.
Overall, then, federal antitrust enforcement against unilateral conduct in the United 
States is largely governed by the concern for avoiding false positives.
2. Europe: Dominance Threshold on the EU Level, Economic 
Dependency on the MS Level, and Avoiding Type II Errors
Unilateral conduct has long been identified as one of the major issues on which US 
and European law have substantial and persisting differences of opinion.132  Both the 
EU and, in particular, the Member States require less in terms of market power than 
the US before an undertaking has to fear antitrust scrutiny of its unilateral conduct 
(below a.).  And in terms of impermissible conduct, the main concern of European 
antitrust law again appears to be avoiding type II errors, that is, false negatives due to 
under-enforcement (below b.).
a. The Threshold Below Which Unilateral Conduct Is Free from Scrutiny
On the EU level, Article 102 TFEU requires an abuse by “one or more undertakings 
of a dominant position.”  Below this threshold of dominance, EU law does not scru-
tinize unilateral conduct, and to this extent EU law appears to mirror the safe-harbor 
approach of the US  What is more, given that the US courts have occasionally framed 
“monopoly power” in terms of a “dominant position,”133 one could believe that the 
same cut-off threshold is used on both sides of the Atlantic.
131 See the early in-depth treatment in William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application 
of Section 5 Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 antitrust l.J. 929, 944 et seq. (2010) (arguing for the development 
of guidelines); more recently statement oF commissioner Joshua d. wriGht, ProPosed Policy statement reGar-
dinG unFair methods oF comPetition under section 5 oF the Federal trade commission act (June 19, 2013) and 
the ensuing debate, e.g. in the contributions to 9(1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle (September 16, 2013): Maurice E. 
Stucke, A Response To Commissioner Wright’s Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods Of Compe-
tition, ibid.; Daniel Crane, Section 5 of the FTC Act and The Need For Guidelines, ibid.; Harry First, What About 
Green Stamps? A Comment on the FTC’s Section 5 Authority, ibid.; A. Douglas Melamed, A Solution In Search of 
a Problem, ibid.; Sharis Pozen, Section 5 Guidelines: Fixing a Problem That Does Not Exist?, ibid.; Steven Salop, 
Guiding Section 5: Comments on the Commissioners, ibid.; Joe Sims, Section 5 Guidelines: Josh Wright as the 
New King of Corinth?, ibid.
132 See, e.g. kovacic, supra n. 5, at 11-12; Giorgio Monti, Unilateral Conduct: The Search for Global Standards, in 
research handBook on international comPetition law 345, 355-360 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012); John Vickers, 
Competition Law and Economics: A Mid-Atlantic Viewpoint, 3 eur. comPetition J. 1, 5-7 (2007).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Corp., 378 U.S. 441, 458, 459, 461, 464 (1964).
52 William E.  Kovacic  |  An Antitrust Tribute - Liber Amicorum - Volume II 
Comparative Antitrust Federalism and the Error-Cost Framework or: Rhetoric and Reality: 
You Protect Competitors, We Protect Competition – Except When We Protect Competitors
This, of course, is not the case.  On the EU level, dominance is indeed required, but 
the standards applied in the EU for determining dominance are less demanding than 
the US standards.  While firms in the US start to worry about monopoly power once 
they exceed fifty and approach sixty per cent market share, in Europe they will have 
to start paying attention once they get into the vicinity of forty per cent market share,134 
and “very large market shares” starting from fifty per cent may trigger a presumption 
of dominance.135  Of course, market share thresholds are completely vacuous unless 
the standards of market definition are considered.136  So, if it were the case that EU 
law simply defined markets more broadly than the US did, then it would be possible 
that the US-sixty percent and the EU-forty percent market share thresholds actually 
reflected the same level of market power. However, this is unlikely to be the explana-
tion.  Markets tend to be defined at least as narrowly in the EU as they are in the US137
Of course, market share is, on both sides of the Atlantic, only a first indication for 
dominance, and in addition some of the cases in the forty-sixty percent market share 
bracket that may be caught in the EU but not under the monopolization prong in the 
US may be cases that could be pursued as “attempted monopolization” under § 2 
Sherman Act (or perhaps at least under § 5 FTC Act).138  Even with these qualifications, 
however, EU law is arguably quicker to find dominance than US federal antitrust law.
Apart from the lower threshold for finding single dominance, EU law clearly allows 
for collective dominance of several undertakings,139 whereas the joint monopoly theory 
in the United States has had only patchy support from the courts.
134 See, e.g. kovacic, supra note 5 at 12.
135 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 ECR I-3359 para. 60 (“With regard to market shares the 
Court has held that very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position (judgment in Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 
[41]).  That is the situation where there is a market share of 50% such as that found to exist in this case”).  However, 
the significance of this “presumption” should not be overstated; as Andrea Coscelli and Geoff Edwards have recently 
put it: “The decision suggests only that in the absence of contrary evidence rebutting the presumption, can dominance 
be found on the basis of market shares alone.” (Dominance and Market Power in EU Competition Law Enforcement, 
in handBook on euroPean comPetition law – suBstantive asPects 350, 361 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin 
eds., 2013) (emphasis in the original)).
136 Consider, for example, the franchising cases in which the brand of the products which the “locked-in” franchisee 
had to order from the franchisor was defined as the relevant market.  See infra n. 185 and accompanying text.  More 
generally, Louis Kaplow has made a sustained argument that the whole market definition/market share approach 
to market power is a tautological exercise anyway (see, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 
harv. l. rev. 437 (2010); idem, Market Definition Alchemy, social science research network (May 15, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2265306). Contra Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor 
Kaplow, 78 antitrust l.J. 729 (2013); Malcolm B. Coate, Market Definition Is Not Alchemy, social science 
research network (September 30, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333819.
137 See, e.g., the market definition in aftermarket cases, infra note 213.
138 As to the (not crystal clear) market share thresholds necessary to establish the “dangerous probability of success” 
required for attempted monopolization, see  e.g., ernest Gellhorn, william e. kovacic & stePhen calkins, 
antitrust law and economics 5th edn. 189-190 (2004).
139 In the Article 102 TFEU context, see, e.g., Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie maritime belge 
transports and Others v. Commission, 2000 ECR I-1365 [35] et seq.; in the merger context see originally Joined 
Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission (“Kali & Salz”), 1998 ECR I-1375 [152] et seq., 
and more recently C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony v. Impala, 2008 ECR I-4951 [119] et seq. (Grand Chamber); 
Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 ECR II-2585 [56] et seq.; Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, 
1999 ECR II-753 [123] et seq; Nicolas Petit, The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law, in handBook on 
euroPean comPetition law  – suBstantive asPects 259, 296-307 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., 2013); 
BirGit linder, kollektive marktBeherrschunG in der Fusionskontrolle (2005).  For an analysis of collective 
dominance cases on the Member States level, see Nicolas Petit, Collective Dominance: An Overview of National 
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b. The Prohibited Conduct: Predatory Pricing, Refusals to Deal, and Margin 
Squeeze in the EU
Again, the differences between EU law and US law with regard to conduct deemed to 
be abusive are well known.  In the EU, dominant undertakings are said to have “a 
special responsibility not to allow its behaviour to impair genuine undistorted compe-
tition on the common market.”140  I will only mention three examples, although much 
more could be said on the EU jurisprudence regarding exclusionary abuses such as 
loyalty rebates.141 
With regard to predatory pricing, the Court of Justice of the EU merely requires a 
showing either that prices were below average variable cost, in which case it is presumed 
that to pursue the objective of eliminating rivals, or that prices were above average 
variable cost but below average total cost, in which case it is necessary to also prove 
a plan to eliminate competitors or to show anticompetitive effects.142  In either case, 
the likelihood of recoupment is not considered a necessary requirement in the EU 
(although it may be “a relevant factor” in the overall assessment whether the conduct 
was abusive).143  On the other hand, where a dominant undertaking charges prices that 
are not predatory under these standards but are lower for the customers of a competitor 
than for its other customers, the mere fact that there the prices discriminate will not 
qualify these prices as abusive.144
With regard to refusals to deal, European law acknowledges the general principle that 
even a dominant undertaking should “have the right to choose its trading partners and 
Case Law, in 2013 comPetition case law diGest 31-40 (Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo & Maly Op-Courtaigne 
eds., 2012).  For an overview of the German law and practice, see Florian Wagner-von Papp, Germany, in inter-
national encycloPaedia oF laws: comPetition law (Francesco Denozza & Alberto Toffoletto eds., 2013) at paras. 
151, 157, 163-164, 500, 502, 505, 514; see also Eckart Wagner, Die Analyse kollektiver Marktbeherrschung in der 
dEUtschen Fusionskontrolle im Vergleich zur Euopäischen Fusionskontrolle, wirtschaFt und wettBewerB (wuw) 
619 (2009) (comparing German and EU law).
140 Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. Commission, 1983 ECR 3461 at [57]; since then, the 
special responsibility language is consistently used, see, e.g., Case 202/07 P, France Télécom v. Commission, 2009 
ECR I-2369 at [105]; Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, 2012 ECR (nyr) at [23] (Grand Chamber). 
monti, supra note 133 at 351, notes that the “special responsibility” phrase may not be “terribly helpful in provi-
ding guidance”, but that it “serves as a reminder of the stricter scrutiny that dominant firms find themselves under 
in the EU, as compared to the US.”
141 For a critical overview on the EU law on rebates see Alison Jones & Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, Abuse of Dominance: 
Exclusionary Pricing Abuses, in handBook on euroPean comPetition law – suBstantive asPects 423, 457-467 
(Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., 2013).
142 France Télécom, supra note 140 at [109], reiterating the principles established in AKZO, supra note 135 [70]-[71] 
]; Jones & Lovdahl Gormsen, supra note 141, 427-442.
143 France Télécom, supra note 140 at [110]-[113].  But see ibid. at [107]: “In particular, it must be found that an 
undertaking abuses its dominant position where, in a market the competition structure of which is already weakened 
by reason precisely of the presence of that undertaking, it operates a pricing policy the sole economic objective of 
which is to eliminate its competitors with a view, subsequently, to profiting from the reduction of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market.”  This indicates that, while recoupment is not a formal requirement in the 
EU, the theory of harm is essentially the same as in the United States.
144 Post Danmark, supra note 140, at [23] (“[T]he fact that the practice of a dominant undertaking may . . . be described 
as ‘price discrimination’, that is to say, charging different customers or different classes of customers different 
prices for goods or services whose costs are the same or, conversely, charging a single price to customers for whom 
supply costs differ, cannot of itself suggest that there exists an exclusionary abuse.”).
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to dispose freely of its property,”145 and that the impact on investment incentives and 
the need to avoid free riding have to be taken into account.146  For the same reasons, 
access to resources protected by intellectual property rights is only granted in “excep-
tional circumstances.”  Nevertheless, the authorities and courts in the EU are generally 
quicker than American courts to allow access, provided the product or service is 
indispensable for carrying out that person’s business, that is, it cannot economically 
viably be duplicated by an as-efficient competitor, there is no actual or potential 
substitute for the facility to which access is requested, the refusal would eliminate all 
(or only effective?) competition, there is consumer harm, and there is no objective 
justification.147
Then there is the decision by EU courts to acknowledge a separate theory of harm for 
margin squeezes148—without any need to demonstrate that the wholesale prices on the 
upstream market are so high as to amount to a constructive refusal to supply (or that 
the downstream prices are so low as to be predatory).149  The diametrically opposed 
positions that the US Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
have taken on margin squeezes—in nearly contemporaneous decisions—have been 
explored in a host of comparative articles.150
An even broader point is that Article 102 TFEU cannot only catch exclusionary conduct 
but also exploitative abuses,151 even though in the case law pure exploitation (as opposed 
to exclusionary conduct coupled with exploitation) is sparse.152
145 communication From the commission – Guidance on the commission’s enForcement Priorities in aPPlyinG article 
82 oF the ec treaty [now 102 TFEU] to aBusive exclusionary conduct By dominant undertakinGs, [2009] O.J. 
C45/7 para. 75 [hereinafter commission, Priorities PaPer].
146 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 ECR I-7791; see also the Opinion by AG Jacobs 
in that case; commission, Priorities PaPer, supra note 145 paras. 75-90.
147 The above formulation is an amalgam of the not entirely consistent requirements established in Bronner, para. 41, 
Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, 2007 ECR II-3601, and commission, Priorities PaPer, supra n. 145, 
paras. 81 et seq.  See also 6/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] ECR 223.  While the Court decisions 
to date have adopted slightly different criteria to refusals to deal where IP rights were concerned and those where 
physical resources were concerned, the Commission, ibid., seems to want to move to a unitary standard (see Renato 
Nazzini, Abuses of Dominance: Exclusionary Non-Pricing Abuses, in handBook on euroPean comPetition law 
– suBstantive asPects 473, 490 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., 2013); for an analysis of the requirements 
for a refusal to deal, ibid., at 488-502).
148 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v. Commission, 2010 ECR I-9555; Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. 
TeliaSonera Sverige, 2011 ECR I-527.
149 TeliaSonera, at paras. 54-58. But see the commission’s Priorities PaPer, supra note 145, para. 80 (treating margin 
squeezes as constructive refusals to supply).
150 See, e.g., George A. Hay & Kathryn McMahon, The Diverging Approach to Price Squeezes in the United States 
and Europe, 8 J. comPetition l. & econ. 259 (2012); John B. Meisel, The Law and Economics of Margin Squeezes 
in the US and the EU, 8 eur. comPetition J. 383 (2012); Johannes Zöttl, Kein Verbot der Kosten-Preis-Schere im 
US-amerikanischen Kartellrecht, recht der internationalen wirtschaFt (riw) 445 (2009).  See also Jones & 
Lovdahl Gormsen, supra note 142, 442-457.
151 kovacic, supra note 13, at 11.
152 On exploitative abuses in the EU, see e.g. Michal S. Gal, Abuse of Dominance - Exploitative Abuses, in handBook 
on euroPean comPetition law – suBstantive asPects 385-422 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., 2013); 
see Renato Nazzini, Abuse Beyond Exclusion: Exploitation and Discrimination Under Article 102 TFEU, in 2012 
Fordham comP. l. inst. 459-492 (Barry Hawk ed., 2013).  The absence of exploitative abuses in the US is arguably 
again to be explained by a reliance on the self-correcting forces of competition.  But see Ariel Ezrachi & David 
Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting? 5(2) J. comPetition l. & econ. 249-268 (2008).
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c. Economic Dependency Rules in the Member States
On the European Union level, the standard for dominance may be lower than in the 
US, but at least the standard employed is that of dominance: unilateral conduct below 
this threshold is in a safe-harbor as far as EU competition law is concerned.153  The 
differences in the required market shares should be acknowledged but not be overstated, 
given that they are not the only criterion but only a first (though in practice extremely 
important) indication of dominance.  With regard to the prohibited conduct, there are 
also significant differences; for example, compared to the United States, less is required 
in the EU to show an abuse of predatory pricing, a refusal to deal, or a margin squeeze. 
And yet, important as they are, these differences seem more questions of degree than 
qualitative.  This changes once we move to the Member States level.
On the Member States level, the approach to unilateral conduct is even more restrictive 
than on the EU level.  This is possible because Member States are not required by EU 
law to adopt the standards of EU law with regard to unilateral conduct.  While the 
“convergence rule” in Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 more or less requires Member 
States to mirror the EU standards with regard to agreements and concerted practices, 
the second sentence of that provision provides for an exception from the convergence 
rule in so far as “unilateral conduct” is concerned.154  This exception was introduced 
as a result of lobbying from the Member States, especially Germany and France, which 
have provisions on “economic dependency” in their national competition laws.155  I 
will outline the consequences of this concept of “economic dependency” using the 
German example.156
Under constant lobbying pressure from the small and medium-sized enterprise (“SME”) 
lobby, German competition law has added more and more rules on “economic 
dependency” over the past decades.  Under the current regime—reaffirmed by the 
legislature as recently as June 2013157—German law distinguishes between two sets 
of economic-dependency type rules in the relevant provision, § 20 ARC—dependence 
on undertakings with “relative market power” and on those with “superior market 
power.” 
153 For a discussion of this safe-harbor effect see Giorgio Monti, The Concept of Dominance in Article 82, 2 eur. 
comPetition J. 31, 46-48.
154 See infra Part VII.2.  Actually, the exception is already contained in the phrasing of the first sentence, i.e. the 
convergence rule, itself, which only applies where there is an agreement, a decision of an association, or a concerted 
practice.
155 For a comparative overview of economic dependency provisions and other stricter law for unilateral conduct in 
various Member States, see ioannis kokkoris, a GaP in the enForcement oF article 82, 21-43 (2009); commission 
staFF workinG PaPer accomPanyinG the rePort on the FunctioninG oF reGulation 1/2003, SEC(2009) 574 final 
(April 29, 2009) at paras. 160-179. For a worldwide comparison, see ICN Task Force for Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position [sic], Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position, 7th Annual Conference, Kyoto (April 
14-16, 2008).
156 I focus on German law instead of French law, first, because I am much more confident as to the content, enforcement 
practice, and potential functional equivalents to be taken into account in German law, and secondly, because I feel 
much more comfortable and unconstrained when criticizing my home jurisdiction.
157 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Gazette) 2013 I 1738 (June 29, 2013).
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(i) Relative Market Power
The first set of rules applies to undertakings with “relative market power.”  An under-
taking is deemed to have “relative market power” if SME’s depend on it “in such a 
way that sufficient and reasonable options to switch to other undertakings do not 
exist.”158  It is something of a mystery how such options could be absent when there 
is effective competition in the market.  The very term “relative market power”—the 
direct translation from the German “relative Marktmacht”—reveals the oxymoronic 
nature of this concept (although I find it much easier to identify the “moronic” aspect 
than the “oxy” one).  Either there is market power, in which case it cannot be “relative” 
to the parties; or there is relative power, in which case it is not “market” but “bargaining” 
power.  The solution to this mystery seems to be that there may be effective competi-
tion for newcomers into the market, but that path dependencies following from earlier 
decisions of the dependent undertaking deprive the dependent distributor’s freedom 
to switch to other suppliers (or vice versa), perhaps because of transaction-specific 
investments. 
Economic dependence (and the corresponding relative market power) can arise from 
three case scenarios: an SME undertaking may depend on making available a product 
to its customers if the product in question is the “top brand” in a particular product 
category, or one of a “group of top brands.”  The question in these cases is whether a 
customer would confidently expect a seller to stock this particular brand (or at least 
one of the top group of brands).  The standard example for this category is the so-called 
Rossignol case: Rossignol terminated a long-standing business relationship with a 
sports shop.  The sports shop claimed that it needed to stock Rossignol skis to be taken 
seriously by its customers.  Rossignol was said to have a market share of only about 
8%.159  Nevertheless, the court decided that economic dependence could be established 
even in the presence of “considerable competition” between suppliers, and that Rossi-
gnol had a duty to deal with the sports shop.160
A second case category is “scarcity-induced dependence.”  The paradigm example for 
this category, mentioned already in the legislative materials, are cases from the oil 
crisis, in which a supplier of oil, faced with scarce supply during the oil crises, was 
supposed to apportion its supplies non-discriminatorily among its distributors. 
The final category is dependence due to the “unique relationship” between the supplier 
and distributor.  These are cases where the SME has made transaction-specific invest-
ments into the relationship with a particular supplier or distributor, which make the 
SME vulnerable to opportunistic conduct by the party with relative market power.
158 See the legal definition of ‘relative market power’ in § 20(1) ARC, as amended in 2013.
159 BGH, Nov. 20, 1975, KZR 1/75, neue Juristische wochenschriFt 801, 802 (1976).  An English translation of an 
extract of the decision is available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/
case.php?id=1488. 
160 One explanation for the harsh line by the Court may have been that the termination of the sports shop apparently 
was a reprisal for undercutting recommended prices.
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Many of these “relative market power” cases concern refusals to deal; in particular, 
§ 20(1) ARC is often invoked where distribution agreements are terminated.  Much 
like courts in the US,161 German courts stress that in principle the “powerful,” and even 
the dominant, supplier must remain free to choose its contractual partners and to 
structure its distribution system as it sees fit.162  However, it is clear that the whole 
point of § 20 ARC is that this freedom is only a conditional one.  The question then 
becomes how quick the courts are to find an undertaking to be “dependent” on another 
undertaking, despite the fact that the latter is not in a dominant position.  German 
courts follow—or at least pay lip service to—the principle that in determining 
dependency they will not take into account the allegedly dependent firm’s prior 
“miscalculations” and any “uncalled-for self-inflicted dependency.”163  But the demar-
cation between an “uncalled-for” self-inflicted dependency and the kind of prior 
decision that results in a cognizable dependency is left to the vagaries of a balancing 
of interests.  Under German law, duties that would only apply to firms with monopoly 
power under US federal antitrust law apply below the threshold of dominance as soon 
as the lower hurdle of “relative market power” is reached.
Undertakings with relative market power are prohibited from “unduly impeding” or 
“discriminating without objective justification” dependent SME undertakings (§ 20(1) 
ARC 2013).  Undertakings with relative market power are also prohibited from 
demanding or inducing dependent (SME or large) undertakings to afford them prefe-
rential treatment (§ 20(2) ARC 2013)—a provision that was inserted to deal with 
demand-side market power, especially as exercised by the big food retail chains vis-
à-vis their suppliers, such as charging slotting fees or demanding retroactive rebates.
(ii) Superior Market Power: Sales Below Cost and Margin Squeezes
The second big category of economic dependence are cases of “superior market power” 
(§ 20(3) ARC 2013).  This concept denotes a disparity of power not in the vertical 
relationship between supplier and distributor, but on the horizontal level between a 
powerful competitor and its SME competitors.  Two paradigm examples for superior 
market power are the big food retail chains vis-à-vis their mom-and-pop-store compe-
titors, and the petrol stations run by the big brand petroleum conglomerates vis-à-vis 
independent gasoline stations. 
Where an undertaking has superior market power vis-à-vis its SME competitors, it is 
prohibited from exercising its superior market power to impede its SME competitors. 
161 Colgate, supra note 126.
162 BGH, 31 Jan. 2012, KZR 65/10, WuW/E DE-R 3549, 3554 para. 29—Werbeanzeigen; BGH, 28 Jun. 2005, KZR 
26/04, WuW/E DE-R 1621, 1624—Qualitative Selektion; BGH, 8 Mar. 1983, KZR 1/82, WuW/E BGH 1995, 
1996—Modellbauartikel III (qualitative selective distribution system allowed the exclusion of mail order distribu-
tors); BGH, 24 Mar. 1981, KZR 2/80, WuW/E BGH 1793, 1797—SB-Verbrauchermarkt (qualitative selective 
distribution for toy car racetracks was legitimate, and the refusal to supply supermarkets was not abusive); also cf. 
BGH, 15 Apr. 1986, KVR 3/85, WuW/E 2238, 2246—EH-Partner-Vertrag.
163 Cf. Jörg Nothdurft, in, kommentar Zum deutschen und euroPäischen kartellrecht 11th edn (EUgen Langen & 
Hermann-Josef Bunte eds., 2011) at § 20 paras 58, 73.
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In particular, it is prohibited from selling below cost and from engaging in margin 
squeezes. 
The prohibition against “sales below cost” is at the core of the provision that is today 
§ 20(3) ARC.164  The rules on superior market power were first introduced in 1980, 
but back then the provision was merely an authorization for the competition authority 
to initiate administrative proceedings.  In 1990, it was “upgraded” to a prohibition that 
could be enforced by private plaintiffs.  While sales below cost were not, at that time, 
explicitly mentioned in the statutory text, the explanatory memorandum accompanying 
the government bill mentioned that sales below cost should be considered abusive 
conduct in the meaning of the prohibition for undertakings with superior market power 
to unduly impede their SME competitors.  The German antitrust courts, however, 
argued in the Hitlisten-Platten decision that, in order to amount to an antitrust infrin-
gement, sales below cost would have to result, with a sufficient likelihood, in lasting 
harm to the structural conditions for effective competition.165  Given that such lasting 
harm to structural conditions is difficult to prove even in cases of predatory pricing 
practiced by a dominant firm, this reduced the category of “sales below cost by non-
dominant firms with superior market power” to little more than a complicated defini-
tion of an empty set.  Furthermore, the courts explicitly stated that it is perfectly 
permissible for multi-product sellers to employ a loss-leader strategy, in which the 
losses of advertised loss leaders are compensated by profits from other products bought 
by one-stop shoppers attracted by the loss leaders.166
It did not take long for the lobbyists and the legislator to react.  With effect from 1999, 
the legislature amended the prohibition of an abuse by firms with superior market 
power by adding that sales below cost were to be deemed an abuse unless it was only 
practiced on an occasional basis or objectively justified.  This amendment was a direct 
reaction to, and intended to repeal, the Hitlisten-Platten decision; the legislator expli-
citly sought to eliminate the requirement of a likely lasting effect on competition 
established in that decision.167  This time, the antitrust courts bowed grudgingly to the 
legislature’s express wishes.  While the Court of Appeal in Düsseldorf accepted that 
the stricter requirement of a likely lasting effect on competition had been rejected by 
the legislator, it still sought to reintroduce a requirement of at least an “appreciable 
effect on the competitive conditions” in the Wal-Mart case.168  However, the Federal 
Court of Justice decided on appeal that, considering the legislative amendment, sales 
164 More precisely, the German case law and statutory antitrust law speaks of proffering below purchase price, which 
on the one hand prohibits not only the sale but even advertising sales below costs but on the other hand leaves 
producers free to sell below their production cost. As the term “sales below cost” is more frequently used in the 
international context, I shall use this term instead.  In the German unfair competition context, it is indeed the 
cost—not the purchase price—which is the relevant threshold (see, e.g., Helmut Köhler, in, GesetZ GeGen den 
unlauteren wettBewerB 31st edn. (Helmut Köhler & Joachim Bornkamm eds, 2013) at § 4 para. 10.190).
165 BGH, April 4, 1995, KZR 34/93, ZeitschriFt Für GewerBlichen rechtsschutZ und urheBerrecht (Grur) 690, 
692 (1995)—Hitlisten-Platten.
166 Ibid.; BGH, March 30, 2006, Case I ZR 144/03, GRUR 596, 597 [19] (2006)—10% billiger.
167 See Bundestags-Drucksache (Parliamentary Documents) no. 13/10633 at 72 (report and recommendation of the 
committee for economy).
168 OLG Düsseldorf, December 19, 2001, Kart 21/00 (V), WuW/E DE-R 781—Wal-Mart (II.B.3.d.aa. of the opinion). 
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below cost by an undertaking with superior market power constituted a per se abuse, 
provided only the below-cost price was offered on more than an occasional basis and 
not objectively justified, even where there was no danger of any harm to the structural 
conditions for effective competition.169 
In the meantime, the Court of Appeal in Düsseldorf seems to have managed to pull 
the teeth of the sales-below-cost provision for many of the practically relevant scena-
rios; where a manufacturer has granted certain generalized promotional rebates for its 
entire product range to a distributor, the distributor may allocate the entire rebate in 
full to the “cost” measure of those products from the range that were actually marketed 
as loss leaders.170  In cases in which the manufacturer has agreed to such general rebates, 
it will be nearly impossible to find that any sale was “below cost.”171  Nevertheless, 
where such an allocation of general rebates is not possible, for example, in the case of 
a single-product manufacturer, it is still the case that German law considers it an 
antitrust violation for undertakings with superior market power to sell below cost on 
a more than an occasional basis, even in the absence of any likelihood that the low 
prices could affect competition.  Accordingly, advertising loss leaders, designed to 
attract customers into a store in order to make a profit on other products bought by 
one-stop shoppers—once (rightly) considered to be entirely unproblematic under both 
antitrust and unfair competition law172—may infringe antitrust law, despite the absence 
of any injury to competition or the market structure.
To make matters even worse, the legislator in 2007 caved in to renewed lobbying 
efforts and made the rule even more restrictive for food products.  With respect to food 
products, even occasional offers to sell below cost are now deemed to be an infringe-
ment unless objectively justified—and available objective justifications are reduced 
to selling perishable stocks or “similarly serious cases.”  While this special provision 
for food products lapsed according to a sunset clause on January 1, 2013, the legisla-
ture chose to revive and extend it until 2018 in the most recent revision of the ARC 
(see now § 20(3)2 no. 1 ARC).173
Margin squeezes are prohibited for the undertaking with superior market power where 
the spread between the wholesale price charged to the SME competitor and the retail 
price of the powerful undertaking is negative (§ 20(3)2 no. 3 ARC).  The paradigm 
case here are cases of the big brand petroleum conglomerates operating their own 
petrol stations while also supplying independent petrol stations.  The Bundeskartellamt 
169 BGH, Nov. 12, 2002, KVR 5/02, WuW/E DE-R 1042, 1045, 1049–1050—Wal-Mart.  For an English summary of 
that case see Wagner-von Papp, supra note 139, para. 465.
170 OLG Düsseldorf, Nov. 12, 2009, VI-2 Kart 9/08 OWi, BeckRS 2010, 07922 – Rossmann, affirmed by the BGH 
(reported in Bundeskartellamt, tätiGkeitsBericht 2009/2010, Bundestags-Drucksache (Parliamentary Documents) 
no. 17/6640, at 30, 80–81).
171 See Bundeskartellamt, aBschlussBericht sektoruntersuchunG milch (Final Report Sector Enquiry Milk), Docket 
B2-19/08 (Jan. 2012) at [330]-[331], available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Stel-
lungnahmen/2012_01_Sektoruntersuchung_Milch_Endbericht_final.pdf (in German).
172 Supra note 153.
173 Supra note 144.
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seems to handle margin squeeze allegations in its enforcement practice with the 
necessary skepticism.174
(iii) Summary and Critique
To summarize, for undertakings that are not dominant, but which have “relative market 
power” because SME undertakings are dependent on them, § 20(1) ARC establishes 
a prohibition to “unduly impede” dependent SME undertakings.  In particular, this 
may result in a duty to deal with SME distributors or suppliers.  § 20(1) ARC also 
prohibits undertakings with relative market power from discriminating between 
dependent SME undertakings without objective justification.  § 20(2) ARC seeks to 
protect dependent suppliers against demands by buyers with demand-side market 
power that seek “special favours.”  § 20(3) ARC establishes prohibitions for underta-
kings that are not dominant but have “superior” market power vis-à-vis their SME 
competitors.  The main categories of prohibited conduct for undertakings with superior 
market power are sales below cost and margin squeezes with a negative spread.
The problem with these rules should be evident.  After all the careful balancing that 
has gone into avoiding false positives in the context of abuses of dominant positions 
(even in the more interventionist EU regime) by making sure that only dominant 
undertakings are subjected to an abuse control of their unilateral conduct, some Member 
States simply overthrow this balance and subject a wide range of other undertakings 
to control of their unilateral conduct.  And on what basis? In the “top brand”/“group 
of top brand” category, in particular, the undertaking is being penalized for having 
invested and succeeded in creating a valuable brand.  One may debate whether having 
such success can in some cases result in an increased exposure to a duty to deal where 
the brand product is so distinct from any substitutes that it becomes a market in itself, 
so that the supplier of this brand is dominant in the market.  But these cases can be 
taken care of under the rules on abuses of a dominant position; in that context, due 
account can be taken of the balancing between underutilization due to the dominant 
undertaking’s incentive to limit output artificially, and the underinvestment that could 
result if the investment incentives for the dominant undertaking to invest in the brand 
product were reduced due to the anticipation of having to accommodate free riders, 
and also the underinvestment into competing brands or technologies on part of the 
dominant undertaking’s competitors.  Extending these balancing decisions to under-
takings that are not dominant—such as Rossignol with its 8 per cent market share—is 
certain to upset the carefully crafted balance, in particular because the standard for 
determining relative market power is a vague one, and the ex ante determination 
whether a given undertaking is subject to the restrictions on its unilateral conduct is 
accordingly difficult.  This may lead to both the prohibition and the chilling of pro-
competitive conduct by non-dominant undertakings.
It is perhaps slightly less easy to deconstruct the merits of the “unique relationship” 
category based on transaction-specific investments.  Where the parties choose markets 
174 Cf. Bundeskartellamt, B7-11/09, [49] et seq.—MABEZ (Aug. 6, 2009).
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over hierarchies, and one of the parties has to make transaction-specific investments, 
there is a potential for post-contractual opportunism by the other party.175  To the extent 
that the investments would be lost for the first party if it moved its assets to another 
use, the second party has the first party over the barrel.  Even where the contract 
specifies the rights of the parties, the law always permits later renegotiations, which 
the second party can use opportunistically to extract the value of the transaction-specific 
investments. It is understandable that a legal regime should want to protect against 
such post-contractual opportunism, because otherwise non-myopic parties would 
underinvest in transaction-specific investments.  And yet, it is unclear that this amounts 
to a competition law problem.  First, one could expect that at least in some cases 
reputational effects would prevent parties from exploiting opportunities to act oppor-
tunistically.  Where a powerful supplier, for example a franchisor, exploits its fran-
chisees, word will get around; short-term profitable opportunism may well be a poor 
business strategy in the longer term.  Secondly, while reliance on reputational effects 
may not always be a sufficient safeguard, the remaining cases of post-contractual 
opportunism could be taken into account in assessing the validity of the modification 
or novation of the contract concluded following renegotiations under contract law 
principles.  It does not require the extension of the control of unilateral conduct to 
conduct by non-dominant undertakings, which could stifle pro-competitive initiatives. 
With regard to prohibited conduct, the rules on economic dependence likewise upset 
the careful balancing that has gone into deciding whether conduct by dominant under-
takings is abusive. 
The harmfulness of the economic dependency rules is particularly evident in the 
prohibition of undertakings with superior market power to offer to sell below cost.176 
With regard to predatory pricing by dominant undertakings, even EU law, which takes 
a more interventionist stance than US law in not requiring proof of likely recoupment, 
requires that the prices are shown to be below the relevant measure of cost; there needs 
to be a short-term sacrifice, at least in the form of deliberately foregone profits as 
opportunity costs.177  It seems clear that even in the EU, it is not predatory pricing if 
an undertaking makes losses on a loss leader which it hopes to recapture concurrently 
with the sale of another product—where, in other words, the undertaking does not 
make a short-term sacrifice.  In the latter case, prohibiting the below-cost pricing would 
harm consumers without addressing any competitive problem.  If any further demons-
tration of the harmfulness of sale-below-cost prohibitions should be necessary, the 
following thought experiment may be instructive.  If two competitors agree not to sell 
below cost, this horizontal price-fixing cartel agreement would not only be unenfor-
ceable for reasons of public policy (see also article 101(2) TFEU), but also would it 
attract a large fine on the undertakings, and in some jurisdictions, may result in fines 
175 See generally, Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 52-67, 95-96, and passim (1985).
176 For more detail, see orGanisation on economic co-oPeration and develoPment (oecd), resale Below cost 
laws and reGulations, DAF/COMP(2005)43 at 9-12 (executive summary) and 19-58 (background note) (Feb. 
23, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/36162664.pdf. 
177 commission, Priorities PaPer, supra note 145, paras. 63-65.
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for or imprisonment of the responsible individuals—and rightfully so.  Where the two 
competitors, however, are supermarket chains (or other undertakings with superior 
market power), the statutory sale-below-cost prohibition is a perfect substitute to the 
cartel agreement, which is even enforced by the law, so that the usual incentive to cheat 
in a non-cooperative prisoners’ dilemma cannot undermine the compact. 
The prohibition of sales below cost in § 20(3) ARC undermines all this careful balan-
cing.  It prohibits low prices from which consumers could have benefitted without any 
clear theory of harm.  Various theories are advanced, explicitly or implicitly, to support 
the prohibition of sales below cost, but none of them is even remotely persuasive. 
Traditionally, the justification for the prohibition of below-cost sales relied on a 
predation narrative; competitors, such as mom-and-pop stores, might be priced out of 
the market by powerful large undertakings, such as the evil supermarket chains.  There 
are several problems with supporting the current law on selling below cost on this 
basis.  First, the practice of offering loss leaders below cost in order to recoup the 
losses with sales of other products to the same customers during their one-stop shop-
ping is not likely to result in any anti-competitive exclusion.  Exclusion of competitors 
is only possible where the overall bundle of products bought by one-stop shopping 
consumers is cheaper than it would be elsewhere—and such overall cheaper prices are 
a victory achieved by efficient competition, not by anti-competitive exclusion.178  Also, 
in the market for retail stores, barriers to entry are low—there would be no possibility 
for post-predation raising of prices.179  The theory relies on a predation narrative without 
any of the necessary preconditions of predatory pricing.  Secondly, the genesis of the 
prohibitions in today’s § 20(3)2 nos. 1 and 2 ARC demonstrates that the predation 
narrative cannot be the justification of these prohibitions.  The Federal Court of Justice’s 
Hitlisten-Platten decision had explicitly been based on this rationale, and had accor-
dingly added the necessity to show a sufficient likelihood of lasting harm to the 
structural conditions for effective competition; but the legislature amended the law 
precisely to overturn this decision.  A predation theory without any need to show that 
the structural conditions for effective competition will be, or at least realistically could 
be, impaired is implausible.  Thirdly, the predation theory becomes even more absurd 
if it is advanced to support the prohibition of even occasional sales below cost, intro-
duced for food products in 2007, and extended in 2013.  Fourthly, especially in the 
paradigm case of supermarkets against mom-and-pop stores, the prohibition of below-
cost sales is completely ineffective in preventing supermarkets from displacing mom-
and-pop stores.  The reason why supermarket chains can offer products at much lower 
prices than mom-and-pop stores are twofold: first, their distribution costs are usually 
lower because of economies of scale and scope; and secondly, they will be able to 
negotiate with their suppliers for larger discounts, either because of economies of scale 
or because of demand-side market power vis-à-vis these suppliers.  Because their costs 
178 For the (self-evident) statement that exclusion on the basis of more efficient conduct is not abusive, see Post 
Danmark, supra note 140, and the quotation from that judgment infra note 241.
179 monoPolkommission, Preiskontrollen in enerGiewirtschaFt und handel? Zur novellierunG des GwB, sPecial 
rePort 47 (2007) [58].
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are lower, supermarket chains can price mom-and-pop stores out of the market even 
with sales at (or slightly above) cost.  Below-cost sales will often be aimed at compe-
tition between the large supermarket chains, rather than at competition with mom-and-
pop stores.
Realizing that the predation narrative does not work, the justification is occasionally 
(implicitly) shifted to a demand-side market power narrative: where supermarket chains 
offer, for example, milk products at below-cost prices to lure customers into their 
stores, they may exercise their demand-side market power to milk the dairy farms and 
creameries dry.  There is indeed some evidence that demand-side market power 
depresses prices below the competitive level in the milk sector.180  The problem, 
however, is that the justification of the prohibition of below-cost selling based on 
demand-side market power is not only a non sequitur; the remedy would be positively 
counterproductive.  Where supermarkets may not offer below cost but nevertheless 
want to lure customers into their stores with low prices for milk products—or want to 
match their competitors’ low prices—they have to reduce their costs for milk products. 
In other words, they have to exert even more pressure on creameries and dairy farms 
to lower their supply prices.  Also, if it were the demand-side market power that was 
to be addressed, it would not make sense to condition the prohibition on the relative 
horizontal size of the undertaking in comparison to the undertaking’s competitors, as 
is the case for cases of superior market power.  If demand-side market power were the 
underlying rationale, sales below costs would have to be a category of relative market 
power in the vertical relationship—the question would have to be whether the 
suppliers—the dairy farms or creameries—are dependent on the distributor, the super-
market chain.
In short, none of these justifications for the sale-below-cost prohibition is remotely 
persuasive.  The continued existence and extension of the sale-below cost statute is 
only explicable by public choice considerations.  The price-increasing effects help 
producers that are well organized and ready to lobby the legislator.  For the general 
population, the harmful effects of sale-below-cost statutes are not sufficiently trans-
parent to put any pressure on legislators; instead, the statute can be sold as a mom-
and-pop store protection scheme—and who would not want to save the high street 
against the evil chains (unless it requires paying transparently higher prices)?
It is particularly unfortunate that the Bundeskartellamt, usually a stalwart for good 
competition advocacy, sent mixed signals to the legislator in the run-up to the 2013 
amendment to the ARC.  On the one hand, it did point out the harmfulness of the 
prohibition.181  On the other hand, it complained at the same time that the Rossmann 
decision by the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf made enforcement of the prohibition 
exceedingly difficult, and that this could only be remedied by a legislative clarifica-
180 See, e.g., Bundeskartellamt, supra note 158.
181 Bundeskartellamt, stellunGnahme Zum reGierunGsentwurF Zur 8. GwB-novelle (June 22, 2012) at 25-26, 
available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/publikationen/Diskussionsbeitraege/StellungnahmenW3D-
navidW26146.php.
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tion.182  Furthermore, the €100,000 fine the Bundeskartellamt had imposed on an 
individual in the Rossmann case—despite unfettered discretion not to prioritize the 
enforcement of the prohibition, or at least not to impose fines, or at least not fines on 
individuals, and despite the borderline conduct, which was later even found to be 
lawful by the courts183—likewise did not send the signal that the sale-below-cost 
prohibition is actually an undesired anti-competitive contaminant in the ARC.  The 
legislator followed the much less mixed signals given by the lobbyists for the retention 
of the prohibition.
3. SME-Protection in the United States
Surely such a travesty could never happen in the United States.  After all, restricting 
unilateral conduct below the monopoly power threshold is the clearest example of 
interference with free competition that is likely to prohibit or chill pro-competitive 
conduct, especially where low prices are concerned.
And yet, once we move beyond Sherman Act enforcement, we encounter quite a number 
of prohibitions that are eerily reminiscent of the economic dependency rules just 
outlined.  Rules limiting the competitive pressures that chain stores may exert vis-à-vis 
mom-and-pop stores without regard to efficiencies (below a.), rules protecting SME 
distributors against termination or non-renewal (below b.), and rules against selling 
below cost (or even below cost plus mark-up) even where there is no question of 
recoupment (below c.) are not wholly unknown in the United States.
a. Robinson-Patman Act
First, similar to the German rules in § 20(1) and (2) ARC—the prohibitions for under-
takings with relative market power to discriminate dependent undertakings and to 
request preferential treatment from suppliers—the Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions184 
were introduced with exactly the same aim of protecting mom-and-pop grocery stores 
against chain stores.185  Like the prohibition of unjustified discrimination in § 20(1) 
ARC, selling at discriminatory prices or providing special favors to selected purchasers 
requires a justification under the Robinson-Patman Act, and unlike the open-ended 
182 Ibid. at 25.
183 See supra note 170.
184 Technically, the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13) amended the Clayton Act.
185 See Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco GMC, 546 U.S. 164, 175 (2006) (“Augmenting that provision 
[§ 2 of the Clayton Act] in 1936 with the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress sought to target the perceived harm to 
competition occasioned by powerful buyers, rather than sellers; specifically, Congress responded to the advent of 
large chain-stores, enterprises with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could demand.”); 
see also Justice Stevens’s dissent (joined by Justice Thomas), ibid., at 187 (“the Robinson-Patman Act was prima-
rily intended to protect small retailers from the vigorous competition afforded by chain stores and other large volume 
purchasers.”); Dayton Superior Corp. v. Majram Supply Co., 2011 WL 710450 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 22, 2011) (“The 
Robinson-Patman Act was specifically enacted to protect small businesses from discriminatory pricing by manu-
facturers in favor of large chain stores” (internal citations omitted)); American Federation of State, County and 
Mun. Employees Dist. Council 37 Health & Sec. Plan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co,—F. Supp.2d—, 2013-1 Trade 
Cases § 27,402, 2013 WL 2391999 at *13 (S.D.N.Y., June 3, 2013).  See also antitrust moderniZation commis-
sion (“amc”), rePort and recommendations 311, 313 (April 2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.  
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interest-balancing under § 20(1) ARC, the Robinson-Patman Act even limits the 
available defenses.186 
Like § 20(2) ARC, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits “passive discrimination” by 
making it unlawful “knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which 
is prohibited by this section.”187
The Robinson-Patman Act distinguishes between primary-line, secondary-line, and 
tertiary-line price discrimination.188  In primary-line price discrimination cases, compe-
ting manufacturers complain that price-discriminating rebates to distributors lead to 
customer foreclosure, for example because particularly high rebates are targeted at the 
competitors’ customers.  In secondary-line price discrimination claims, purchasers 
complain about the seller’s preferential treatment of other purchasers who compete 
with them for customers.  In tertiary-line cases, the discrimination affects competition 
between competing customers of the purchasers where the purchasers themselves are 
not direct competitors. 
Primary-line price discrimination claims are all but obsolete; Brooke Group has held 
that such primary-line discrimination claims have to satisfy basically the same preda-
tory pricing requirements as are required to show a § 2 Sherman Act infringement.189 
Primary-line discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act is arguably not an irritant 
to the error-cost framework any more. 
By contrast, the secondary-line (and tertiary-line) price discrimination prohibited by 
the Robinson-Patman Act aims at protecting individual competitors against injuries, 
regardless of any harm to competition in general. All that is required is a showing of 
a “diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser,” 
and a “permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that a 
favored competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial period of 
time.”190  It is one of the few instances in which most US American antitrust lawyers 
186 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).
187 15 U.S.C. § 13(f).  As to the requirement of “knowingly” inducing a discrimination “prohibited by this section”, 
see Gorlick Distribution Centers v. Car Sound Exhaust System, 723 F.3d 1019, 1021-1024 (9th Cir. July 19, 2013) 
(affirming summary judgment for defendant, because, while the competitor-defendant had known that its discounts 
were higher than those granted to its competitors, plaintiff had not shown that defendant had known that the discounts 
did not qualify for a defense under the Robinson-Patman Act).
188 See, e.g., Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 176; Marjam Supply Co., v. Firestone Building Prods. Co., 2012-2 Trade 
Cases § 78,157, 2012 WL 6005709 at 3 note 6 (D.N.J., Nov. 30, 2012).
189 Supra note 125.  In addition to the requirements of predatory pricing, a primary-line price discrimination claim has 
to show discriminatory rebates.  See Felder’s Collision Parts v. General Motors—F. Supp.2d— 2013 WL 1681175 
(M.D. La., April 17, 2013).  For a similar rejection of primary-line price discrimination allegation under EU law 
where prices were not predatory, see Post Danmark, supra note 144.
190 Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 177 (citing, inter alia, FTC v. Sun Oil, 371 U.S. 505, 518-519 (1963), and FTC 
v. Morton Salt, 334 US 37, 49-51 (1943), respectively); J.D. Fields & Co. v. Nucor-Yamato Steel—F. Supp.2d—2013 
WL 5467104 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 30, 2013). 
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openly, though grudgingly, acknowledge that the law protects competitors instead of 
competition.191
The Robinson-Patman Act is certainly not loved by US American antitrust lawyers, 
and usually its existence is swept under the carpet.192  Judge Bork characterized the 
Act as based on “wholly mistaken economic theory,”193 a characterization with which 
Justice Stevens “happen[s] to agree.”194  
Calls for the repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act are nearly constantly on the table. 
For example, the Antitrust Modernization Commission recommended in 2007: 
The Commission recommends that Congress finally repeal the Robinson-
Patman Act (RPA).  This law, enacted in 1936, appears antithetical to core 
antitrust principles. Its repeal or substantial overhaul has been recommended 
in three prior reports, in 1955, 1969, and 1977.  That is because the RPA 
protects competitors over competition and punishes the very price discounting 
and innovation in distribution methods that the antitrust laws otherwise 
encourage.  At the same time, it is not clear that the RPA actually effectively 
protects the small business constituents that it was meant to benefit.  Continued 
existence of the RPA also makes it difficult for the United States to advocate 
against the adoption and use of similar laws against US companies operating 
in other jurisdictions.  Small business is adequately protected from truly 
anticompetitive behavior by application of the Sherman Act.195
And yet, the Robinson-Patman Act remains in force.196  Nor is it a mere “law in the 
books.”  Even though the DOJ has completely ceased its enforcement, and the FTC 
191 AMC, supra note 185, at 317 (“[t]he Robinson-Patman Act does not promote competition, however. Instead, the 
Act protects competitors, often at the expense of competition that otherwise would benefit consumers . . .”); see 
also the quote accompanying note 176.  But see Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 180-181 (majority stating that 
interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust law, that “[t]he Robinson-Patman Act signals no large 
departure from that main concern,” and that “we would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of 
existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition” (emphasis in the original)).
192 See, e.g., Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 Fordham l. rev. 1113, 1118 (1983) 
(“No one, it appears, dwells longer than necessary in the land of Robinson-Patman”).  The leading treatise on 
Antitrust Law had originally declined to deal with the Robinson-Patman Act, PhiliPP e. areeda & donald F. 
turner, 1 antitrust law 1st edn. (1978) at § 100.  The current edition deals with the Robinson-Patman Act, but 
with the apologetic proviso that “dislike for a particular statute or doctrine is not a good reason for excluding it 
from what purports to be a ‘full coverage’ treatise on federal antitrust law.”  herBert hovenkamP, 14 antitrust 
law 3rd edn. (2012) at § 2300 in footnote 1.  At least at Columbia Law School, exams in antitrust law regularly 
include the instruction: “Assume that the Robinson-Patman Act has been repealed.”
193 Bork, supra note 16 at 382 (“The attempt to counter the supposed threat to competition posed by price discrimi-
nation constitutes what is surely antitrust’s least glorious hour.  The instrument fashioned for the task was the 
Robinson-Patman Act, the misshapen progeny of intolerable draftsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic 
theory. . . .  Although it does not prevent much price discrimination, at least it has stifled a great deal of competition.”). 
194 Dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, in Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 188.
195 AMC, supra note 185, iii.  On the AMC’s recommendation, see Daniel J. Gifford, Farewell to the Robinson-Patman 
Act? The Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Report and Recommendation, 53 the antitrust Bulletin 481-516 
(2009).
196 In Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, this was essentially the dissent’s argument: while the policy of the Robinson-Patman 
Act may be “wholly mistaken,” the letter of the law is still binding.
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has also all but stopped enforcing it, private enforcement—in the form of injunctive 
relief or treble-damages actions—is alive and kicking.197 
In addition to the private enforcement of the federal Robinson-Patman Act, there is 
additional enforcement of similar provisions in state laws; numerous states have 
provisions that more or less mirror the Robinson-Patman Act.198
By contrast, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union, usually 
so much more interventionist than US courts, held that primary-line and secondary-line 
price discrimination as such does not constitute an abuse, even where the discrimina-
ting undertaking is dominant.199
b. Protection of Distributors and Franchisees against Termination
As mentioned above, one of the most common case categories under the German § 20 
ARC is the termination or non-renewal of, or other abusive conduct in the context of 
franchise and similar distribution agreements.  Especially car dealerships and petrol 
station owners frequently seek protection under § 20 ARC. 
Are franchisees protected against opportunistic conduct by the franchisor in the United 
States? Once the question is reframed in these functional terms, it is much less clear 
that US law can be reduced to the simple rule that the non-dominant firm is free to 
structure its distribution system as it sees fit.  There are several state laws protecting 
franchisees against the franchisor’s opportunism.200  As is the case in Germany, car 
dealership franchises and petrol stations are important sub-categories of franchises in 
the United States, and in these sectors franchisees are even protected by federal law.201 
197 While AMC, supra note 185, 316, describes a downward trend in successful enforcement, there is no dearth of 
recent, at least partially successful, Robinson-Patman litigation.  See, e.g., J.D. Fields & Co. v. Nucor-Yamato 
Steel—F. Supp.2d— 2013 WL 5467104 (E.D. Ark. September 30, 2013) (defendant’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings denied in relation to the Robinson-Patman price discrimination claims). 
198 For an in-depth, albeit now slightly dated, treatment of the state price discrimination statutes, see aBa antitrust 
law section, Federal and state Price discrimination law Ch. 4-56 (1991).
199 Supra note 144.
200 See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can franchisee associations serve as a substitute for franchisee 
protection laws?, 118 Penn. st. l. rev. 99, 106 (2013) (citations to the relevant state laws in note 31 and summary 
of the content at 105-107); Lafontaine & Scott Morton, supra note 52; Boyd Allen Byers, Making a case for federal 
regulation of franchise regulation—A return-of-equity approach, 19 J. corP. l. 607, 622, 624-627 (1994) (citing 
various sector-specific and general franchise relationship laws).  See also David Hess, The Iowa Franchise Act: 
Towards protecting reasonable expectations of franchisees and franchisors, 80 iowa l. rev. 333 (1995).
201 With regard to petrol stations (and other franchises in the petroleum industry), the Petrol Market Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806, provides for a notice period for terminations (15 U.S.C. § 2804), and for protection against 
termination and non-renewal for other reasons than those enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b).  In this sector, the 
federal protection preempts state law, 15 U.S.C. 2806(a). With regard to car dealers, 15 U.S.C. § 1222 provides: 
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer engaged in commerce . . . and 
shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit by reason of the failure of said automobile 
manufacturer from and after August 8, 1956, to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of 
the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with 
said dealer: Provided, That in any such suit the manufacturer shall not be barred from asserting in defense 
of any such action the failure of the dealer to act in good faith.
It has, however, been noted that courts tend to interpret ‘good faith’ in 15 U.S.C. § 1222 narrowly as the absence 
of intimidating or coercive conduct. Byers, supra note 200, at 626 (text accompanying fn. 121 with references); 
Byers points out, however, that the federal statute does not preempt state law, unless it is in direct conflict: 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1225, so that the states may protect for more protection of the franchisee under (sector-specific or general) state 
law.
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Contract law rules may also be used to protect franchisees.202  To the extent they apply, 
these provisions usually have the consequence that the franchisor is limited in the 
reasons for terminating, and sometimes even not renewing, the franchise, and/or that 
sufficient notice has to be given to the franchisee—which is very similar to the 
consequences once § 20 of the German ARC applies.203
In the case of car dealerships, US federal law does not preempt state law that does not 
directly conflict with the provisions of federal law.204  Consequently, some state fran-
chise laws exceed the federal protection.  As an illustration, we can use a case mentioned 
in the previous section on the Robinson-Patman Act.  In Volvo Trucks, the US Supreme 
Court held that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibition of secondary-line price discri-
mination has to be interpreted restrictively to exclude competitive bidding cases where 
the product is produced to the customer’s specifications and there is no head-to-head 
competition between the favored and the disfavored purchaser in the individual case.205 
While the plaintiff therefore did not succeed under the Robinson-Patman Act, and 
therefore did not receive treble damages under the Clayton Act, the Court noted that 
the plaintiff had successfully claimed for single damages under the Arkansas Franchise 
Practices Act before the state courts.206  The plaintiff in Volvo Trucks had claimed to 
have been singled out for elimination in the 1997 “Volvo Vision” programme, which 
sought to reduce the number of dealers from 146 to 75; the plaintiff filed the suit in 
February 2000, arguing that Volvo’s strategy had been to make the conditions for its 
dealership so unpleasant as to amount to a constructive termination.  Apparently, this 
argument was enough to claim damages under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act. 
Even under the restrictive German economic dependency rules, Volvo could have 
terminated the dealership outright without fear of reprisal with a notice period of only 
12 months (or possibly less).207 
Leaving antitrust-unrelated rules aside, some US American courts have also argued 
that § 2 Sherman Act (or its state law equivalents) may apply to franchisors even if 
202 See Byers, supra note 200, at 628 (discussing cases under Article 2 of the UCC) and 631-635 (discussing common 
law doctrines).
203 For the question in which cases sufficient notice has to be given before a distribution system can be restructured 
see BGH, Jan. 31, 2012, Case KZR 65/10, WuW/E DE-R 3549, 3553–3554 paras. 22–27—Werbeanzeigen.  Where 
a car dealership is terminated, a contractually agreed notice period of 12 months was considered sufficient even 
where transaction-specific investments have not been amortized by the time the termination becomes effective, 
BGH, Feb. 21, 1995, Case KZR 33/93, neue Juristische wochenschriFt-rechtsPrechtunGs rePort (nJw-rr) 
1260, 1261 (1995) (at the time, the European Block Exemption Regulation no. 123/85 required a notice period of 
1 year, which the court took into account in the assessment).  See also Wernhard Möschel, in, GwB, 4th edn (Ulrich 
Immenga & Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker eds., 2007) at § 20 para. 153 with further referenes.  More generally, 
commercial agency agreements are subject to certain notice periods in the EU. Article 15-19 of Council Directive 
86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed 
commercial agents, [1986] O.J. L382/17 (providing, in principle, for staggered statutory minimum notice periods 
of up to three months (reached after the third year of the contract has commenced), or, if the Member State so 
chooses, up to six months (reached after the sixth year of the contract has commenced)).
204 See supra, note 202.
205 Volvo Trucks, supra note 185. The Court left undecided whether or not two purchasers could ever compete in such 
a situation, given that the sale of the custom-made product would eventually only be made to the one successful 
purchaser. 
206 Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 173 in n. 2.
207 Supra note 190.
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the primary market for franchises on which the franchisor operates is competitive.208 
The reasoning of these courts comes down to the argument—and I apologize for the 
crude oversimplification—that under certain conditions a contract lock-in may confer 
monopoly power even where the primary market is competitive.209  True, where the 
franchisee conferred this power on the franchisor knowingly by contract, it is common 
ground that § 2 Sherman Act will not apply;210 but there are cases where this post-
contractual power was not evident to the franchisee, and under Newcal § 2 Sherman 
Act may apply to these cases.211  This, albeit limited and not widely accepted, contract 
lock-in theory of monopoly power is essentially the same reasoning as that applied by 
German courts to justify “relative market power” while acknowledging that there is 
no dominance.212
To be clear, the point I want to make here is not that we need, or do not need, franchisee 
protection in the absence of monopoly power by the franchisor—perhaps we do, perhaps 
we do not. Nor is my point that we should infer from Newcal that § 2 Sherman Act 
will be applicable in a wide range of franchise cases—arguably it will not.  Nor is my 
point that because US law restricts the supplier’s freedom to structure its distribution 
agreement even in some instances in which the supplier has no monopoly power, we 
should not be critical towards antitrust statutes that provide for rules on economic 
dependency—we should.  Nor is my point that US federal or state law is in many or 
most cases as restrictive (or, depending on one’s point of view, “protective”) as juris-
dictions with rules on economic dependency—my overall impression is that US law 
is much less restrictive (or “protective”).
My point is this: while we are aware of the danger of over-enforcement in the antitrust 
laws, we tend to compartmentalize the law and view its various subdivisions “antitrust 
law,” “contract law,” “franchise law,” “unfair competition law,” etc. in isolation.  As 
a consequence, we are very concerned that antitrust law retain its conceptual and 
doctrinal purity—such as the non-dominant firm’s unrestricted freedom to act unila-
terally.  Accordingly, antitrust lawyers find harsh words for antitrust decisions like 
208 Newcal Ind., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. den., 129 S.Ct. 2788 (2009) (although 
the 9th Circuit was at pains to emphasize that this was only a Rule 12(b)(6) decision, ibid. at 1046 and 1051); 
followed by In re Apple & AT&TM Antitr. Lit., 596 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1302-1306 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  Newcal and In 
re Apple were distinguished in In re ATM Fee Antitr. Lit., 768 F. Supp.2d 984, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (no monopoly 
power conferred by alleged lock-in where switching costs were low).  For a critical discussion of Newcal see PhiliP 
areeda & herBert hovenkamP, 2B antitrust law § 519 3rd edn. (2007) with idem, 2013 suPPlement to antitrust 
law 205-210 (2013). 
209 Newcal, supra note 189, at 1046-1051.  The antitrust franchise cases usually concern allegedly abusive conduct 
within the existing franchise relationship, especially in relation to tying. Arguably, US American courts would not 
go so far as to use the same argument for the termination of the franchise, which by definition releases the franchisee 
back onto the competitive market. This is concededly a not insubstantial difference to the German case law under 
§ 20 ARC, where terminations are one of the main categories of allegedly abusive conduct; but these latter cases 
may be covered by the American state franchise relationship laws as functional equivalents (above nn. 181-183).
210 Newcal, supra note 209, at 1048-1049; Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 (3d 
Cir.1997); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir.1997); In re Apple, supra note 189, 1302-1303, 
1305-1306.
211 Newcal, supra note 208, at 1046-1051; see also In re Apple, supra note 208, at 1301-1306 (alleged technological 
restrictions on switching communications services on the iPhone after the contractual two-year period were not 
transparent to consumers).
212 Supra V.2.c.(i).
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Newcal or the European aftermarket cases such as Hugin or Hilti,213 or antitrust laws 
that include rules on economic dependency.214  However, we lose sight of all the 
restrictions of conduct imposed in other areas of law.  If we are genuinely concerned 
about over-enforcement and the chilling effect it may have on legitimate forms of 
competition, we need to take into account all legal (and ideally even extra-legal) 
restrictions of conduct, not just restrictions by “antitrust laws.”215  The comparative, 
functional perspective highlights that what one jurisdiction treats as an antitrust problem 
(for example franchisee protection under the German rules on economic dependency), 
may be treated by another jurisdiction as a contract or sui generis problem (such as 
the franchise relationship state laws); and that what one jurisdiction treats as a problem 
of economic dependency below the threshold of dominance may be treated by another 
jurisdiction without special rules on economic dependency as a case of monopoly 
power.  We need to look beyond the artificial confines of legal classifications to see 
the whole picture.
c. Sales Below Cost
Surely, however, the non-sensical sales-below-cost prohibition for undertakings with 
superior market power vis-à-vis their SME competitors in the German ARC described 
above216 is so antithetical to the well-balanced error-cost approach in Matsushita and 
Brooke Group,217 which carefully avoids prohibiting or chilling conduct that would 
benefit consumer welfare by requiring a showing of a dangerous probability of recoup-
ment, that nothing like it could possibly exist in the United States.
Yet, again, state law complicates matters.  The sale-below-cost state statutes adopted 
by “a majority of states”218 do upset the careful balance of the predatory pricing error-
213 Cf. Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. Commission, [1979] ECR 1869 [8] 
(market for Hugin cash register spare parts required by independent undertakings); Case C-53/92 P, Hilti AG v. 
Commission, [1994] ECR I-667 (separate market for cartridge strips/nails that are compatible with Hilti nail gun).
214 For the German rules on economic dependency, see supra V.2.c.
215 This is not quite the same as saying that it is irrelevant whether a particular jurisdiction treats, for example, the 
wrongful termination of a franchise as a pure contract (or sui generis etc.) issue or as an antitrust issue.  To the 
extent, for example, that the law of that jurisdiction provides for different remedies in antitrust cases, it may clearly 
be of tremendous importance how the case is qualified.  This is most notably the case in the US, where the quali-
fication of the case as an antitrust case (or not) is of tremendous importance because of the mandatory trebling of 
damages in antitrust cases, whereas under contract and franchise law only single damages are owed (in Volvo 
Trucks, the nudged-out dealer received $513,750 under the Arkansas state franchise law, but missed out on the 
more than “$1.3 million” under the Robinson-Patman Act; Volvo Trucks, supra note 185, at 173 text in and 
accompanying n. 2). But in jurisdictions where the remedy in both contract and antitrust cases is single damages 
to begin with, the distinction may well be of less practical importance.
216 Supra V.2.c.(ii).
217 Supra note 114.
218 Francis M. Dougherty, Validity, Construction, And Application of State Statutory Provision Prohibiting Sales of 
Commodities Below Cost – Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R. 4th 612 § 2[a] (originally published in 1985).  The US 
contribution to the 2005 OECD Roundtable lists 25 states with general resale-below-cost laws, and 31 states with 
resale-below-cost laws for specific products (mostly gasoline, cigarettes, liquor, and milk/dairy products), OECD, 
supra note 176, at 171, 178-179.
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cost framework, and these statutes are frequently litigated.219  Unless these statutes are 
invalidated on constitutional grounds, which is not generally the case,220 or are inter-
preted restrictively along the lines of the federal predatory pricing standard, they, too, 
can undermine the fine balancing of the case law under the federal antitrust laws with 
regard to predatory pricing.221  Some courts have started to interpret these state laws 
restrictively along the lines of federal antitrust laws.  However, the extent to which 
these statutes are to be interpreted restrictively is often unclear; and the statutes 
frequently let sales below costs suffice as prima facie evidence of an intent to injure 
competition, which helps these cases, at a minimum, clear the summary judgment 
hurdle222—which in itself may act as a disincentive to sell below cost because of the 
threat of discovery costs.  Some courts have affirmatively stated that the differences 
between the Sherman Act and the respective state sales-below-cost prohibitions prevent 
the courts from aligning the interpretation of the state statutes with the federal standards 
on predatory pricing.223
219 For an overview of general state law prohibitions of sales below cost and their application, see e.g., douGherty, 
ibid.; see also Edward K. Esping, John R. Kennel & Thomas Mukus, 58 c.J.s. monoPolies § 97 at II.E.3.a. Low 
or Predatory Pricing; for additional statutes against selling gasoline below cost, see Erin Masson Wirth, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provisions Prohibiting Sale of Gasoline Below Cost, 26 A.L.R. 
6th 249 (originally published in 2006).
220 A few state courts have considered sales below cost statutes to be unconstitutional under their state constitutions, 
especially where the statutes did not at least require an intent to injure competition (e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. 
of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 1996-1 Trade Cases § 71,338 (Ark., 1996), striking down art. 4 of Act 380 of 
1993 as violating the due process clause of the Arkansas Constitution; Kentucky Milk Marketing and Antimonopoly 
Commission v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893 (Ky., 1985), finding a minimum-markup scheme (for milk products) 
in violation of art. 2 of the Kentucky constitution; Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80 (Ky., 1989), 
finding a similar minimum-markup scheme for gasoline likewise in violation of art. 2 of the Kentucky constitution), 
while other state courts have rejected claims of unconstitutionality (e.g., Bhandari v. Nilsestuen, 342 Wis.2d 248, 
816 N.W.2d 350 (Table), 2012 WL 1623501 (Wis.App.), 2012 WI App 73 (Wis. App. 2012) (rejecting claim that 
a statute prohibiting sales below cost plus a statutory markup for petrol [and, as the court notes in fn. 4, tobacco 
products and alcohol], as opposed to pure sales below cost for other products, infringed the equal protection clause; 
the statute in question was Wisconsin Stat. § 100.30); Utah v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah, 1990); 
Baseline Liquors v. Circle K Corp., 129 Ariz. 215, 630 P.2d 38 (Ariz. App., 1981) (upholding a statute requiring a 
markup of 12% in the absence of proof of a lesser cost).  For a collection of successful and unsuccessful constitu-
tional challenges see douGherty, supra note 218, at §§ 3-7; for the sector-specific statutes referring to gasoline, 
see masson wirth, supra note 219, at §§ 4 and 5.
221 William H. Jordan, Predatory pricing after Brooke Group: The problem of state “sales below cost” statutes, 44 
emory l.J. 267, 268, 270-272, 300-304, 307-316 and passim (1995), with further references. 
222 See, e.g., J.M. Smith Corp. v. Ciolino Pharmacy Wholesale Distributors, 2012 WL 5349376 (E.D. La. 2012) (leaving 
undecided whether the Louisiana sales below cost statute, La. R.S. § 51:422, is to be interpreted as an antitrust 
statute and requires a likelihood of recoupment, and emphasizing that the mere sales below cost constitute a prima 
facie violation).  In Felder’s Collision Parts, supra note 189, the plaintiff alleged predatory pricing, Robinson-Patman 
Act discrimination, and an infringement of La. R.S. 51:1405(A) (which tracks roughly § 5 FTC Act language), but 
apparently and astonishingly not an infringement of the sales-below-cost statute La. R.S. § 51:422 (the only 
provision that seems to me to have held a modicum of promise on the basis of the pleadings).
223 Bay Guardian v. New Times Media, 187 Cal. App.4th 438, 445, 452-459, 114 Cal. Rptr.3d 392, 395, 402-407 (Cal. 
App. 1 Dis. 2010) (stating that “Section 17043 recites distinctive language, and has dissimilar elements and a 
different focus than [scil.: § 2 Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act]”, 187 Cal. App.4th at 455, 114 Cal. 
Rptr.3d at 404, holding that “recoupment of losses . . . is not a requirement to prove a violation of section 17043”, 
187 Cal. App.4th at 445, 114 Cal. Rptr.3d at 395, rejecting any requirement of an anticompetitive impact, 187 Cal. 
App.4th at 456-457, 114 Cal. Rptr.3d at 405, and upholding jury verdict awarding some $16m in damages); applied 
in Rheumatology Diagnostics Laboratory, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 2013 WL 5694452 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 18, 2013); see 
also Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc., 362 F.3d 639, 648 (10th Cir. 2004) (“This distinction between the 
two Oklahoma statutes is important because an attempted monopolization claim requires not only anticompetitive 
conduct, but that the defendant have sufficient market power such that there is a “ ‘dangerous probability’ that an 
attempt to achieve monopoly power will succeed.”  [citing Brooke Group].  When the anticompetitive conduct at 
issue is below-cost selling, the plaintiff must show that there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will 
recoup any losses it sustained in selling below cost [citing, inter alia, Matsushita].  The purpose of the OUSA, 
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These sales-below-cost statutes can be even more pernicious than the German prohi-
bitions in § 20(3)2 nos. 1 and 2 ARC.  First, some of these statutes prohibit not only 
sales below cost, but sales below “cost plus x% markup” (with x being often around 
5-10).  If one went along with the underlying narrative that mom-and-pop stores and 
other SME’s are to be protected against competition from more efficient chain stores, 
these “cost plus markup” statutes could even make some sense.  Where the German 
provision is internally inconsistent, because the plain sales-below-cost prohibition 
cannot achieve the stated purpose of protecting mom-and-stores against the chain stores 
where the latter have lower costs, the “below-(cost+markup)” prohibition really does 
protect SME’s against competition from more efficient chain stores.224  However, to 
the extent there is agreement that the sales-below-cost prohibitions reduce consumer 
welfare by protecting less efficient competitors, it is clear that the even more restrictive 
“cost plus markup” statutes reduce consumer welfare even more by protecting even 
less efficient competitors against the pressures of competition.  It should also be noted 
that the sales-below-cost statutes will often apply to dual distribution cases so as to 
prohibit margin squeezes—and in the case of sales-below-(cost+markup) statutes, even 
margin squeeze cases where the margin between wholesale and retail prices is positive 
(but lower than the mandatory markup).
There is a second consideration why (at least some) of the state legislation on sales 
below cost can be more restrictive than the German provisions.  The German provisions 
prohibit sales below cost only for undertakings with “superior market power” vis-à-vis 
SME’s, the mom-and-pop stores.  In contrast, many state statutes prohibit sales below 
cost across the board.  As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted: 
Indeed, in some instances the Act appears to have exactly the opposite effect 
from its stated purpose. . . .  The flip side of prohibiting below-cost pricing 
is that smaller enterprises and single retail outlets (the mom and pop stores) 
are not able to use this strategy as a means of attracting customers and, thereby, 
competing with larger firms.  Though completely free and innocent of preda-
tory intent, these smaller outlets are foreclosed by the Act from engaging in 
a pricing mechanism that is one of the few competitive tools they have at 
their disposal.225
Under the German antitrust rule, at least this particular danger does not exist, because 
only undertakings with superior market power, not the “mom and pop stores,” are 
however, is simply to prevent loss leader selling and to protect small businesses. Whether a defendant, in the future, 
may recoup its losses is irrelevant. Thus, under the OUSA, a defendant’s market power is not at issue; rather, the 
inquiry is limited to the defendant’s intent, and whether competitors (or customers) have been injured.” (emphasis 
supplied)). 
224 Provided the mom-and-pop store is not also subject to the cost+markup requirement, see infra text following 
note 207.
225 Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 755, 1996-1 trade cases § 71,338 (Ark.,1996).
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prohibited from selling below cost.226  In addition, where the sales-below-(cost+markup) 
prohibitions apply equally to chain stores and mom-and-pop stores, the internal incon-
sistency that characterizes the German provisions is replicated: the lower costs of chain 
stores enables them to underprice mom-and-pop stores without even selling below 
cost+markup because mom-and-pop stores will have to add the same markup to their 
own, higher, costs.  In other words, there is a Catch 22: either, the cost+markup statute 
applies only to chain stores, in which case less efficient competitors are kept alive arti-
ficially to the detriment of consumer welfare, or the cost+markup schemes applies across 
the board, in which case it will also be detrimental to consumer welfare, but not to the 
same extent, but will at the same time be ineffective in protecting mom-and-pop stores. 
Indications in the EU that above-cost predatory pricing might, in exceptional cases, merit 
attention under Article 102 TFEU227 are usually met with an almost visceral reaction on 
the other side of the Atlantic.  Yet these considerations at least apply only to dominant 
undertakings, and where markets are highly concentrated, it may make some (limited) 
sense to protect even slightly less efficient competitors; they may still provide some 
competitive pressure on the dominant firm and so keep prices below the price (and the 
output above the output) that would result in their absence.  By contrast, the sales-below-
cost statutes generally apply to all firms, regardless of any market power, and the German 
statute applies to cases of merely “superior” market power.  In these cases, the artificial 
protection of less efficient competitors will most likely not contribute anything positive 
to the degree of competition on the market.  Even if there may be exceptional constel-
lations where the protection of the inefficient competitor could put some downward 
pressure on prices even in these markets, this positive effect is surely outweighed by the 
costs of shielding the many inefficient competitors from competition by more efficient 
undertakings.  The balance between type I and type II errors is difficult to strike in many 
situations; I would submit that this is not one of them. 
Given the various US American rules that explicitly or implicitly protect SMEs against 
competition from more efficient larger competitors—such as the Robinson-Patman Act, 
the federal and state laws on franchisees’ protection, and prohibitions of sales below cost 
on the level of state law—it is perhaps slightly surprising that the United States denied 
226 Concededly, the German unfair competition rules could apply to sales below cost even where the seller does not 
have superior market power (even though “some degree of market power” is said to be required even here, supra 
note 145, at para. 10.191).  However, sales below cost without more are not considered to be unfair competition. 
On the contrary: the seller is generally free to sell below its costs. See BGH, January 31, 1979, Case I ZR 21/77, 
neue Juristische wochenschriFt (nJw) 2611 (1979) = ZeitschFirt Für GewerBlichen rechtsschutZ und urhe-
Berrecht (Grur) 321 (1979)—Verkauf unter Einstandspreis I; BGH, October 27, 1988, Case I ZR 29/87, neue 
Juristische wochenschriFt-rechtsPrechunGsrePort (nJw-rr) 356 (1989) = GRUR  371 (1990)—Preiskampf; 
BGH, March 30, 2006, Case I ZR 144/03, GRUR 596, 597 (2006)—10% billiger.  The qualification as “unfair” 
competition is reserved for those sales below cost which are (i) intended to eliminate competition and (ii) “objec-
tively capable of eliminating competitors”. BGH, March 30, 2006, Case I ZR 144/03, GRUR 596, 597 (2006)—10% 
billiger; Köhler, supra note 164, paras. 10.189-192. Moreover, the intention to eliminate competition may not be 
deduced from the mere fact that the sales were below cost, or that they result in the elimination of a (less efficient) 
competitor, see Köhler, supra note 164, para. 10.192. 
227 commission, Priorities PaPer, supra note 145, [24], [65].
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not merely having explicit rules on “abuses of superior bargaining power,” but also that 
there were any other applicable competition or non-competition provisions.228 
VI. A Preliminary Summary and  
a Few Comparative Observations
1. A Few Comparative Observations on the Differences  
between the EU and US
The examples have shown that the error-cost framework, so carefully balanced for 
vertical non-price restraints (part III), vertical price restraints (part IV), and unilateral 
conduct (part V) on the US federal antitrust level, is not applied as strictly in the 
European Union, even though there has been some convergence over the past 15 years. 
Remaining differences between the US and the EU are sometimes due to the institutional 
background.  In the EU, where antitrust enforcement is still largely administrative 
enforcement (despite efforts to strengthen private enforcement that have changed the 
landscape in recent years229), type I errors do not have to be eliminated to the same 
extent on the level of the interpretation of the substantive laws; the reduction of type 
I error can be left to the discretion of the administrative authority tasked with enforcing 
the laws.230  This environment is very different from the one in the United States, where 
the restrictive interpretation of the substantive antitrust laws is often a result of the—
justified or unjustified—fear of a chilling effect resulting from unmeritorious private 
litigation.231  We have it on excellent—indeed the very best—authority that in the 
United States
228 See ICN, supra note 155, at 10 (“Of the 32 jurisdictions responding to the survey, 24 jurisdictions indicated that 
their laws and regulations do not contain any specific prohibition against ASBP.  Most agencies in those jurisdictions 
noted that ASBP is not an antitrust term or concept under the legal systems of those jurisdictions.  In this category, 
12 jurisdictions (Barbados, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Jersey, Pakistan, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States) reported no applicable provisions and did not respond to the remainder 
of questionnaire section B.  The remaining jurisdictions responded to the questionnaire on the basis of their general 
competition provisions, non-competition provisions, or both types of provisions, to the extent that these may apply 
to ASBP-type conduct.”).
229 There is now considerable private enforcement in some Member States, for example, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, although it is not remotely comparable to the practice in the US  The EU Commission has recently 
proposed legislation to overcome some of the remaining procedural hurdles, see Commission Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 (June 11, 2013).
230 Cf. vickers, supra note 132 at 6; for a formalization in an economic model of the different incentives under an 
administrative and a private enforcement regime see Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, Insti-
tutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards (13 March 2014) (preliminary version of the working paper 
presented at the MaCCI Annual Conference 2014).  This is a consideration that is accepted in the US as well, where 
the laxer standards of § 5 FTC Act are justified by pointing to the enforcement discretion and expertise of the FTC. 
I refuse to take a position in the recent heated discussion about the merits or demerits of § 5 FTC Guidelines that 
would limit the FTC’s discretion (supra note 131) for much the same reasons why I avoid travelling into war zones 
during my holidays.
231 Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-559 (2007), and the statements by Bill Kovacic in the text 
following this footnote.  But see aai supra note 16 at 219-246 (arguing that the allegations of wide-spread 
unmeritorious, frivolous and prohibitively expensive private enforcement are unfounded, and that the EU should 
introduce effective private rights of action).
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[j]udicial concerns about over-deterrence also appear to stem from perceptions 
that the existing system of private rights of action is unduly expansive.  Fears 
about unduly expansive private enforcement are driving doctrine in an increa-
singly non-intervention minded direction that encumbers public agencies as 
well.  In their efforts to correct what they believe to be overreaching by private 
litigants, courts are embracing liability standards that inevitably curb public 
enforcement bodies.232
Bill Kovacic concludes:
If, as I believe, judicial perceptions of overreaching by private suits are 
narrowing the zone of substantive liability, public agencies eventually may 
be unable to do their job.  This consideration points to the need for a deeper 
empirical examination of how the operation of private rights actually affects 
business decision making and how public agencies can prosecute cases without 
carrying burdens that courts have imposed on private litigants to cure perceived 
deficiencies in the system of private rights.233
Other differences between the EU and US systems may be explicable by a different 
weighting of type I and type II errors due to the different historical development of 
the market players in the European Union, where many sectors, especially utilities, 
are still dominated by incumbent state-owned undertakings, undertakings protected 
by legal monopolies, or their successors. 234  Where investments in infrastructure were 
initially financed by taxpayer money, granting competitors access to this infrastructure 
may be less problematic from an error-cost perspective than in an environment where 
the investment in the infrastructure was a result of private initiative.  Whatever its 
merits in the US, “[y]ou did not build that!”235 gets a whole new meaning in the 
European context.
Then there is, of course, the old recognition that the US is, for all practical purposes, 
a single market, whereas Europe started with protected national markets.  The idea 
that it is not sufficient to tear down state interference with interstate trade if private 
actors then re-establish the division into national markets by way of private restraints 
is one that underlies not only the creation of the Single Market in Europe,236 but also 
many of the initiatives to introduce a competition law framework into the WTO regime, 
or more generally the accusations of market barriers against international entry erected 
by private restraints.  While Europe has come a long way since 1958, surprisingly 
232 statement oF Ftc chairman william e. kovacic, supra note 8, at 4 (see also ibid. at 6-7); also cf. kovacic, supra 
note 8, at 22-23; monti, supra note 132, at 357-359.
233 statement, ibid. at 8.
234 Post Danmark, supra note 140, at [23] (“When the existence of a dominant position has its origins in a former 
legal monopoly, that fact has to be taken into account.”).  See also vickers, supra note 132, at 6; Jones & Lovdahl 
Gormsen, supra note 141, at 456; Zöttl, supra note 150 (seeing this aspect as part of the explanation for the greater 
willingness of the Court of Justice of the EU to accept margin squeeze allegations against incumbent telecoms 
firms).
235 A phrase that even has its own Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You_didn’t_build_that.
236 Supra notes 28, 39.
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many product markets are still to be defined on a national level, for example due to 
national regulations, consumer preferences, or language barriers. 
Yet other differences may be due to the different ideological background of the antitrust 
laws.  Ordoliberalism has been a strong influence on European Union law, and the 
starting point of an individual’s freedom to compete which should be restrained neither 
by state nor by powerful private actors, and the focus on the competitive process rather 
than the outcome may lead to slightly different results than the prevailing focus on 
efficiency dominating the US American discourse.237  However, these ideological 
differences should not be overstated.238  Contrary to the insinuations by many depictions 
of ordoliberalism in English,239 the individual’s freedom to compete240 is not to be 
confused with a guarantee for this individual to stay on the market.  Where an indivi-
dual competitor cannot compete with more efficient competitors solely because of its 
lower efficiency, its elimination from the market is a result of competition.241  Just like 
the freedom of speech does not guarantee that anybody listens to you, the freedom to 
compete does not guarantee your survival on the market.  Even though ideological 
differences are arguably most often invoked in explaining differences, the real reasons 
usually lie elsewhere.  In reality, the two approaches of ordoliberalism and efficiency-
237 See in particular Pierre Larouche & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: 
Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act, social science research network (May 2013), TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2013-020, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293141; see also david J. GerBer, GloBal comPetition: 
law, markets, and GloBaliZation 159-204, esp. 167-175, 181-198 (2010) with further references; idem, law and 
comPetition in twentieth century euroPe: ProtectinG Prometheus (1998).
238 For a concise yet very well-balanced account of different strands of ordoliberalism and the freedom to compete in 
English, see Lianos, supra note 39, at 30-36; see also ibid., 36-41 on the competitive process as an intrinsic value.
239 See, e.g., alison Jones, eu comPetition law 4th edn. 35 (2011) (“An ordoliberal approach leads to the kind of 
competition policy . . . where competitors and small and medium sized enterprises are protected for their own sake 
regardless of the effects on efficiency . . . .”); richard whish & david Bailey, comPetition law 7th edn. 22 (2012) 
(“It is not surprising that the beneficiaries of such thinking would be small and medium-sized firms . . .”); even 
Anca Daniela Chiriţă, The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices Under German Antitrust Law 
in Light of EC Antitrust Law, 4 eur. comPetition J. 415, 439-440 (2008) appears to fall into this trap, despite her 
otherwise extensive knowledge of the subject matter (see at 439: “German ordoliberal thinking considers SMEs 
to be crucial to achieving the goal of enhancing consumer welfare . . .”, and at 440: “This ‘special’ protection from 
the excess of market power applies only to SMEs and newcomers . . ., and reveals a modern facet of German 
ordoliberalism.”).  The confusion is understandable—German competition law is heavily influenced by ordolibe-
ralism, and it contains provisions that clearly protect SMEs for their own sake.  However, these latter rules are the 
result of SME lobbying and political opportunism, not of ordoliberal ideas.  The SME provisions have been 
consistently denounced by ordoliberals, see e.g., ernst-Joachim mestmäcker, der verwaltete wettBewerB (1984); 
and the many critical observations and recommendations by the Monopoly Commission, e.g., monoPolkommission, 
supra note 179 at [54]-[72] (sales below cost), [73]-[99] (passive discrimination); monoPolkommission, die 8. 
GwB-novelle aus wettBewerBsPolitischer sicht, sPecial rePort 63, (2012) at [79]-[82] (passive discrimination), 
[83]-[85] (sales below cost); monoPolkommission, stärkunG des wettBewerBs in handel und dienstleistunGen, 
xix. main rePort 2010/2011 (2012), Bundestags-Drucksache (Parliamentary Document) no. 17/10365, at [169], 
[1184]-[1188] (sales below cost), [1178]-[1183] (passive discrimination); see also monoPolkommission, marktöF-
FnunG umFassend verwirklichen, XII. Main Report 1996/1997 (1998), Bundestags-Drucksache (Parliamentary 
Document) no. 13/11291, at [99].  For an excellent account of ordoliberalism see Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 
237.
240 Wernhard Möschel, The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: TheExample of 
Competition Policy, 157 Journal oF institutional and theoretical economics (Jite) 3, 5 (2001) (“Ordoliberal 
policy . . . protects the individual’s economic freedom of action as an end in itself”).
241 See the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Post Danmark, supra note 140, at [21]-[22] (“Nor does that provision 
[article 102 TFEU] seek to ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position 
should remain on the market.  Thus, not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition (see, 
by analogy, TeliaSonera Sverige, paragraph 43).  Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure 
from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers 
from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.”).
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based competition law are rarely far apart in their recommendations.  From a US 
perspective, the following quote from Richard Posner encapsulates the relationship of 
efficiency and the process of competition well: “Efficiency is the ultimate goal of 
antitrust, but competition a mediate goal that will often be close enough to the ultimate 
goal to allow the courts to look no further.”242  The ordoliberal perspective is often said 
to be that efficiency is not an end in itself but is “an indirect and derived goal” of the 
competitive process;243 but there is also the even more process-oriented view that we 
will only ever know what outcome is efficient if there is competition, because we can 
establish what is efficient only once the individual preferences have been revealed in 
the process of competition (Erich Hoppmann).244  Even this view, however, has to be 
modified in cases where market failures make the outcome of unfettered competition 
unreliable indicators for efficiency and welfare.245  The difference between the effi-
ciency-oriented Chicago approach and the process-oriented ordoliberal approach, then, 
is that the former sees competition as a “mediate goal that will often be close enough 
to the ultimate goal [of efficiency],” while the latter sees the process of competition, 
usually, as a necessary condition for achieving efficiency, but exceptionally allows 
departures where there are intrinsic reasons why merely guaranteeing an unfettered 
process of competition would be inefficient.  The positions are not very far apart, even 
though the efficiency-oriented view may be, as a matter of degree, more willing than 
the process-oriented view to short-circuit the competitive process as soon as the most 
efficient outcome appears evident.  Mutatis mutandis, the result-oriented view may 
also, as a matter of degree, put more weight on certain and quantifiable allocative 
efficiencies that are achievable in the short run, for example resulting from cooperation, 
and discount to a greater degree uncertain dynamic efficiencies that could potentially 
result from independent action, while the process-oriented view might prefer to force 
the firms to engage in duplicative (and therefore in the short term inefficient) inde-
pendent action, in the hope that the uncertain, but potentially great dynamic efficiencies 
eventually offset the short-term inefficiencies of duplication.  This difference goes less 
to the “freedom versus efficiency” debate that is so often emphasized when ordolibe-
ralism is mentioned, and more to the potential conflict between certain short-term 
quantifiable allocative efficiencies on the one hand, and uncertain long-term, difficult 
to quantify, though potentially large dynamic efficiencies on the other hand.  This is a 
conflict that even a system that focuses purely on efficiency-reasons has to address.
Ordoliberalism has also resulted in a preference for ex ante legal certainty, justiciabi-
lity, and hence “form-based” rules.246  Especially in the context of Article 102 TFEU, 
this form-based approach has led to severe criticism for leading to too many Type I 
errors.  Yet again, however, it is necessary to distinguish the application of the “form-
242 Posner, antitrust law, 2nd edn. 28-29 (2001). 
243 möschel, supra note 240, at 4.
244 See also lianos, supra n. 39, at 36-39.
245 On the controversy on this point see wernhard möschel, wirtschaFtsrecht im wandel 210-228 (2011). 
246 lianos, supra n. 39, at 35-36; wernhard möschel, recht der wettBewerBsBeschränkunGen 53-54 (1983).
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based” approach as practiced by the Court of Justice—which is, in my view, indeed 
often too interventionist—from the principle of relying on predictable ex ante rules 
that do not depend on the ad hoc proof of anti-competitive effects in each individual 
case.  The approach of accepting the Type I and Type II errors in individual cases that 
are inevitably associated with a rule-based (as opposed to a case-by-case) decision-
making in competition law can be justified when the costs of administering the 
application of competition law are taken into account.247  This concern is also reflected 
in the US American staggered approach of applying per se prohibitions, a quick-look 
rule of reason illegality, the full rule of reason, a quick-look rule of reason legality, or 
per se legality, depending on the ex ante probability that a particular form (!) of conduct 
is pro- or anti-competitive.  However, even from the perspective of a form-based 
approach, the rules can and should be fine-tuned to reflect new insights into the relative 
costs of Type I and Type II errors; and, in this regard, the Court of Justice’s practice, 
which often refers to 40 year old cases without any discussion whether their analysis 
may need updating, can be criticized with good reason.
2. Differences between the Theoretically Pure and Practically Messy 
Legal Position in the (United?) States
However, the examples above have also shown, however, that the remaining points 
that are in dispute between the US and the EU framework occasionally pale against 
the differences between the rhetoric underlying the application of the US federal 
antitrust laws (more precisely, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, excluding the 
Robinson-Patman Act) and the reality of the law in action in the individual states. Due 
to a number of “irritants,” the error-cost framework may be of less impact on the law 
in action in the United States than could be assumed on the basis of the federal law in 
the books as it is presented to foreigners.
Some of the irritants derive from the application of federal statutes, such as the 
Robinson-Patman Act, § 2 Sherman Act where market power is found to derive only 
from a contractual lock in, or the federal franchise protection statutes in the petroleum 
and car sectors. 
Most of the irritants to the error-cost framework, however, originate on the state level, 
either because of more restrictive state antitrust laws—for example, states prohibiting 
minimum resale price maintenance per se even post Leegin248—or because of unfair 
competition laws in the broader sense that protect competitors to the detriment of 
247 Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of ‘Per 
se Rules vs. Rule of Reason’ social science research network (November 21, 2005), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=872694. 
248 Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of 
Regulatory Competition, 13 Geo. mason l. rev. 309, 321-322 (2005), warning that Regulation 1/2003 risks “[r]
eplicating the flaws of the US system”, “in which there are dozens of institutions that can say ‘no’ but not one that 
can say ‘yes.’” (internal citation marks omitted, citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 
61 antitrust l. J. 99, 109 (1992)), Firat cenGiZ, antitrust Federalism in the eu and the us (2012) 94 (writing, 
after discussing the validity of Illinois Brick Repealers: “[A]s the downside of this flexible approach [scil.: to 
preemption of state antitrust law], when designed strategically, diverse state standards may impose significant 
burdens on the system and force a policy change at the federal level, even though that policy change is not 
considered entirely plausible from a substantive perspective.”).
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consumers, such as franchisee protection statutes or sales-below-cost statutes.  Bill 
Kovacic is among those who have called attention to the problem: 
To an important degree, both jurisdictions [scil.: US and EU] resemble a 
policymaking archipelago in which various government bodies other than the 
competition agency deeply influence the state of competition. Too often each 
policy island in the archipelago acts in relative isolation, with a terribly 
incomplete awareness of how its behavior affects the entire archipelago.  It 
is ever more apparent that competition agencies must use non-litigation policy 
instruments to build the intellectual and policy infrastructure that connects 
the islands and engenders a government-wide ethic that promotes competi-
tion.249
Given that the error-cost framework is firmly based on the recognition that over-
enforcement can be not only unhelpful for, but positively detrimental to the goals of 
antitrust law, the question of federal pre-emption of the state laws by the federal 
antitrust laws arises naturally.
VII. A Case for Federal Preemption 
and EU Convergence?
After all that was said above, it is not surprising that there have been calls for federal 
pre-emption,250 especially where state statutes interfere with interstate vertical price 
maintenance schemes251 or the predatory pricing standards.252  Others, including the 
majority of the Commissioners in the Antitrust Modernization Commission, consider 
the resulting divergences as an acceptable price to be paid for having antitrust federa-
lism.253
249 kovacic, supra note 5, at 24. 
250 Commissioner John Warden’s separate statement in the AMC Report and Recommendations, supra note 185, 444 
(“I believe that state law—whether called antitrust law, consumer protection law or unfair competition law—that 
regulates the same business activity with the same purported objectives as the federal antitrust laws should be 
preempted except in its application to strictly local activities affecting a particular State. . . .”).
251 See, e.g., Bruckmann, supra note 114 (arguing for a narrow pre-emption where the conduct takes place wholly out 
of the per se State and where the prohibition’s application to this conduct would amount to controlling extraterri-
torial conduct); Katherine M. Brockmeyer, Note, State Regulation of Resale Price Maintenance on the Internet: 
The Constitutional Problems with the 2009 Amendment to the Maryland Antitrust Act, 67 wash. & lee l. rev. 
1111 (2010) (finding in Maryland’s per se approach a violation of the dormant commerce clause); Leiv Blad & 
Bryan Killian, A Civil Conflict: Can the States Overturn Leegin? 1(1) cPi antitrust chronicle (Jan. 7, 2011). 
252 Jordan, supra note 221, 306-309 (discussing whether the interference of sale-below-cost statutes with the federal 
predatory pricing standards could lead to a constitutional challenge, but, after reviewing several unsuccessful 
challenges under the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process 
Clause, concluding that “the Supreme Court’s decision in ARC America and the opinions of appellate courts . .  . 
make the success of a preemption challenge to state sales below cost statutes extremely unlikely.” (ibid. at 309)). 
For an overview of various unsuccessful and (much less often) successful constitutional challenges of the sales-
below-cost statutes, see also Dougherty, supra note 218, at §§ 3-7.
253 Supra note 185, at 185-197 (though suggesting that state antitrust enforcement focus on local markets); but see the 
separate Statement of Commissioner Carlton, ibid. 400, and especially the one by Commissioner Warden (supra 
note 250).  It should be noted that the trigger for the scrutiny by the AMC seems to have been the Microsoft case, 
and therefore the focus was more on state enforcement of the federal laws. Harry First, Modernizing State Antitrust 
Enforcement: Making the Best of a Good Situation, 54 the antitrust Bulletin 281-304 (2009).  While divergences 
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1. Preemption in the United States
This is not the place to discuss in depth constitutional issues, such as that of the dormant 
Commerce Clause—and, at any rate, I certainly would be the wrong person for doing 
this.254  I will therefore confine myself to a few superficial observations that, I hope, 
are permitted to an outsider. 
At least at first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in California v. ARC America255 
would seem to prevent successful pre-emption challenges based on the reasoning that 
the state laws on resale price maintenance, sales below costs, or franchise protection 
interfere with the general policies under the federal antitrust laws.  ARC America 
concerned a pre-emption challenge to Illinois Brick Repealer statutes.  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had argued that the state statutes allowing indirect purchasers 
to claim damages contrary to the interpretation in Illinois Brick of the federal antitrust 
laws (§ 4 of the Clayton Act) interfered with the policies espoused in Illinois Brick, 
namely preventing complex litigation regarding the amount of the pass on, preventing 
multiple liability of the defendant, and providing sufficient incentives for the direct 
purchasers to bring a claim.256  The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that, first, the 
federal antitrust laws did not explicitly or implicitly preempt the field of antitrust law.257 
Secondly, any pre-emption challenge against the application of state antitrust laws 
would face an uphill battle, because of the presumption that “areas traditionally regu-
lated by the States” are not preempted by federal law258 and antitrust laws were 
traditionally regulated by the states.259  Thirdly, the relevant test for answering whether 
the application of state laws was preempted was the following:
The path to be followed in pre-emption cases is laid out by our cases. It is 
accepted that Congress has the authority, in exercising its Article I powers, 
to pre-empt state law. In the absence of an express statement by Congress 
that state law is pre-empted, there are two other bases for finding pre-emption.  
First, when Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field, state law 
between enforcers may lead to practical problems as well, this state enforcement of federal laws seems more 
unproblematic to me than the application of divergent state laws, especially as the federal courts have jurisdiction 
over state enforcement of federal antitrust law, so that there is a harmonizing influence here.  See also Thomas C. 
Arthur, The Unsatisfactory Application of the Antitrust Statutes of the United States by the Federal Courts, in 
modernisation oF euroPean comPetition law 61, 64-65 (Jules Stuyck & Hans Gilliams eds., 2002).  Arthur states 
that “[w]hile state antitrust laws could be more restrictive of business practices than is federal antitrust law, that 
has remained a theoretical rather than a practical problem.” (ibid., 64).  The different assessment here (in contrast 
to the AMC and Arthur) is arguably owed to two circumstances: first, Leegin has made federal law more permissive, 
so that in this respect states are now “lagging behind.”  Secondly, Arthur’s remark and the considerations of the 
AMC refer to the state antitrust laws, while I consider (albeit superficially) non-antitrust state rules as well as state 
antitrust rules.
254 The most important constitutional considerations with respect to antitrust federalism are discussed from a compa-
rative US-EU perspective in cenGiZ, supra note 248.
255 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
256 In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Lit., 817 F.2d 1435, 1444-1447 (9th Cir. 1987).
257 California v. ARC America, 490 U.S. 93, 101-102 (1989).
258 Ibid. at 101; see also ibid.: “‘[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not 
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).”
259 Ibid. at 101 with footnote 4.
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in that field is pre-empted. . . .  Second, even if Congress has not occupied the 
field, state law is nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with 
federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impos-
sible, . . . , or when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” . . . .260 
In ARC America, as in the scenarios of interest here, the only question was whether 
the state laws in question “pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”  With regard to the Illinois Brick Repealer statutes granting 
standing to indirect purchasers, the court argued that “State laws to this effect are 
consistent with the broad purposes of the federal antitrust laws: deterring anticompe-
titive conduct and ensuring the compensation of victims of that conduct.”261  The Court 
then went on to explain that Illinois Brick merely concerned the statutory interpretation 
of federal law, and that the policy reasons that led the Court in Illinois Brick to restrict 
standing for damages claims to direct purchasers under federal law were not undermined 
by state laws granting indirect purchasers standing as well.262  The complexities of 
litigation reintroduced by the necessity to unravel the pass-on issue could be confined 
to state courts.263  The Court also dismissed the argument that the Illinois Brick Repea-
lers interfered with the policy that direct purchasers should have a sufficient incentive 
to bring a suit.264  With regard to the policy of avoiding multiple liability, the Court 
stated that multiple liability was only to be avoided under § 4 Clayton Act, and that 
“in none of those cases [scil., inter alia, Illinois Brick] did the Court identify a federal 
policy against States imposing liability in addition to that imposed by federal law.”265
The problem in extrapolating from ARC America to the pre-emption questions at issue 
here (resale price maintenance, franchise protection, sales below cost) is that ARC 
America is based on both a broad and a narrow ground.  The narrow ground consists 
260 Ibid. at 100-101 (internal citations omitted).
261 Ibid. at 102.
262 Ibid. at 103 (“[N]othing in Illinois Brick suggests that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to 
allow indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust laws.  The Court of Appeals also erred in concluding 
that state indirect purchaser statutes interfere with accomplishing the purposes of the federal law that were identi-
fied in Illinois Brick”).
263 Ibid. at 103-104, pointing to the fact that claims under the Illinois Brick Repealer statutes could be brought in the 
state courts to begin with, and that where the plaintiff sued before the federal courts, the federal courts could 
exercise their discretion to decline jurisdiction over the state law claims.
264 The Court’s argument here seems not entirely unambiguous to me.  The Court argues that the settlement should 
have separated the funds for distribution under federal antitrust law for direct purchasers and those for distribution 
under the state laws, which could be distributed among direct and indirect purchasers (see ibid. at 104-105).  Yet 
it is clear that unless there is multiple liability for the defendant, it is impossible to divide the damages in such a 
way that both indirect and direct purchasers receive damages without necessarily diminishing the amount of damages 
that would have been available to the direct purchasers.  The argument seems to be that Illinois Brick was merely 
concerned with providing sufficient incentives that somebody bring an action: “Illinois Brick was concerned that 
requiring direct and indirect purchasers to apportion the recovery under a single statute—§ 4 of the Clayton 
Act—would result in no one plaintiff having a sufficient incentive to sue under that statute. State indirect purchaser 
statutes pose no similar risk to the enforcement of the federal law.” Ibid. at 104. This, however, seems to be based 
either on multiple liability for the defendant or on an implicit discounting of the force of the incentive argument 
in Illinois Brick. It appears that the Court assumed that the indirect purchasers would be reimbursed from separate 
funds, after direct purchasers were fully compensated under federal law – in other words, the Court seems to accept 
multiple liability for the defendant. See the text following this footnote. 
265 Ibid. at 105.
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in the analysis that the three policy grounds for denying standing for indirect purcha-
sers are unaffected by the state statutes.  Some commentators have indicated doubts 
whether this narrow argument can be extrapolated to the conflict between Leegin and 
the per se treatment in the states, or the conflict between the safe-harbor afforded to 
unilateral conduct of firms without monopoly power on the federal level and the 
franchise protection laws on the state level, or the conflict between the federal preda-
tory-pricing standards and the sales-below-cost statutes.266  However, it seems to me 
that the broad reason given by the Court, that in principle state statutes based on the 
state’s police powers will not be preempted except where there is a clear indication 
from Congress, would lead the courts in all the above-mentioned scenarios to adopt a 
position equally accommodating to the state statutes as the analysis in ARC America. 
In all these scenarios one can argue that the State laws in question “are consistent with 
the broad purposes of the federal antitrust laws,”267 despite their divergence from federal 
law. 
With regard to resale price maintenance, one can argue that, first, federal antitrust law 
considered this practice as per se prohibited for nearly a century and, secondly, that 
even today federal law does not consider the practice per se legal but subjects it to a 
rule of reason analysis; it does not seem particularly outrageous, then, that individuals 
states take a slightly stricter stance.  Thirdly, during the time when there was a federal 
per se rule but the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts permitted the states to enact “fair 
trade laws” (from 1937 to 1975), the constellation that a seller from a “non-fair trade 
law State” (today: a per se State, such as California268 or Maryland269) sold goods below 
the minimum price into a “fair trade law State” (today: a Leegin State, such as 
Tennessee270) already existed in the United States.  In one such case, the Second Circuit 
accepted that the undercutting of the fair-trade prices was a natural consequence of 
leaving the decision whether to adopt fair trade laws to the individual states.271  While 
it is true that the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts made it clear that the choice whether 
to outlaw resale price maintenance was one for the states to make, while today this 
freedom of choice for the states merely follows from the general assumption that the 
states are free to regulate unless they are preempted, it seems unlikely that the courts 
would today see exactly the same constellation as so unbearable that they would find 
the state laws as implicitly preempted.272 
266 See, e.g., Bruckmann, supra note 114 (arguing for a narrow pre-emption where the conduct takes place wholly out 
of the per se State and where the per se prohibition’s application to this conduct would amount to controlling 
extraterritorial conduct); Blad & Killian, supra note 251 (arguing that ARC America does not preclude a preemp-
tion challenge against Leegin Repealers).
267 Ibid. at 102.
268 Supra note 90-92.
269 Supra note 102.
270 Supra note 86. 
271 General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. den., 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
272 But see Bruckmann, supra note 114, at 401-403, who discusses the Masters Mail Order case, but finds its reasoning 
unavailing in today’s environment, because today, in contrast to then, there is no federal statute that makes clear 
that leaving the decision to the states is an affirmative choice.
83William E.  Kovacic  |  An Antitrust Tribute - Liber Amicorum - Volume II 
Florian Wagner-von Papp
The franchise protection laws, which, like other unfair competition laws on the state 
level, can conflict with the safe-harbor for firms without monopoly power, also share 
the “broad purpose” with federal laws—namely, the federal laws protecting franchisees 
in the car sector and the petroleum sector.273  What is more, the federal statute in the 
car sector explicitly allows the states to adopt their own car dealership protection laws 
provided they do not conflict with the federal statute.274  In this context, it seems 
difficult to argue that the State franchise protection laws must be preempted.  More 
generally, if one wanted to preempt all laws that would interfere with the safe-harbor 
for firms without monopoly power, it would be difficult to know where to stop—unless 
one wants to harmonize practically all laws regulating businesses across the States. 
We will get back to this argument in the European context.275  It seems to me that in 
the United States the idea of preempting vast fields of police powers would meet with 
even greater resistance than in the European Union.276
This last argument also applies to the sales-below-cost laws.  While the attempt to 
justify these laws in terms of an antitrust theory of harm seems to defend the 
indefensible,277 the states could argue that the sales-below-cost laws are meant to protect 
SME competitors with strong roots in the local community, or that they serve a consumer 
protection purpose, because consumers could be misled into thinking that in a store 
where milk is cheap everything else is cheap as well.  Before anyone objects that it is 
unrealistic that anyone would employ these justifications, I would like to point to the 
Wisconsin sales-below-cost prohibition, which states that 
[t]he practice of selling certain items of merchandise below cost in order to 
attract patronage is generally a form of deceptive advertising and an unfair 
method of competition in commerce.  Such practice causes commercial 
dislocations, misleads the consumer, works back against the farmer, directly 
burdens and obstructs commerce, and diverts business from dealers who 
maintain a fair price policy.  Bankruptcies among merchants who fail because 
of the competition of those who use such methods result in unemployment, 
disruption of leases, and nonpayment of taxes and loans, and contribute to an 
inevitable train of undesirable consequences, including economic depression.278
273 Supra note 202.
274 Supra note 202. In the petroleum sector, the federal preemption is made explicit (from which one may arguably 
deduce, a contrario, that franchise protection laws in other sectors are not generally preempted).
275 Infra 2.
276 Similarly, First, supra note 253, at 292-293.
277 See supra V.2.c.(ii) in the German context.
278 Policy Statement in the Unfair Sales Act, Wisconsin Stat. § 100.30(1).  See also the wording of the Louisiana statute 
(La. R.S. § 51.422(A)): 
Any advertising, offer to sell, or sale of any merchandise . . . at less than cost as defined . . . with the intent 
or effect of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or 
impairing fair competition and thus injuring public welfare, is unfair competition and contrary to and 
violative of public policy as expressed in this Sub-part, where the result of such advertising, offer or sale 
is to tend to deceive any purchaser or prospective purchaser, or to substantially lessen competition, or to 
unreasonably restrain trade, or to tend to create monopoly in any line of commerce. (Emphasis added)
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Surely, the federal antitrust laws should not preempt a statute that prevents all these 
evils from arising. . . .
2. European Union: Convergence Vel Non
In the EU, the “pre-emption” issue is addressed in a slightly different way.  For a long 
time, Member States were in principle free to adopt and apply national antitrust laws 
that could be stricter or more lenient than the European standards; only where European 
law had made an affirmative choice by “positive action” that certain conduct was 
permissible were the Member States prevented from undermining that choice by 
applying their stricter rules.279  In all other cases, parties had to clear both “barriers,” 
the European competition rules and the national antitrust rules.280  The situation was 
not unlike the situation today in the United States today, although it was arguably 
always easier for the “federal” level to “preempt” stricter national law.281
This changed with effect from May 1, 2004, the date from which Regulation 1/2003 
became applicable. Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003 provides in its first sentence that 
where agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices 
may affect trade between Member States, and EU competition law does not prohibit 
the conduct, Member States may not apply their stricter national laws to prohibit the 
conduct (the so-called convergence rule).  In other words, with regard to vertical and 
horizontal agreements, Member States may apply stricter national law only where the 
conduct also infringes EU law, or where the conduct lacks the capability of affecting 
trade between Member States.  The upshot is that Member States are more or less 
Similarly, the definition of “loss leader” in California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17030).  Generally, see Dougherty, 
supra note 218, at § 2[a] (“Such statutes . . . are aimed at ending ‘loss leader’ selling, which has been defined as 
below-cost sales . . . advertised and made with the intent of luring customers to the store, where they may be 
entrapped into purchasing other goods at marked-up prices that will more than make up for the loss on the ‘leaders.’ ”). 
See also Parish Oil v. Dillon Companies, 523 F.3d 1244, 1254-1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting sources stating 
that loss leaders may mislead consumers in this way, quoting, inter alia, Safeway Stores v. Okla.  Retail Grocers 
Ass’n, 360 U.S. 334, 340 (1959), but noting that “[w]e cite economic literature from the first half of the last century 
because that is when the Colorado legislature enacted the UPA.  We do not mean to suggest that these theories 
would necessarily pass muster under more modern economics.”  Ibid. in footnote 6; the 10th Cir. rejected the 
classification of the gasoline discount that was conditioned on a grocery purchase as a loss leader, ibid. at 1255). 
The same reasoning has been used in Germany by the lobbyist for the brand manufacturer association before the 
parliamentary subcommittee on the question whether to revive the strict sales below cost provision for food 
products in the 2013 amendment to the ARC that had lapsed under a sunset clause.  Andreas Gayk’s submission 
to the subcommittee economic affairs, Protocol 17/74 (June 27, 2012).
279 Case 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt) [1969] ECR 1, establishing the “modified double barriers” approach. 
The Court held that “one and the same agreement may, in principle, be the object of two sets of parallel proceedings, 
one before the Community authorities under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty [now Article 101 TFEU], the other before 
the national authorities under national law” (ibid., at para. 3; this is the “double barriers” part of the so-called 
“modified double barriers” approach—if undertakings wanted to go ahead, they generally needed to clear both the 
EU law hurdle and the national law hurdle).  However, “this parallel application of the national system can only 
be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the Common Market of the 
Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of those rules” (ibid., 
at para. 4; this is the “modification” compared to a “pure” double barriers approach).
280 Ibid.
281 The exact contours of the “positive action” affirmative-choice exception never became clear, but it was widely 
assumed that, for example, the decision to exempt certain conduct in a Block Exemption Regulation would be 
taken to prohibit the application of stricter national antitrust laws to that conduct.
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confined to copying the EU law with regard to vertical and horizontal agreements.282 
The positive consequence is that problems such as the difference between Leegin and 
per se states could not arise in the EU.283  The negative aspect, of course, is that with 
regard to the substantive rules in this area antitrust federalism has ceased to exist.284
The convergence rule does not, however, apply to unilateral conduct.285  In this area, 
Member States are free to legislate for and apply stricter rules to conduct, even where 
this conduct may affect trade between Member States.  As mentioned above,286 this is 
why rules such as the German rules on economic dependency still exist.  These stricter 
national rules on unilateral conduct may be an irritant to undertakings that want to 
draft their business plans on a pan-European scale.  To ensure “a level playing field,” 
the Commission had argued for a convergence rule including unilateral conduct from 
the start,287 and the exclusion of unilateral conduct from the convergence rule was 
merely a compromise with the Member States that insisted on retaining their stricter 
rules.  In a Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission reiterated 
their view that the unilateral-conduct exception and the resulting divergent standards 
in the Member States “fragment business strategies that are typically formulated on a 
pan-European or global basis,” and that the problems caused by this exception “should 
be further examined”.288 
However, the discussion above has hopefully made clear that the troubles with an 
uneven playing field would not end even if the political feat289 of eliminating the 
282 Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 is much more complex than that, but the details are not of concern here.  For details 
see Ulf Böge & Andreas Bardong, in Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure (Günther 
Hirsch, Frank Montag & Franz Jürgen Säcker eds., 2008) at 4-3-074 et seq.; Eddy De Smijter & Lars Kjølbye, The 
Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, in the ec law oF comPetition 2nd edn. (Jonathan Faull & Ali 
Nikpay eds., 2007) at para. 2.43-2-54.
283 Always keeping in mind that EU law treats minimum vertical price fixing as a hardcore restriction, which is not 
quite the same as saying that it is per se prohibited (it may be justifiable in the individual case under Article 101(3) 
TFEU).  A better example would be maximum vertical price fixing: Member States could not start to prohibit 
maximum vertical price fixing where the vertical Block Exemption Regulation 330/2010 applies. 
284 For a recent plea for more antitrust federalism in the EU, see Christopher Townley, Co-ordinated Diversity: 
Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU Law too) social science research network 
(July 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298588.
285 This is generally taken to be the result of the second sentence of Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003, although it is 
already implicit in the wording of the first sentence, the convergence rule itself. For details on the unilateral-conduct 
exception see Böge & Bardong, supra note 282, at 4-3-097 et seq.
286 Supra, text accompanying note 154.
287 Even though Article 3 of the Commission Proposal would not have achieved this result.  Article 3 of the Commis-
sion Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No. 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and 
(EEC) No 3975/87 (‘Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’), COM(2000) 582 final, [2000] 
O.J. C 365 E/284.  But that is another story.
288 communication From the commission to the euroPean Parliament and the council, rePort on the FunctioninG 
oF reGulation 1/2003, COM(2009) 206 final (April 29, 2009) at paras. 22, 43.  For more detail, see commission 
staFF workinG PaPer accomPanyinG the communication From the commission to the euroPean Parliament and 
council - rePort on the FunctioninG oF reGulation 1/2003 {COM(2009)206 final}, SEC(2009) 574 final (29 April 
2009) at paras. 160 et seq., esp. paras. 177-179.
289 It is doubtful that the resistance put up by the Member States in 2002, when Regulation 1/2003 was adopted, can 
be overcome in a revision of Regulation 1/2003.  Cf. Luis Ortiz Blanco & Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, EU 
Competition Law Enforcement: Elements for A Discussion on Effectiveness and Uniformity, in 2011 Fordham 
comP. l. inst. 45, 96-97 (noting that the unilateral conduct exception is seen as a problem by stakeholders, but 
“whereas the EC appears to share this opinion, the extension of the convergence rule to unilateral conduct appears 
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unilateral conduct exception could be achieved.  The reason is that Article 3(2) Regu-
lation 1/2003 only addresses national competition rules.  Article 3(3) Regulation 1/2003 
provides that the convergence rule does not “preclude the application of provisions of 
national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by 
Articles [101 and 102 TFEU],” and Recital 9 elaborates that the convergence rule 
does not preclude Member States from implementing on their territory national 
legislation, which protects other legitimate interests provided that such 
legislation is compatible with general principles and other provisions of 
Community law.  In so far as such national legislation pursues predominantly 
an objective different from that of protecting competition on the market, the 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States may apply such 
legislation on their territory.  Accordingly, Member States may under this 
Regulation implement on their territory national legislation that prohibits or 
imposes sanctions on acts of unfair trading practice, be they unilateral or 
contractual.  Such legislation pursues a specific objective, irrespective of the 
actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on the market.  This 
is particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings from 
imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from 
them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate or without 
consideration.290
The problem, which by now should be obvious, is that functional equivalents from 
areas of law such as “acts on unfair trading practice” may very well interfere with EU 
antitrust law just as much as national antitrust laws.291 
The clearest example to demonstrate this is, once again, prohibitions of sales below 
cost.292  As discussed above, these prohibitions—contained, for example, in § 20(3)2 
nos. 1 and 2 of the German ARC293—have the potential to upset the fine balance, struck 
by the law on predatory pricing abuses by dominant undertakings, between permitting 
aggressive competition with low prices as long as they are not capable of eliminating 
competition, and prohibiting prices that are genuinely predatory.  If the Commission 
succeeded in extending the convergence rule to unilateral conduct, Germany would 
arguably have to let go of these provisions in its antitrust laws.294
not to have enough political support” (citation omitted)).
290 For commentary on Article 3(3) Regulation 1/2003, see, e.g., Smijter & Kjølbye, supra 282, paras. 2.55-2.73. ¶
291 Cf. commission staFF workinG PaPer, supra note 155, para. 181 (“Drawing the borderline appears particularly 
difficult in relation to laws concerning stricter competition rules for unilateral conduct, on the one hand, and laws 
covering unfair trading practices, on the other hand, both of which currently fall outside the scope of the convergence 
rule.”).  For more detail see Hanns Ullrich, Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Trust Law: A Continental 
Conundrum?, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2005/01, social science research network (Feb. 2005), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=837086. 
292 ullrich, ibid.
293 For similar rules in other EU Member States, see commission staFF workinG PaPer, supra note 155, paras. 170-172.
294 Böge & Bardong, supra note 282, at 4-3-023 and 4-3-026 (also pointing to the opposite view which considers the 
sales-below-cost provisions in (now) § 20(3) ARC as provisions which predominantly pursue a different objective).
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However, even if § 20(3) ARC were emasculated by an extended convergence rule, 
nothing much would change: Germany has practically interchangeable rules on sales 
below cost in its rules on unfair trade practices.295  That sales-below-cost prohibitions 
straddle the line between antitrust law and unfair competition laws will also be fami-
liar to the American reader.296  Indeed, the unfair competition rules on sales below cost 
interfere even more with the balance struck by the antitrust—here predatory pricing—
rules: where the German antitrust prohibition at least requires a certain market power, 
the unfair competition rules have an even lower standard.297  Nevertheless, these rules 
would arguably qualify as “provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an 
objective different from that pursued by Articles [101 and 102 TFEU],” precisely 
because they are concerned with effects on individual market participants and do not 
require an effect on competition. 
The problem, in other words, is that bad antitrust rules and non-antitrust rules share 
the characteristic that they are not conditioned on actual or likely effects on compe-
tition.  To use this characteristic in order to distinguish antitrust rules and non-antitrust 
rules, and to allow Member States to apply stricter non-antitrust rules at will, undermines 
the attempt to achieve a level playing field.
The difficulty is that there is no easy solution to avoid this problem.  In order to achieve 
a level playing field and to avoid interference of functional equivalents with well-
balanced antitrust rules, one would have to harmonize ever more fields of law.  One 
could start with a harmonization of unfair competition rules.  However, the question 
then becomes how to distinguish unfair competition rules from contract law rules—
many practices prohibited in one jurisdiction under unfair competition rules are treated 
in another jurisdiction under contract law rules, for example under public policy.  Again, 
we have encountered this in the US context when looking at the unenforceability of 
resale price maintenance in New York and New Jersey.298  Restrictive covenants are 
also often subjected to a double control under antitrust laws and contract law rules, 
for example, both in the United States and in Germany.299  Where a party with mono-
poly power, such as a utility, has reserved itself the right to determine the price 
unilaterally, German contract law provides for judicial review of the exercise of the 
295 The general prohibition in § 4 of the Act against Unfair Trade Practices (UWG) has traditionally been applied to 
sales below costs under certain conditions; see supra note 207. Given Recital 9, it would be difficult to argue that 
that rule does not predominantly pursue a different objective in the meaning of Article 3(3) Regulation 1/2003. 
See Böge & Bardong, supra note 282, at 4-3-023. 
296 See, e.g., the California, Wisconsin and Louisiana statutes, supra note 279.
297 Supra note 226.
298 Supra note 104.
299 See, e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust’s Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal For Dealing with Restrictive Covenants 
Under Federal Law 73 colum. l. rev. 1193 (1973); Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade And 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 669 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 187, 
188; in Germany, see e.g., BGH, March 13, 1979, Case KZR 23/77, neue Juristische wochenschriFt 1605-1606 
(1979); BGH, November 3, 1981, Case KZR 33/80, neue Juristische wochenschriFt 2000 (1982).
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discretion in determining the price,300 leading to a de facto control of exploitative prices 
that may or may not coincide with standards under Article 102 TFEU.301 
Indeed, in the area of unfair trade practices in the business-to-consumer context, the 
EU has attempted to achieve full harmonization, and has again encountered the problem 
discussed here.  The Unfair Commercial Practices (“UCP”) Directive,302 which provides 
for full harmonization can, of course, not fully harmonize all functional equivalents. 
Just as Article 3(3) Regulation 1/2003 cops out by permitting the application of rules 
with a predominantly non-competition objective, the UCP Directive leaves Member 
States free, for example, with regard to their contract law (Article 3(2) UCP Directive), 
health and safety rules (Article 3(3) U.C.P. Directive), and “conditions of establishment 
or of authorisation regimes, or to the deontological codes of conduct or other specific 
rules governing regulated professions in order to uphold high standards of integrity” 
(Article 3(8) UCP Directive).  Recital 7 adds that the Directive “does not address legal 
requirements related to taste and decency which vary widely among the Member 
States,” and mentions that “[c]ommercial practices such as, for example, commercial 
solicitation in the streets, may be undesirable in Member States for cultural reasons. 
Member States should accordingly be able to continue to ban commercial practices . . . 
for reasons of taste and decency even where such practices do not limit consumers’ 
freedom of choice.”  I leave it to the reader to assess how “full” this full harmonization 
really is.
In order to achieve a level playing field, we would not only have to harmonize the 
national antitrust rules, unfair competition rules, and contract law rules, but also tort 
law, commercial law, business regulations, etc.  A harmonization of all these areas 
would not only be infeasible politically but would also be impossible legally, because 
the European Union operates under the principle of conferred competences.  While 
the European Union has legislated in a wide range of areas, its competences are not 
unlimited.
VIII. A Few Tentative Conclusions
Divergent rules in federal systems can lead to severe frictions.  The policy of the federal 
antitrust laws can be completely undermined by state antitrust laws, if there is no 
coordination mechanism.  This is largely the case in the US, even though it should be 
stressed that most states go along with the decisions made by the federal antitrust laws. 
Short of harmonizing the entire legal system on the federal/EU level, there appears no 
300 § 315 of the German Civil Code.
301 BGH, July 5, 2005, Case X ZR 60/04, neue Juristische wochenschriFt 2919, 2920 (2005); BGh, March 28, 2007, 
Case viii Zr 144/06, neue Juristische wochenschriFt 1672, 1674 [17] (stating the principle, but rejecting its 
application where there was no monopoly power because customer had the choice of another provider).  See also 
BGH, July 31, 2013, Case VIII ZR 162/09, BeckRS 2013, 15532 (considering the provider’s wording of a the 
reservation of the unilateral power to determine the price in a boilerplate contract vague and void). 
302 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market . . . , [2005] O.J. L149/22 (the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or UCP Directive).
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entirely principled solution to the problem of divergent rules in federal systems.  Full 
harmonization of the entire legal system is not only legally impossible under the US 
Constitution and the EU Treaties, but would also be undesirable—competition between 
competition systems, testing different rules empirically, is a desirable feature as long 
as we do not know the “objectively best,” or at least “objectively better” rules.303  
This leaves muddling through as an option. Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 is an attempt 
at such muddling through.  Considering there was no experience with or model for 
such a convergence rule, it is not a bad first attempt.  Nevertheless, Article 3 Regula-
tion 1/2003 falls into the two extremes with their respective disadvantages.  With regard 
to unilateral conduct, Member States are completely free to apply stricter law; this 
replicates the problems of the US system.  With regard to horizontal or vertical agree-
ments, however, it leads nearly to full harmonization, leaving virtually no room to 
experiment at all.
There are intermediate solutions.304  One would be to allow the states to act freely as 
long as there are no, or no substantial, externalities on other states.  In the US, the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission recommended that “[s]tate non-merger enfor-
cement should focus primarily on matters involving localized conduct or competitive 
effects.”305  In the EU, Member States are unconstrained by EU competition law to the 
extent that the conduct in question lacks the capability of affecting trade between 
Member States.  An advantage of these approaches to allocate “localized” matters to 
the states, is that the states in these cases have better knowledge of the competitive 
environment, and also that externalities, if any, will be negligible.  However, reducing 
state jurisdiction to only these cases would mean emasculating state antitrust enforce-
ment and the scope for experimentation with better rules. 
With regard to other than localized cases, it seems to me that the approach developed 
by the Court of Justice in the Walt Wilhelm decision has a lot to commend itself: in 
principle, states are free to experiment with their competition laws, but the “parallel 
application of the [state] system can only be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice 
the uniform application” of the federal/EU rules.306  To me, this combines very nicely 
the advantages of a competition of competition laws with the advantages of uniformity. 
The question then becomes, of course, under what circumstances the state enforcement 
does prejudice the uniform application of federal/EU law, and who should decide that 
this is the case.
This contribution has shown that, first, the importance of the law in action, including 
state antitrust enforcement, should be acknowledged, and, secondly, that the federal/
EU legislator (or, failing that, the courts) should be much more precise in specifying 
the extent to which they want to achieve convergence, and to what extent they want 
303 See, e.g., Townley, supra note 284.
304 First, supra note 253, at 286-291.
305 AMC, supra n. 185, at 187; see also ibid. at 192, 196-197.
306 Supra note 279.  
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antitrust federalism to play a role.  If the federal decision to treat resale price mainte-
nance under a rule of reason is to be given effect, somebody with the requisite compe-
tence would have to clarify that conflicting state law is preempted.  If the convergence 
rule in Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 were to be extended to unilateral conduct, one 
would have to bear in mind that this would not only eliminate rules on economic 
dependency (arguably a desirable effect), but also would affect rules that could catch 
conduct aimed at collusion, such as prohibitions of invitations to collude.  The EU 
competition rules have no § 5 FTC Act to address the gap between concerted practices 
and unilateral conduct, and one should arguably not eliminate national rules addressing 
this gap without considering the implications. 
Even with regard to rules on economic dependency, whose elimination I would gene-
rally welcome very much, one has to bear in mind that these rules may have some 
residual desirable functions.  One such function may be as a facilitator of private 
enforcement.  In civil law jurisdictions, access to evidence rules are often underdeve-
loped.  For a private plaintiff it is well-nigh impossible to prove dominance without 
discovery or disclosure, and civil law jurisdictions do not usually provide for extensive 
access to evidence in their civil procedure laws.  To the extent that economic dependency 
rules catch truly abusive conduct by dominant undertakings, they may serve the useful 
function of allowing private enforcement against conduct that in reality is, but could 
not procedurally be proven to be, an abuse of a dominant position.  Of course, it would 
be better if the national systems addressed the evil at its root, and instead provided for 
a procedural solution to a procedural problem, in order to avoid the many type I errors 
that go with the extension of unilateral conduct rules to non-dominant undertakings.307 
As long as this switch to a procedural solution is not made, however, the economic-
dependency rules may have a modicum of value as a functional equivalent for effective 
access to evidence rules.  With regard to the protection of transaction-specific invest-
ments, as well, the economic-dependency rules may serve some useful purpose.  Again, 
it would be preferable to treat it as the contract-law problem that it is; but before a 
convergence rule eliminates the provisions seeking to protect such investments, one 
would have to decide whether one wants to eliminate the protection of those investments 
or whether they should be protected by other means. 
One last observation.  The bulk of this contribution has portrayed antitrust laws on the 
state level as an undesirable irritant to the “gold standard” of the antitrust rules on the 
federal/EU level.  While I have pointed to several instances where this is arguably true, 
I do not want to suggest (or be seen as suggesting) that this is generally the case.  I do 
believe there is value in competition between competition systems, and between 
different competition enforcement systems.  In particular in the EU, where the compe-
tition rules on the Union level are fragmentary and do not have any emergency gap-
fillers such as § 5 FTC Act, there is value in retaining a system of antitrust federalism. 
As always, discovering the best—or at least better—rules by relying on competition 
may be more wasteful than the immediate adoption of the system that is known to be 
307 See now the commission ProPosal, supra note 229.
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the most efficient system.  Relying on regulatory competition and soft convergence, 
aided by networks of enforcers,308 may mean that we have to put up for a certain time 
with inefficient rules such as economic dependency rules on the Member State level. 
The worst thing that could happen, however, would be to entrench an undesirable rule 
on the federal/EU level.  Imagine the effects the entrenchment of economic dependency 
rules would have on the EU level—and then read the Green Paper on Unfair Trading 
Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe.309
I would, however, like to end on a positive note: the Green Paper gives Bill Kovacic 
ample opportunity to apply to the European Union his considerable skills in antitrust 
advocacy.  I look forward to watching and learning.
308 For a proposal of a “Domestic Competition Network” between the various antitrust enforcers in the United States 
in analogy to the International Competition Network, see kovacic, supra note 7. From a comparative EU/United 
States perspective, see Firat Cengiz, Management of Networks Between the Competition Authorities in the EC and 
the U.S.: Different Polities, Different Designs, 3 Eur. Competition J. 413-436 (2007).
309 euroPean commission, Green PaPer on unFair tradinG Practices in the Business-to Business Food and non-Food 
suPPly chain in euroPe, COM(2013) 37 final (January 31, 2013). 
In the wake of William E. Kovacic Liber Amicorum  - An Antitrust Tribute - Volume I, 
this Volume II provides, in the European tradition of  Liber Amicorum,  27 contributions 
from 37 prominent authors spanning various antitrust topics across the world. 
In this Volume II, the authors pay tribute to Bill Kovacic’s antitrust career tackling 
issues such as the international convergence and cooperation, agencies performance 
and effectiveness, cartels criminalization, vertical restraints, leniency policies, etc. 
Volume II sheds a light over the antitrust law world offering a unique combination 
of theoretical insights, practical knowledge, together with some more personal 
remarks on Bill Kovacic’s antitrust career.
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